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The question posed is this: In the wake of the "deconstruction" of
Continental Philosophy (from Nietzsche and Heidegger to Derrida
and Foucault) and the "pragmatization" of Anglo-American
Philosophy (from James and Dewey to Rorty), what sort of genre
of writing is Philosophy? A selective history is narrated to
illustrate the alliances between sophism and traditional rhetoric
(from Gorgias and Protagoras through Cicero and Quintilian);
between rhetoric and classical American pragmatism (Peirce,
James and Dewey); between contemporary pragmatism (Rorty)
and contemporary continental philosophy (Derrida); and between
contemporary literary criticism (Fish) and "post-modern"
aesthetics. It is proposed that these alliances form a coherent
narrative which exemplifies a form of rapprochement in the
aestheticization of philosophy's own discourses and texts. It is
argued that the consequence of this shift, from reading philosophy
as foundational for the other inquiries culture institutes to reading
it as rhetoric, is to see the genre of philosophy as an art, as a set of
texts which contributes to the plurality of relativistic discourses
which we construct for particular critical purposes: constructed
not as mirrors of Truth, but as useful and persuasive social
dramas.
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PRAGMATIC RHETORIC AND THE ART OF PHILOSOPHY
1.1 INTRODUCTION:
The question posed is this: In the wake of the "deconstruction" of
Continental Philosophy (from Nietzsche and Heidegger to Derrida
and Foucault) and the "pragmatization" of Anglo-American
Philosophy (from James and Dewey to Rorty — among, of course,
others), what sort of genre of writing is Philosophy? A selective
history will be narrated to illustrate the alliances between
traditional rhetoric and contemporary pragmatism; between
pragmatism and contemporary continental philosophy; between
contemporary literary criticism and "post-modern" aesthetics, in
order to exemplify a form of rapprochement in the
aestheticization of Philosophy's own discourses and texts. Also
posed will be the question of the consequences of this shift from
reading Philosophy as foundational for the other inquiries culture
institutes to reading it as an art which contributes to the plurality
of relativistic ' but interrelated discourses which we construct for
particular critical purposes.
Firstly: The strategy offered will propose that the way we test
philosophical texts is to assess them not in terms of their
correspondence to something external to themselves (Truth), but
to assess them through internalist comparison, testing them in
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rhetorical and pragmatic ways, reading them in ways which ask
them to dramatize their usefulness in terms of the power of the
stories they tell, and relative to the epistemological allegories
which support and structure those stories. Theories are, as James
put it, "instruments, not answers..." The critical question thereby
becoming not only: "what can the instrument do?," but in a
stylistically reflexive way: "how is the instrument put together?."
In other words, the question will be framed within a literary
theoretical and pragmatic corpus of criticism; both of which
presently show an enormous amount of convergence in
attempting to sustain, theoretically and practically, the
foregrounding of an interest in the construction of texts rather
than the discovery of Truth, testing them not as if "the mirror of
nature" (Rorty: 1980) but as useful and persuasive metaphors, as
rhetoric.
Secondly: Philosophy, when read as rhetoric, as art, raises the
question not only of what sort of art philosophy is, but also the
question of how philosophers talk about and use art (write
aesthetics). That is, it poses the question of how aesthetics
functions as a way to establish (often covertly) a philosophical
discourse as an important arbiter in our understanding of the
world and of the arts — usually considered as second order
"representations" of the world. In other words, the genre of
"aesthetics" will be considered as a function of how philosophers
understand themselves in contradistinction to the arts --
especially literature.
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Chronologically, though, the debate can be most productively
located nearer its original offspring, in the conflict between
rhetoric and Dialectic, between, for example, Gorgias and Plato.
Only after this historical conflict between the pragmatics of
civilian rhetoric and the foundation-seeking of Dialectics has been
presented (in chapter 2) will it be productive and possible to
present a streamlined version of the contributions of classical and
contemporary pragmatism and contemporary literary criticism-
theory as they bear on the issues of the aestheticization of
philosophy and the question of genre (in chapters 3, 4 and
following). (Although the reading offered of the classical
background will already play back into the historical narrative the
voice of Dewey (and to some extent, Derrida) as a strategy for
ordering the debate and its consequences for what follows.) As
Protagoras always asked to hear two sides to every story, or
indeed two stories, the philosopher is advised to be able to tell
more than one story about himself. He is no longer, like a 19th-
century novelist (or Philosopher), an omniscient narrator of one
single plot, with an obvious beginning and end; nor does he
operate within one stabilized style (aesthetic) of writing (like a
philosophical artisan mimetically reproducing givens provided by
the tradition). In other words, the suggestion (and analogy) will
be that pragmatic and post-modern philosophers, like their
artistic contemporaries, rewrite (narrate) their traditions to suit
the present purposes of an essenceless and changing genre.
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1.2 WRITING TEXTS:
First, a directional quotation:
"Plato's generation would, I think, have found it difficult to
class Plato. Was he an inept visionary or a subtle
dialectician? A political reformer or a founder of the new
type of literary art? Was he a moral exhorter, or an
instructor in an Academy? Was he a theorist upon
education, or the inventor of a method of knowledge? We,
looking at Plato through the centuries of exposition and
interpretation, find no difficulty in placing Plato as a
philosopher and in attributing to him a system of thought.
We dispute about the nature and content of this system, but
we do not doubt it is there. It is the intervening centuries
which have furnished Plato with his technique and which
have developed and wrought Plato to a system.."1
Dewey wrote this about our reception of Plato while talking about
Emerson, whom he considered to be a 19th-century example of a
thinker/poet who constructively blurred the sorts of distinctions
Dewey himself mentions, and which philosophers tend to
construct to explain what it is they do. And by way of introduction
it helps open up and yet organize some of the parameters of our
question: What is it that makes us consider philosophy as a
distinctive literary genre?; how did (does) the pragmatic tradition
understand this question?; and, a third strategy I wish to sketch:
how does the analogy with the literary, the rhetorical and
aesthetic help clarify what one might consider to be this peculiar
type of writing?
1 Dewey, 1903 (cited in J. Ratner, 1957.)
5
I want to offer, firstly, as a descriptive device, for interpretational
convenience, an assessment of this classical and contemporary
opposition between writing literature and writing philosophy, a
view of its persistence, and, hence, a view of what Philosophy
(even so-called Philosophy of Art, or Aesthetics) is. I propose to
do this under the general and not yet very explanatory rubric:
"Philosophy and/as/of Literature" (Danto, 1985: More on Danto's
rhetoric in chapter 6.). The opposition, duality, or perhaps
paradox I have in mind is Philosophy's search, on the one hand, to
find the given, the true, the real, and distinguish these from the
made, the constructed, fictitious and/or false. The search is to
find the ground or foundation of things behind our language, or
languages or other cultural artifices, which our most trusted and
refined Philosophical languages better mirror, or accurately
represent or, even more hopefully, to which they correspond. The
opposition, then, is between the given and the media we use
(language, sight, touch) to get at the given. The structure of
philosophy is, or has been most often, then, the setting up of this
oppositional tension, and then the attempt to overcome it.
Perhaps we (that is, the true Philosopher) might overcome it by a
trip to 5th-century Athens, that is, by Platonic ascension to a third
meta-point (to the Forms) mystically uninfected by mere opinion
and the imperfect copies of language. Another strategy might be
to posit an introspective/intuitionist technique by which we, in
17th-century France, reflect our way behind the opposition -- the
oppositional distinction between needing either absolute certainty
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or fearing skepticism (this, with a little help from the still-
neoplatonic Descartes). With a little Kantian ingenuity we might, in
18th-century Prussia, see things in terms of a different set of
fundamentally unbridgable gaps; in effect, we might see the world
in opposition, or contrast, to our ways of construing it, in contrast
to our categories of rationality and understanding; that is, by
opposing things in themselves to their appearance in, or
construction by, thought, (by opposing noumena to phenomena).
Or we might, in 20th-century Vienna, return to objects in the
search for constraints that language can't avoid when it wants to
say something sensible. What all of these pictures postulate, as
consolation for the difficulty of holding onto the Truth, is the
rational philosophical Subject as purveyer of the ontological
structure of the world, of thought, and of the language in which
the dilemma is dramatized. The production of, and "need" for, the
"professional philosopher" is the consequence of such dualisms.
These little prolegomenal caricatures are simply attempts to begin
to fill in a picture of Philosophy as that form of intellectual work
where big stories have been told about big fundamental gaps,
gaps between our worldly investigative strategies and the Truth,
between the way we have been doing things at some point and
the way things really are when we see and/or philosophize
"clearly," "in the light of reason" — to use some ocular metaphors.
Philosophy is, then, the construction of new and hopefully better
ways of writing about why the old ways didn't quite get us to the
Truth. The paradox which supports this form of writing is the
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metaphysical and/or epistemological belief that we are finally
getting things right, leaning on the right something,2 that we are
learning to know better, (as if we could compare this writing to
what we don't yet know, in order to know we're improving and
getting closer to "it"). Yet, this belief conjoins itself also with the
historical view that all our vocabularies thus far seem, at best, to
have been or be provisional, perspectival. (I will try to clarify this
paradox by retrieving and reformulating it further as we go.)
So, is Philosophy a genre of writing about Truth? Or is this, Truth,
the sort of thing, as the Pragmatists have said, about which there
is not much of interest to be said? A different way to ask the
question is: what is it that is useful, true, interesting or deep about
saying that there is something in common between the in-some-
sense-true sentences: "Plato wrote Gorgias," "2 + 3 = 5,"
"democracy is better than tyranny," and "the grass is green"?
What essence of interest could these sentences have that is worth
worrying about, or asking a particular discipline called Philosophy
to explain? But, it is the history of just such attempts which has
most often been considered to constitute that genre we call
Philosophy — instituted by Plato, its founder, and reissued more
recently by Descartes, Kant and Carnap, his successors. (So, as the
reader sees already, the present narrative will be playing off two
stories: Philosophy as writing about what is Truth, and philosophy
2 James writes that, in contrast to the Truth, "the essential service of
humanism ... is to have seen that tho one part of our experience may lean
upon another part to make it what it is in any one of several aspects in
which it may be considered, experience as a whole is self-containing and
leans on nothing." (1909:124)
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as writing about what is pragmatically useful at a given time.
And I will be following James' skepticism, Dewey's indifference
and Rorty's practice regarding the "P" as opposed to the "p" when
referring to these different philosophical practices.)
In the 19th century the issue of Truth, and, hence, philosophy,
squared off into another institutional opposition: between
"transcendental Philosophy" and "empirical Philosophy," between
"Platonists" and "positivists" (Rorty, 1982:xv), i.e., between those
philosophers who thought that to be a human subject and rational
was to have a foot beyond space and time, requiring belief in
things invisible to natural science, and those philosophers who
insisted that space and time make up the only Reality there is. Of
course this is hopelessly vague. The point is that it is the totalizing
universality of the claims, and the inevitable opposition to an
Other that makes them both Philosophical. What the
transcendentalist "saw" as spiritual and primary, the empiricist
"saw" as emotional and secondary. And what the latter (the
empiricist) "saw" as the pre-eminence of hard fact, the former
"saw" as hardly the whole or most eminent side to the story. They
both had a different view (using the same metaphorics of vision)
of what is True and, therefore, of what is Philosophy.
The oppositional "structure"3 I'm tracking down can be formulated
in countless ways: as a dispute between idealists (things are in
the mind) and realists (no, they are in the world), or subjectivists
3 I am not yet wanting to refer to Structuralist structures.
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versus objectivists, transcendentalists versus materialists,
platonists versus positivists, theologians versus historicists, belief
versus verificationism, socialism versus capitalism.4 We needn't
here decipher all the intricacies of these oppositional loyalties, but
simply highlight that in the 19th and early 20th centuries most
philosophers would claim loyalty to one side or the other. They
knew where they stood. And the totalizations of the claims by
both sides in cosmological opposition is what preserved their
commerce and debate with each other, thereby standing for what
Philosophy was. What the pragmatists began to suggest was that
the statements: "this is True" or "this is Philosophical," were empty
metaphysical compliments, overly generous rhetorical pats on the
back to different styles of inquiry, and troublesome if taken
absolutely seriously. (To rhetoric, I will return shortly.)
This line of attack by the 19th-century Nietzsche, on the continent,
and James, in Boston, became a 20th-century amendment to what
we have thus far characterized as bona fide Philosophy. It
became a part of this textual tradition of setting up grand
ontological opposites to criticize the setting up of these opposites
in the first place — opposites like the mind over and against the
body, freedom versus determinism. Imagining one side without
the other seemed unintelligible. They needed each other. Each
4 I refer to this opposition because its difference from the others helps
illustrate its similarity. The l^^-century opposition between socialism and
capitalism illustrates, perhaps more obviously than the others, the mixing
of evaluative and social agendas with appeals to foundations (like "human
nature") as the device for universalizing the claims to Truth of one position
over and against the other. And much of the dispute traded on some of the
aforementioned oppositions too.
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side was constituted by its contrast with the other; so, dramatizing
the opposition as an eternal struggle working toward the final
victory of one seemed counter-productive and useless. This is
what connects Gorgias, James and Dewey, and Nietzsche, Foucault
and Rorty -- the opinion that there is no cosmological fight
between true knowledge on the one hand and social practice on
the other, between our true selves and our conventions.
Knowledge is what powerful practices put there, and rhetoric is
the practice which persuades us to keep or change what we've
become. (More about the comparative values and styles of these
rhetoricians in the following chapters.)
For Nietzsche, the aphorism, the treatise, and the drama were all
settings .for perspectival philosophical expression, as
demonstration of the power of the story as the co-maker of truth,
a power which manoeuvres and gives meaning to the discreet and
isolated noun or fact. For Nietzsche, constructs, metaphors were
the "forgotten" or suppressed foundations to all systems of Truth,
their fluidity having later become frozen in order to stand as that
foundation.5 The analytic tradition too began to take itself apart
in a similar (of course less hyperbolic) fashion, with Wittgenstein
ridiculing and satirizing his earlier self of the Tractatus (and
others) with the dry (occasionally melancholic) wit of his
aphorisms and parables about Philosophy which tries, with the
use of an opposition (between things and grammars, or
"intuitions" and grammars) to get behind language (paradoxically,
in terms of the grammatical conventions and metaphorics of sights
and feels).6 This dissimulation continues with Quine criticizing the
5 "What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies,
anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which became
poetically and rhetorically intensified, meta^morphosed, adorned, and
after long usage, seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding; truths are
illusions of which one had forgotten that they are illusions; worn out
metaphors which have become powerless to affect the senses (die
abgeniinzt und sinnlich kraftlos geworden sind), . . ." Nietzsche, "Uber
Wahrheit und Liige im auBermoralischen Sinne," Werke. Band V, Hanser,
1980:314; trans. "On Truth and Lies in their Extra-moral Sense" in Complete
Works of Nietzsche. Ed. Levy, p.180. This has become a communal and
hopefully not over-quoted piece, used (perhaps "abgeniitzt") by both post-
structualist Derrida ("White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of
Philosophy," 1982:217), and Paul de Man (The Rhetoric of Romanticism.
1984:239, & Allegories of Reading, 1979:110), and by pragmatists Rorty
("Solidarity or Objectivity?," 1985:14), and J. Margolis, ("Deconstruction; or
The Mystery of the Mystery of the Text," 1983:xxxiii).
6 Nor are these totally different traditions. The dense and acute aphorism
as technique, as aesthetic/philosophical form (of both Nietzsche and
Wittgenstein), frustrates the System as the final product, as the conclusive
and revelatory justifyer of usage, as the justification or explanation of
what are practical "forms of life" (p.226). Wittgenstein, too, notes "The
queer resemblance between a philosophical investigation . . . and an
aesthetic one." (Culture and Value. 1980.) Wittgenstein's Investigations
also echo Nietzsche in regarding grammar and convention as the supports
for pseudo problems: and the links between them are quite direct. For
Nietzsche, so long as there was grammar there would be essentialists and
theologians, philosophical aggrandizers of linguistic convention.
Wittgenstein later writes: "Essence is expressed by grammar" (#371).
"Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology is grammar)."
(#373). The dryness, rather than the hyperbole, of Wittgenstein's wit is
evident when he sees . . . "[a] whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a
drop of grammar." (The tone of the German is much more ironic: "Eine
ganze Wolke von Philosophie kondensiert zu einem Tropfchen
Sprachlehre." (p. 356). (My italics). Wittgenstein, 1976 (English); 1971
(German).
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assumptions of positivist Carnap, breaking down the ontologized
distinction between the analytic and synthetic;7 with Davidson
deconstructing the dualistic opposition between scheme and
content;8 and (more importantly for my purposes) with Goodman
working from his earlier logical conventionalism (The Structure of
Appearance, also to escape Carnap) toward his full-blown and
aestheticized relativism (Ways of Worldmaking). And more
recently Derrida and Rorty are two philosophers who appeal most
to irony and satire as a technique for reminiscing about the
tradition (Continental and Anglo-American), for loosening the hold
of the tradition's oppositions on our ability to take up new
subjects and new ways of talking; and they do this by offering
literary/philosophical, or rhetorical readings of great texts --
indeed, as we read, one of Dewey's suggestions. So, the dogmas of
positivist empiricism became discredited with the same speed as
those of their opposition, the transcendentalists. Philosophy
became more pragmaticized. We ended up with some highly
technical and professionalized texts, but no orthodoxy; with a lot
of history and tradition, but no absolute Truth; with a lot of
important philosophical artifacts and critical contributions to the
way our culture has coped with itself and reality's many
entailments, but not with a mirror of nature or reality, itself
uninfected by the culture which copes through such reflections.
7 Cf. especially Quine, 1963.
8 Davidson, 1973.
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1.3 THE HISTORICAL SETUP:
What I wish to do is to relocate the historical tension between,
say, writing about the True and/or pragmatic writing, between
Philosophy and/or literature, prior to the aestheticizations of
Nietzsche and James in the presocratics and sophists. In effect,
one might locate the origins of the genre of pragmatic philosophy
with the rhetoricians. Rather than attempting, like the
Dialectician, to hold language in one hand and Reality or Truth in
the other and then, by sleight of hand (or pen), fictionalize a third
meta-point from which to adjudicate the fit, the rhetorician held
some language in one hand and more language in the other, and
compared them to see which was more persuasive, not by
veridical "correspondence" to an Other up there, but horizontally,
in terms of which set of sentences would help most in achieving
the desired purposes; not in the eyes (under the gaze) of the
Forms or the Absolute, but in the eyes of the Athenian Senate.
Gorgias (of Plato's dialogue of the same name) spoke to the Senate,
and Plato to an Academy of speculative Philosophers. (These are
significantly different social locations from which to argue.)
Rhetoric served a democratic forum, and Dialectic the more
authoritarian structure of the as-yet-unformed Republic. Plato
polemicized against Gorgias, Protagoras and Isocrates (as did
Aristotle) with the use of what he was denying -- rhetoric. (I
mention Isocrates because he had an academy too — of rhetoric.)
While rhetoric could "only" (thought Plato) appeal to assent,
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Philosophy wanted the "Truth." Plato was, of course, so aware of
the art (of poetics and its offspring in sophistic rhetoric) that he
banned it from the Republic, banning what he himself used to
such great effect. He talks of the purity of the True and the Good,
but exploits the rhetorical forms of the day to do so: the dramatic
dialogue, irony, satire, and other sophistic tools.9
Aristotle, with a less metaphysical turn of mind, wanted facts over
rhetorical and persuasive stories, solid nouns over the
embellishments of metaphors and Forms -- (more oppositions).
But the rhetoricians, as often in the courts as in the classroom, saw
that what was crucial was in whose story which of the facts
appeared, how they were marshalled, and for whose benefit.
They saw how manipulable was the evidence which Aristotle
sought to make the ground of systematic Philosophy. They
understood the situation not as an ontological choice between facts
and/or stories, nouns and/or pictures, images and metaphors; it
was, rather, a question of how best to wield the two together for
the right purpose — Plato in service to the Forms, the rhetorician
in service of free speech, in a very public form; not, therefore, in
the form of a Socratic and extremely private dialogue between
ascending and essentially unworldly souls. (I'm thinking here of
the "Meno," which exemplifies a style less interested in forms of
social change than in metaphysical conversion by a form of
9 And Plato's antipathy has not merely to do with the metaphysics of Virtue.
The sophists became more threatening as they became a professional class
and successful teachers of rhetoric. Plato, for example, refers thirty-one
times to the sophists' earnings. Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, The Sophists. 1971:33 &
36.
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discourse.) In contrast, the sophists thought of philosophy as
involving different forms, of discourse, to be compared in the
interest of public policy -- (another link between the classical and
the pragmatic, especially Dewey). Rhetoric was, to the "free man"
of Athens, a primarily social and liberal art, not the discovery of
absolute Truth.
Gorgias, speaking of Helen of Troy, said "she acted as she did
either (i) by a combination of chance, necessity, and the will of the
gods, or (ii) because she was abducted by force, or (iii) because
she was seduced by persuasion . . . Persuasion by speech is on a
par with abduction by force: . . The power of speech over the
disposition of the soul is comparable with the effect of drugs on
the disposition of the body." Remembering also, of course, that "in
contending against adversaries, destroy their seriousness with
laughter and their laughter with seriousness."10 (We can easily
hear an anticipation of Nietzsche's laughter, hyperbole and
mockery of the gods, Foucault's more haunting links between
discourse, power and the body, and Plato's irritation at the light-
hearted textualization of the soul, open, here, to the ephemeral
persuasions of the dandy.) Part of the conflict between Gorgias
and Plato was that they were both close readers of poetry, and
knew its conventions, its power to seduce. But Gorgias wanted to
use it to good effect, while Plato feared its negative potential to
mislead. Gorgias spoke not about true belief, but, like James much
later, about the will to believe, using (perhaps) the rhetoric of the
10 Wheelwright, 1966:248-250.
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True and the Good for that which is good in the way of belief
(James, 1907( 1981 a):42).
The opposition (the point of our first set of caricatures) which the
Dialecticians (also the positivists) and followers used in order to
relegate the rhetorician was to oppose nature to convention, or, in
Greek, physis (nature) to nomos (literally, "law", or all man-made
institutions and conventions). This opposition between nature (or
something given) and convention (or something man-made) is
recapitulated and continuously rehearsed in Plato's "Form" and
Aristotle's fact versus man-made metaphor or art, in Kant's
(indeed quite different) noumenal thing-in-itself versus the
phenomenal as we construct it, in Ayer's opposition between the
empirical and the emotive and moral, between the verifiable and
the sentimental. But also, and perhaps more subtly, the very
notions of style, of the aesthetic, of sentiment, have been used
throughout the tradition to classify and exclude or marginalize
texts as unPhilosophical, as belonging to a different class of
writing.11 Or, these notions (of the aesthetic, of style) have been
dignified only by becoming "categories" under the scrutiny of a
Philosophy (like Kant's). (More on this issue also in the following
chapters.) But, as James remarks while reproaching his neo-
kantian colleagues: "The enormous esteem professed by all
philosophers for the conceptual form of consciousness is easy to
understand. From Plato's time downwards it has been held to be
11 Cf., for example, A. O. Rorty, 1983:545-564 on how designating a style has
functioned as a method of excluding a form of language from the "truly"
philosophical.
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our sole avenue to essential truth."!2 James' question, like that of
the Athenian rhetorician, is no longer: what is the single truth, and
which concept captures it?, but what is true relative to these
circumstances, needs and words?. This is, as Sellars put it, "an
attempt to see how things, in the broadest possible sense of the
term, hang together, in the broadest possible sense of the term." 13
Cicero, of course, tried, in the broadest sense of the term, to bring
together the Philosophical and the rhetorical, knowledge and
purposeful convention, as did Dewey in our quotation (p. 4). And
this is one of the connections I wish to make: "What is
Philosophy?" is the same question as: "How do we read Plato?". We
can read him as the visionary, the politician, the writer, moralist,
educator, epistemologist, and as the carefully wrought product of
an institution which has highlighted, and in so doing, developed
the System, and proceeded to offer critical re-readings of that
system. But all of these ways of reading (as the rhetorical
tradition of Cicero and Quintilian too will recommend) are
legitimately philosophical and un-philosophical, (non-Kantian)
aesthetic judgements, involving different genres and a mixing of
genres, no longer in Metaphysical opposition to each other and
vying for position in an ontological/epistemological game of
foundational one-upmanship. (More on the role of a theory of
reading in the construction of the philosophical genre in chapters
4 and 5.)
12 James, 1909a (1981b):247.
!3 Cited by Rorty, 1982:xiv.
18
Plato, of course, sets Philosophy up in terms of an ethically
austere version of the arts, of the art of rhetoric, of all plurality.
In the Apology, for example, an early work, Socrates (that is, his
dramatic persona) is in the court room, embodying the tension
between being a court orator for his own defense and a truth-
teller for the sake of Dialectic. And it is in the Gorgias. Protagoras
and Phaedrus dialogues where one finds both descriptive and
polemical discussions of (sophistic) rhetoric: about which Gorgias
himself is reported to have said: "How well Plato knows how to
satirize!"14 In other words, Plato was not representing the "true"
Gorgias with mimetic fidelity, he was interpreting him in service
of Dialectic; and he concluded with the opposition that because
Gorgias has such a high estimation of rhetoric, he must have a low
one of knowledge. The pragmatic function and ubiquity of
rhetoric becomes, thereby, obscured because of "Socrates'"
insistence on the necessity of True knowledge. But the
paradoxical role and power of rhetoric is reinforced through the
back door, through the use of humor, techniques of irony, satire
and caricature, by rhetorical appeal to mystical pathos, myth,
allegory, and later, to a tongue-in-cheek comparison of rhetoric to
the art of cooking, i.e., the art of cheap pleasure.
The Gorgias is a useful preliminary illustration of several literary/
philosophical themes. It occurs early in Plato's literary career,
hence before a fully formed Philosophical and metaphysical
system is evident. And Plato's literary style in this instance
14 Cited in Kennedy, 1980:45.
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depends upon the employment of myth for the conveyance of
"truth" on topics where logically centered processes of dialectical
exchange are not applicable. In other words, he is still the
exploring writer/thinker, oscillating between a reliance on a
"chain of argument" (p. 119) and putting his "faith in [a] story" (p.
147). But either way, his intention is to drive an epistemological
wedge between oratory and having specific expertise (p. 32),
between rhetorical "pandering" (i.e., appealing to gratification) and
"knowing" the "rational" (p. 44). Plato's Socrates is out to
construct a thoroughgoing opposition between what takes place in
appealing to a popular audience -- pandering — as opposed to
orchestrating a private dialogue. This is, for Socrates, an
opposition between "convincing" and "instructing" (p. 32): because
having the "knack" (to convince, or cook) is to engage in an
activity which has "no rational account to give of the nature of the
various things which it offers. (My italics.) I refuse, (follows
Socrates), to give the title art to anything irrational" (p. 46.). That
is, one must "know the nature of a thing" or be classed as
irrational, unable to "instruct." One must be an "expert" in a form
of knowledge or a "panderer." But Socrates' analogue, that oratory
is to philosophy what cookery is to medicine, (i.e., knack rather
than knowledge), illustrates not simply Plato's epistemological
agenda, but also his political bitterness and his blurring of
epistemological and sociological discourses. In other words,
Socrates' attack on the orator is an attack on the politician without
specific and expert knowledge of the good: it is an attack on
Athenian democracy. The issue is statesmanship, about which
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Socrates modestly says: "I believe that I am one of the few
Athenians -- perhaps indeed there is no other -- who studies the
genuine art of statemanship, and that I am the only man now
living who puts it into practice" (p. 140). Is this self-praise an
argument or faith in a story? Whatever the category or class of
statement, it hardly seems a basis in terms of which one could
separate rhetoric and philosophy, convincing and instructing.
Gorgias says, on the contrary, that the rhetorician's job is to give
"instruction intending that it should be put to a good use . . ." (p.
35. My italics.):15 Implying that "good use" is not something
about which one can have absolute and prior knowledge as to "its
rational nature." The pragmatists will repeat this refrain.
The Protagoras dialogue extends some of the same themes and
gives the sophists a more thorough and challengingly persuasive
voice. (One might even say that Socrates comes over looking like
a metaphysical quibbler, engaging in several mischievous shifts
and irresolutions of argument, less urbane and rhetorically
consistent than Protagoras, certainly more bullying and therefore
ironically raising (I think) the credibility of the sophists'
positions.) The dialogue, qua dialogue, also raises more questions
as to the relationship between rhetoric and Philosophy in the
establishment of a philosophical genre.
15 All references from Gorgias. Penguin Classics edition, 1985, translation
and introduction by Walter Hamilton.
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1. Firstly, with respect to virtue, its "metaphysical nature," and
whether it can be taught, Socrates wishes to push an
epistemologically centered thesis that to imitate it (virtue) one
must first know its nature. Protagoras' retort is practical.
Imitation is itself a behavioral category: we are "inspired to
imitate" good examples, not by knowing the one metaphysical
identity of all virtues or by knowing a universal "thing" called
virture by proxy of a special mastery of an ontological form of
knowledge, but by comparative example. In other words,
Protagoras opts for aesthetic and social education rather than
metaphysics, for the use of music and poetry as ways of
"familiarizing the minds of the children with the rhythms and
melodies" of civilization (p. 57).16 Protagoras is not simply
appealing to the content of poetry or music: he is making several
methodological points, and by analogy to the aesthetic. Protagoras
asks: You are "surprised that virtue should be teachable, and
puzzled to know whether it is? The wonder would be if it were
not teachable.
"Why then, you ask, do many sons of good men turn out
worthless?" His answer-by-analogy is that they can fail to be
virtuous just as one can fail to be a good flute-player even when
one has had a good teacher (pp. 58-59). In other words, it is not a
question of metaphysical knowledge but of practice and aptitude.
The second methodological analogy, to practice, pedagogy and skill
over metaphysical knowledge as the crucial issue in the teaching
of virtue, is Protagoras' reference to our many teachers rather
1^ All references from Protagoras. Penguin Classics edition, 1986,
translation and introduction by W. K. C. Guthrie.
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than Socrates' insistence on the one true knower. Because "all are
teachers of virtue to the best of their ability, . . . you [Socrates]
think that no one is. In the same way if you asked who teaches
the Greek language you would not find anyone; . . (p. 59).
Protagoras' point is a relativizing and comparative one; our
success vis-a-vis virtue "and everything else" is that we try to
"find someone only a little better than the others at advancing us .
. ." (p. 60. My italics.) And with this discourse, Protagoras offers
simultaneously his view of virtue and of the rhetorical genre by
which such things are best discussed: in terms of "both the
parable and the argument," by persuasion and comparison, in
terms of art, good taste and disputation together, (p. 60)
2. Also important in this regard is Protagoras' shift (p. 72) from
answerer to questioner, from metaphysics to literary criticism,
from our identity as knowers to our skill as readers of poetry: (A
test which Socrates fails rather miserably.) "In my view Socrates,
the most important part of a man's education is to become an
authority on poetry. This means being able to criticize the good
and bad points of a poem with understanding, to know how to
distinguish them, and give one's reasons when asked. My
question to you . . . will concern the subject of . . . virtue, but
transferred to the realm of poetry." (The discussion centers on a
poem by Simonides.)17
I7 One should recall here that the poetry being referred to involved public
performances (rather than private texts), that the sophists were
themselves in this tradition of the poets and rhapsodes and saw themselves
as their educational successors. Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie's The Sophists, 1971:
esp.42 & 45.
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What is of interest is not primarily that Socrates makes a curious
attempt to translate "hard" as meaning "bad" (p. 75) and then
recants his rather unhelpful interpretion, nor Protagoras' praise
for the "Laconic brevity" of poetic diction as an "expresion of
philosophy" (p. 78) — as interesting as these are: What I find
more revealing of the generic distinction being questioned here
between poetry and philosophy, between literary interpretation
and final knowledge, is that Socrates wishes to leave the literary
behind because it cannot lead to a final truth. Interpretation and
criticism are bad models because they cannot be assimilated into a
discourse which "can produce a conclusive argument." Socrates
says, "I suggest we leave the subject of songs and poems, for I
should be glad to reach a conclusion, Protagoras . . . [S]ome say the
poet's meaning is one thing and some another, for the topic is one
on which nobody can produce a conclusive argument. The best
people avoid such discussions18 ... It is the truth, and our own
minds, that we should be testing." Reading mind and truth are
presumably something quite other than reading texts. But
apparently Protagoras isn't so sure of this.
3. With respect to Plato's own narrative technique in the dialogue,
Socrates' praise for the revelatory "chain of argument" is
compromised. For the dialogue itself mixes the genres of dramatic
18 This is advice which E. D. Hirsch, Jr. and M. H. Abrams did not take. In
chapter 5 (pp. 175 n.ll & 194 n. 37) they both attempt to assimilate literary
interpretation to the philosophical hope of producing conclusiveness. We
are (contra Socrates), they seem to argue, after one meaning; or why
bother interpreting?.
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art and philosophical dispute. And although writing is always
considered second best to direct dialogue, it is the artifice of
writing which allows and encourages such complete and well
crafted conversational reconstructions. It is Plato's nearly
novelistic conventions of presentation which allow the illusion of
Socrates' total dialogical recall of the debate and his ability to
appear as narrator and participant. Plato disparages the public
lecture (the sophist's art) as a way of imparting knowledge, but
the method of "private conversation" is itself groomed into (or,
rather, by) a publishable text. Plato paradoxically restores
textuality as the hallmark of philosophizing.
The Phaedrus has more literary complexity, introducing the theme
of love in the language of eroticism, moving from the seduction of
rhetoric to its idealization and conversion to Philosophy — itself
accomplished by rhetoric. In the Phaedrus dialogue we can read a
philosophical loosening up of eros, a softening of the ontological
opposition between it and the rational intellect, a redressing (if
not a recantation)19 of the polemic between the non-cognitive and
reason and, therefore, between poetry and philosophy as they
relate to ethics and intellectual/literary style. The Phaedrus is a
much subtler attempt to realign more constructively the
relationship between eros and the good, redressing the balance
between sex and intellect. In other words, the slander against
19 Martha Nussbaum, in The Fragility of Goodness. 1986, argues very
persuasively, carefully and sensitively for the Phaedrus as a very
substantial recantation of Plato's previous anti-eros polemic. (Cf. Chapter
7: '"This story isn't true': madness, reason, and recantation in the
Phaedrus".) I am grateful to Peter Lewis for having brought her work to
my attention.
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eros is qualified in terms of its potential to motivate and feed the
intellect. What I find interesting here (and in Nussbaum's
reading) are the implications these requalifications have for the
connection between Philosophy and rhetoric. For the positive
function of "madness" impinges upon the question of philosophical
style. More precisely, the way in which Socrates expresses his
skepticism about Lysias' "beautiful speeches" is, in part, a
concession to the inseparable weaving of style and content,
passion and intellect; and this implies the need to construct a
subtler view of the connection between the poet and the
philosopher as public rhetoricians once the cognitive and moral
efficacy of the poets is conceded. These possibilities within the
Phaedrus are still of course a far cry from a conversion to
sophism, from seeing philosophy as the teacher of a form of
rhetoric and as a supporter of the epistemological skepticism
associated with it. What keeps the opposition between philosophy
and rhetoric in check is that Plato still keeps the distinction
between what goes on in writing and what goes on in the soul as
an irrevocable hierarchical and metaphysical precondition of
ethical discourse. The individual soul is primary. But even if the
Phaedrus is not a complete recantation of the separation between
philosophy and rhetoric, the philosopher is now at least explicitly
and consciously allowed to appropriate some aspects of the poetic
persona and his rhetorical technique less surreptitiously.
Philosophy can now "make use of 'literary' devices such as mythic
narrative and metaphor in the center of its teaching; and it can,
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like poetry, contain material expressive of, and arousing, a
passional excitation."20 Some proximity is restored.
The point to this aper?u is that in the end the difference between
the Dialectician discovering Truth and the rhetorician attempting
to persuade are no different in logical structure,21 demonstrating
no internal technical difference, leaving the belief in the
ontological opposition between them unsupported except by the
paradox of their juxtaposition and the subtle interweaving of
Platonic ideology.22 I'm not wanting to be uncharitable, but only
to highlight the paradox. The Phaedrus starts out playfully not
Philosophically, by eulogizing the oral dialogical power of Socrates
who committed nothing to the power of writing: Plato, of course
does, but covers the tension here by suggesting it is a kind of
game for his own amusement. He is a rhetorician who distrusts
rhetoric; a poet who abolishes poetry from his State; an admirer of
spontaneous oral dialectic who publishes highly crafted dialogues.
(An analysis of the metaphysician's motivation for privileging
20 Nussbaum, 1986:226.
21 One could say that it is indeed a virtue of the "technical" rhetorical
tradition (with which Plato, in the Phaedrus. shows obvious -- even if
polemical and ironical — familiarity) that they had done so much work
precisely on detailing the positive interconnection between logical,
tropological and stylistic parts of speech. Plato's representative technical
rhetoricians are primarily Hippias and Prodicus. He reviews "their
devices" on pp. 83-88. Phaedrus. Penguin Classics edition, 1977, trans. &
intro. by W. Hamilton.
22 The literary upshot here for the reading of philosophical texts is one
which Paul de Man makes the basis for his work: If rhetorical
consequences and logical structure cannot be distinguished in a principled
way, then we no longer have a justification for dismissing the figures,
metaphors and rhetoric of a philosopher as not really a relevant dimension
to what is worth discussing philosophically. Cf. also p. 54 n.24.
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speech in the writing of philosophy will be one of Derrida's
themes in chapter 5.)
Aristotle's opposition too is between theory, (theoria, literally:
"spectating") which discovers knowledge, and rhetoric, which
discovers the available means of persuasion (as if knowledge and
our means for managing it were separated by some mysterious
ontological chasm). He doesn't really define persuasion (which
would have threatened his own opposition); for, in the back door
it comes in his attempt to persuade us as to the so-called "nature"
of knowledge. Aristotle is not really interested in rhetoric, and his
discussion of it is primarily generic, defining genres and species of
rhetoric. It is through essentially classificatory manoeuvres that
he subsumes rhetoric under Dialectic. Again the opposition and
the victory of one side is reconstituted under the guise of
classification.
Aristotle produces two sorts of argument in his Rhetoric under
this guise of (merely) classifying certain uses of language: both
epistemological and normative. That is, in Book Three, Chapter II,
metaphor is subsumed under the prior epistemological criterion of
its "likeness" to things given. And in chapters V and XII style and
rhetoric are accountable to Aristotle's sense of linguistic propriety
and good manners. In other words, metaphor, style and rhetoric
are not constitutive of anything; they are, rather, formalistic
followers of a content already given. Metaphor, according to
Aristotle, can not be constructive or generative of "likeness" (and
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certainly not allowed to be disruptive of habituated uses); it is the
recognition of likeness. In effect, metaphors are "appropriate if
they point to a proportional likeness." (p. 70) This
epistemological and ontological argument stipulates that the
"transference" of the qualities combined in a metaphor are based
on the prior recognition of "things closely akin and similar ... in
kind." (p. 71) And what kinds these are are themselves decided
upon by previous classification.
As for the normative reduction of rhetoric and style (in Book
Three, Chapter V), the "requirements of style" are simply to "write
good Greek." (p. 76) For Aristotle, style is a species of accepted
rules of grammar, to be understood along with other briefly
sketched professorial and textbook-like requirements: to "avoid
ambiguity," keep a sharp eye out for gender, and follow the
"correct use of singular and plural." In other words, "what we
write should be easy to read and easy to speak, which comes to
the same thing."23 In other words, writing, rhetoric and style are
not considered as "categories" to be seen through literature.
Rather, literature is a domain insofar as it is governed by
conventions of acceptable speech. When Aristotle does address
"variations in style" (Chapter XII), his interest remains taxonomic
and socially motivated. So, when he does make a distinction
between writing and speaking, he says "written style is the more
precise" only because he views speech as (unfortunately)
dependent on the tricks and seductions associated with public
23 With such sentiments Grice (p. 153 ff.) will agree, and Derrida (p. 206 n.
will not.
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delivery (p. 97), and writing as presumably a medium for the
ethically more austere to escape such "pandering." Hence, within
the "three kinds of rhetoric," the "forensic style" is the best
because speaking to a judge rather than to a crowd leaves less
"opportunity for rhetorical display." (p. 99)24 Thus Aristotle's
practical observation here is converted into a classificatory
principle: rhetoric is classified as formal display, as a
phenomenological and removable vehicle for the essence of things
(the content).
A concluding counterclaim would be that for argument and the
acquisition and exchange of knowledge to take place at all, a
shared discourse, (or rhetoric, if you will), is required. Successful
philosophical classification, rigor and refutation are only possible
in terms of standards being shared and accredited by a
community of inquirers — to refer to Peirce and Dewey. (More on
the pragmatic role of the community in chapter 3 and following.)
And what Plato and Aristotle among others in the philosophical
community have shared is precisely this opposition between
language and something Other which makes itself present for
purposes of comparison. (On the "metaphysics of presence" and
Derrida's rhetorical twists of it, cf. chapter 5.)
Pedagogically speaking, Plato's power was his use, and the clever
effacement of his use of persuasion, polemic and the power of
language -- as Gorgias well knew. The point to all this is that
24 The preceding references are from Aristotle, On Poetry and Style, (ed. &
transl.) G. M. A. Grube, 1958.
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rhetoric has continuously squeezed through the big net of Grand
theory, grand oppositional Philosophy — "master narratives," as
Lyotard calls them.25 One might say that Isocrates successfully
competed with Plato with his academy of rhetoric. Rhetoric
remained of great importance in the middle ages — and indeed
through Cicero and Quintillian who, ironically, knew much about
rhetoric through the Aristotelian grapevine. It had wide appeal in
the renaissance, (especially in the art world when Theology was
too barren a stimulus), and remained a discipline taught in the
universities, including British and early American colleges through
most of the 19th century. And, presently, questions of a rhetorical
cast are seeping into a wide range of disciplines under the
sponsorship of contemporary literary theory, especially as it
attempts to reengage philosophy in discussing the nature of "its"
texts. (For example: in the work of Paul De Man, Stan(y Fish,
Harold Bloom, and in Philosophy, through Derrida and Rorty).
(More on this following.)
This has reopen[njed in an interesting way the question of what
Philosophy "is," of how we (and on what basis we) constitute "its"
canon; and, again, looking at our opening quotation from Dewey, it
has raised the question of what constitutes a philosophical way of
reading. The suggestion here (Rorty's) is that one curriculum
might rightly choose to read Plato, Kant and Quine, and another,
Plato, Coleridge and Kafka; and there will indeed be different
worlds, being written in different ways, through various genres,
25 Lyotard, 1984. (More on Lyotard and the rhetoric of the "post-modern"
in chapter 6.)
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supported by different academic industries and commentaries,
reading for different things. The point is that the difference is not
justifiable by comparing the philosophical group to some external
standard of Truth, while viewing the other family of texts as
suspicious deviants from the Truth. The difference is not
justifiable in the classical manner, by ontological opposition: as if
Philosophers have no rhetoric but lots of Truth; they, the writers,
have no Truth but lots of clever rhetoric.
Philosophy, then, (the argument runs) need not distrust rhetoric
and define itself by its suppression or opposition, as so much of
our tradition does when it appeals to its clear, uninfected vision of
the truth, as if its (usually linguistic) means have become
transparent. The linguistic medium or means never comes to
anything naked, emptied of itself, being something and yet
nothing. We don't get it both ways. Its very power (the
pragmatists argue/implore/chide) is its positive ability to carry
on its back at all times, meanings, interests, histories and purposes
which define who we are as inquirers, giving us some managerial
grip on our worlds. The un-erasable role of rhetoric simply
encourages us not to presuppose that there is some way of
breaking out of language in order to compare it with something
else, but also that there are good social reasons for encouraging
some sorts of language more than others. Language criticizes and
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enlarges itself;26 and philosophy is one of the arts which
contributes. But one cannot see language-as-a-whole in
oppositional relation to something it is not, but to which it applies.
The arts, sciences and literature, and philosophy as one form of
their self-reflection, constitute this criticism and enlargement.
After a little while, that is, after about 2,000 years of this platonic
urge to escape the finitude of our intellectual escapades, (our
conventions, our "nomos"), and compare ourselves with the
structure of things, (with something absolute, natural or
foundational), this urge need not define that genre of writing we
call philosophy. It is more flexible and ambidextrous when it is
not so defined, but pictured, rather, as an art helping us to
improve our taste (as Hume and Dewey encourage), to refine our
ability to judge the various ways we talk, between the various
self images we produce. Philosophy is the attempt, in various
ways, at various times, and in various cultural contexts,
persistently and sometimes rigorously to manage this tension
between what we are given (or how we are "funded," as Dewey
put it) and what we want, between what we find and what we
make, between what we discover and know, and what we
construct — often in the very process of discovery. It is the
26 "Language" is here a metonymy for "communities of users." I wish
simply to attribute the dynamics of criticism and enlargement to the
domain of discourse rather than to an epistemological domain which goes
hunting for foundational constraints as a way to govern (from the
"outside") the vissicitudes of criticism and changing discourses. Nor do I
wish to imply (as some "structuralist" theory does) that language is some
hypostatized meta-entity without contextual relations which we can
capture in its totality through a general vocabulary of "structure."
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question: how do these things -- truths, images — work ; and what
sort of work do they dol.
If it is left to the philosopher to argue, say, that it is true in some
particular sense that democracy is better than tyranny, that Plato
"misread" (in a Bloomian sense) Gorgias,27 he would do his best to
be persuasive, to offer demonstrations, flex as many traditional
philosophical and rhetorical muscles as were at his or his culture's
disposal. But, (as a "post-modern") he would probably accept the
possible futility of such strategies, and the irony implicit in being
too sure. He probably wouldn't think any longer that the cosmos
has made metaphysical provisions for the survival or necessity of
the ideas and procedures he holds most dear, or that a Modernist
aesthetic could or should provide an edifice capable of stabilizing
them nevertheless. His ambidexterity is in his writing seriously
with his right hand what he knows his left hand can unwrite or
make fun of. He is a writer, as the postmodern writer/theorist
27 For Bloom, 1980, "there are no texts, but only relationships between
texts:" (e.g., Gorgias' to Plato's). And these relationships depend upon
critical acts, upon misreadings which one reader/writer performs upon
another. According to Bloom, the "influence-relationship" governs all
reading and writing; it motivates the need (e.g., Plato's) to "misread;" and it
is crucial for understanding the very notion of "tradition" and the very
ambivalent process of canon-formation. It is "creative misreading" which
forms the basis of literary history, (which sets up the polemic between say,
rhetoric and Platonism). Bloom's emphasis on action, criticism and
alteration are interests which resonate very closely with the pragmatist
tradition, with its style of reading, writing, and criticizing the tradition.
And Emerson is a key figure for both. More on some connections between
literary theory, pragmatism, and Bloom's work in chapter 6.
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John Barth has put it, who can only rise above traditional quarrels
by having the bits he needs "under his belt, but not on his back."28
Telling a story about philosophy which reads it as a form of
criticism rather than Truth decreases its traditional privileges, but
increases its versatility. Philosophers are no longer the final
arbiters of nature, knowledge, goodness, truth or beauty -- even
when they have concepts of them. These issues have been largely
disseminated to more concrete projects within different
disciplines. But the philosopher can still sneak up behind anyone,
the scientist, the politician, the writer, and ask how he
understands himself and what he does; he can ask critically: does
it hang together, and how does it hang together with what other
people do in the largest sense of the term hang together? The
further narration of this story of what philosophy is will be an
attempt to move between the classical Philosophy of deep
oppositions (ultimately to be overcome in the interest of Truth)
and classical rhetoric (which didn't like such a starting point); it
will be an attempt to move between philosophers and literary
theorists as they work to understand and criticize their own
activities and textual productions; to move between pragmatists
and deconstructionists as they interpret the value of the canon
and pick out their heroes within and sometimes without it. So, to
try and answer Dewey, are we inept visionaries or subtle
dialecticians?, political reformers or founders of new types of
28 Barth, 1980:70. Rorty too will be appealed to as an example of the sort of
style Barth recommends for writing within a genre with too many
traditional "givens."
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writing?, moral exhorters or instructors in academies?, educators
or inventors and critics of methods of knowledge?: We (the
argument continues to run), trying to interpret ourselves, should
find it difficult to answer but find the genres available for trying
many.
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2.1 THE PERSISTENCE OF THE RHETORICAL:
"The persistence of the rhetorical," for two reasons: Firstly, Joseph
Margolis has recently written about the "Persistence of Reality,"
and rightly so.1 Contrary to the Metaphysicians' worries that
James had thrown in the towel and given up his rights to talk
about the "real" or the "world," and the "technical realists'"
backlash (against views like Rorty's) for the same reasons,2 the
pragmatist tradition has never really worried about whether the
world is there or not, but only about which vocabularies we say
have privileged access to it, about what gets excluded in the
process, and about what authorities we worship as a consequence.
Margolis articulates a "pragmatism without foundations" in service
of a "rapprochement" with "scientific progress." But whether one
chooses to offer apologetics for progress in science (Dewey did this
too.) and/or for the openness and indeterminacy of the
"foundations" and "progress" of science, a rhetoric for so doing is
always required: hence its persistence.
The second reason: The history of rhetoric (as it will be sketched),
as well as the question of rhetoric (as it will be asked in this and
the following chapters) offers the sense of an (albeit, often
destabilized) trajectory which the leap into the contemporary, the
1 C.f, Margolis, Pragmatism Without Foundations: Reconciling realism and
Relativism. 1986, which is the first installment of a trilogy: "The
Persistence of Reality."
2 by, for example, Saul Kripke, "Naming and Necessity," 1972, and Michael
Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas. 1978.
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post-modern, would immediately deny. In a period when
"discourses," "traditions" and "theories" are created, inflated,
consumed and exhausted within decades, a fictional yet
purposeful construct (in Vaihinger's sense, in his The Philosohv of
"As if". 1924), which we might call "the rhetorical," is quite useful,
if not required. The velocity of "post-modern" literary physics
(and the aura of its ungraspability)3 prevents any glib overviews:
it won't submit to coordination or solution by technique
(structuralism), or to easy generic and historical ordering
(historicism). And, although the dissolution of orthodoxy and
technique might easily lead to the aphorism, the hyperbolic essay,
the "play of the signifier" as appropriate styles for its evocation,
even Nietzsche and Wittgenstein waited until they had attempted
a discursive, treatise-like practice -- their aesthetic
apprenticeship — before they went in that rhetorical direction.4
Hence, a discussion of the pragmatics of the "post-modern" must
be deferred until something else is developed over and against
which it can be played off — i.e., a pragmatic tradition of rhetoric.
2.2 "PRIMARY" RHETORIC:
The following ten points are a condensed and introductory
summary of some of the precedents in the classical tradition
which are of pragmatic interest and pre-emptive historical value
3 Cf. Charles Newman, The Post-Modern Aura: The Act of fiction In An Age
of Inflation. 1985, for a witty and worldly critique of the all-too-compatible
and uncomfortable relationship between post-modernism and
contemporary American consumerist culture.
4
— writing first The Birth of Tragedy (before The Anti-Christ) and the
Tractatus (before the Philosophical Investigations) respectively.
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(for the ensuing argument) within the "primary" (oral-
performative) tradition:
1. Language was understood neither as a metaphysical medium
nor a Dialectical pathway to higher realms; nor was it understood
as primarily propositional, "empirical" and tied to worldly objects
— as the platonists and positivists respectively proposed. It was
understood (and used) as persuasive.
2. Language was contextualized primarily within the workings of
civic life (not mental life) where "speech acts" were important
stagings of social drama in which (contra Searle) the ability to
allegorize and fictionalize was not parasitic on some other
"deeper" set of givens.5 Style and tropes, for Gorgias, were not
qualities "laid on" to thoughts; they were part of the very
invention of thought and speech. They were not transferred from
a "proper" meaning later embellished; they were already
interacting in the provisional establishments of accepted usage.
(This point will resurface in Derrida's critique of "le propre" and
his discussion of "metaphor in the text of Philosophy:" In other
words, the metaphor can only be considered improper, secondary
and "laid on" if a stable, pure and foundational truth-conditional
can be found to underly language. And no such "thing" seems to
be forthcoming. (This issue will be expanded in chapter 5.)
5 Cf. Fish, 1980:ch.9 and Rorty, 1982:ch.7 for criticisms of Searle's
assumptions regarding his distinction between fictional and "normal"
discourses. (More on this issue in chapter 3.)
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3. Rhetoric was primarily oral, lending itself less to the totalizing
embellishments of "textuality" (and ensuing publication within the
academic industry as the outcome which contemporary "theories
of writing" proliferate: contra Derrida and company); but lending
itself more, therefore, to the responsibilities of public political
discourses and argumentation: a context in which the
consequences of rhetorical practice were not taken over by
"secondary" (literary) rhetoric, by the "private" text, or by the
"poetics of isolation" common in the Romantic movement. (This is
not an attempt to identify the oral with speech and attribute to
speech some "originary presence" and onto-epistemological
priority — which Derrida rightly questions. It is not an attempt to
do epistemology at all but, rather, sociology. The oral may be
"textualized" as in speech writing, and oral/acoustic qualities may
be expressed in texts which are never read or heard aloud. But
theories, like Derrida's, which drag all discursive activities through
the elevation of the 19th-century proccupation with textual
technique (Nietzsche) neglect the oral power restored by radio
and television in the 20th -- not an insignificant phenomenon
regarding rhetorical form and consequences: Hitler would have
been an unintelligible rambler if confined to a text.). The oral
remains, therefore, an important dimension to the socio-
pragmatics of rhetoric, to the aesthetics of language and style.
The obvious momentum of the Western tradition (technological
and intellectual) to shift from persuasion to narration, from civic
to personal contexts, and from disputation to literature (printing),
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is not sufficient to justify the ontological extension of "textuality"
as the foundational metaphor of all discourse -- which equates
rhetoric with literary devices. (Still contra Derrida.)
4. Oratory is conjoined with civic power and confrontation in such
a way as to prevent the collapse of such an art into "art for art's
sake" (Baudelaire), into merely "significant form" — (a Bell which
rings untrue in a social context). That is, oratory does not support
a separatist or a formalist aesthetic of social autonomy. (As an
aside: In the rhetoric of India and China, harmony more than
victory was the goal; and a less confrontational and polemical
tradition of relating philosophy and rhetoric ensued.)
5. "Technical rhetoric" grew most directly out of the social needs
of the (elitist) democracies of Sicily and Greece, (not out of a
romanticism of self-expression to elevate the literary dandy).
And this political forum generated the pragmatic connection
between stylistics and how one questioned the civil order, (as
many "modernists" of the 19th and 20th-century artworlds will
implore); and the political forum of the rhetoricians entailed the
connection between inquiries into the "nature of language" and its
ordinary use long before the category of language was
positivistically "formalized" and the category of "ordinary
language" was required as a corrective. In other words, the
question of rhetoric implies the question of style, and asks it
pluralistically form the start: Which style should be used for
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which purpose?.6 A robust notion of style becomes the heart of
understanding its pragmatic efficacy. And its efficacy is improved
because of its strategic plurality. (This too will be developed
explicitly by Bacon, Dewey and later by post-modernists.)7
6. The juridical background of "sophistic" rhetoric recognized the
power of a public forum to determine what counted as law and
fact; and recognized the politics of assent as that which
established their foundations. Hence, facts and foundations were
a function of persuasion not of philosophical discovery. That is, so
long as "rhetoric" remains a self-conscious category, "facts" remain
suspicious entities. In a court room where at least two different
stories are going to be told, facts are presentational not
representational, neutral and autonomous. They are motivated
(as Kuhn, 1970, reminds us) and narrative-bound, open to bribery
and fraud. Courtroom rhetoric was, therfore, less interested in the
6 Against those "who claim to possess the only true style," Cicero
intermittently praises Demosthenes as "the master of all styles." (Orator.
1942:298.)
7 T. Eagleton, 1981, also offers a politicized reading of the history of
"rhetoric," as the theory and practice of effective discourse, the theory and
practice of relativistic and powerful signification. This simultaneity is
thoroughly Deweyian. Eagleton writes that the history of rhetoric entails
"both the theory of effective discourse and the practice of it;" or, put in a
more explicitly political vocabulary: "Its intention, quite consciously, was
systematically to theorize the articulations of discourse and power, and to
do so in the name of political practice: to enrich the political effectivity of
signification." Cf. Eagleton, 1981:101, 102. M. Hadas, A History of Latin
Literature. 1962, also stresses the importance of the political context not
only for the practice and career of Cicero, but also with respect to questions
of his philosophy and style. The conditioning power of historical
circumstances and the development of a theoretical eclecticism as the
necessary support for a successful rhetoric are especially clear in the
Brutus dialogue. It is perhaps not insignificant also that it is in a book on
Latin literature (Hadas') that one can read an account of Cicero (of
rhetoric) as literature and philosophy. In philosophy histories one seldom
finds mention of Cicero or the role and obvious social interplay and
competition between Philosophy and the rhetorical tradition.
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positivism of proof than in the persuasiveness of probabilities
(What are the chances that so and so would do such and such?), in
the role of motivation (And why would they want to do it?), and
in the factual-hermeneutic indeterminateness such questions
produce.
What Aristotle said about the court room was that:
"The just thing is to seek nothing in speech either to annoy
or to delight the audience. It is just for cases to be tried on
the basis of the facts themselves in such a way that
everything other than their demonstration is irrelevant. But
these other factors have great influence, as has been said,
because of the depravity of the audience. Saying something
in such and such a way makes some difference in making it
clear, though not so much as is thought. All these things are
forms of fantasy and directed to the hearer: nobody teaches
geometry like this. (My italics) (Rhetoric 3.1)8
This is, of course, standard dialectical fare, dualistically separating
"facts themselves" from those dubious "forms of fantasy," "clarity"
from "depravity," the pure unit of fact from the style and
narrative within which it is expressed. But Aristotle does not
make it clear just how many cases of social substance are solved
along the aesthetically formalistic and abstracted lines of
geometry. What we are left with is the geometry teacher as the
rhetorical trope of the pure, rational and disinterested intellect:
8 Cited in G. A. Kennedy's, Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular
Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times. 1980:78.
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But how relevant is the geometry teacher in the context of the
court room?9
Zeno the Stoic compared dialectic (and its appeal to "logical proof")
to a closed fist, rhetoric to an open hand (Cicero: Orator: 113).10 On
rhetoric, Aristotle is, like most of the mainstream tradition, rather
professorially closed. He does, of course, note a positive analogy
between rhetoric and the arts, (between painting a scene orally or
visually); and the proximity of rhetoric and the arts is often
pointed out elsewhere, thus performing the double service for
that sort of dialectical Philosophy which would prefer them to
keep each other company on the other side of the Truth, safely
under the gaze of the Philosopher.
7. Language was, thereby, understood not in terms of
epistemological constraint but as a pedagogical "instrument" for
the development and coordination of public praxis — a side to
rhetoric which doesn't go unnoticed in the narrative pedagogies of
9 In contrast, Cicero's recommendation -- "officia oratoris" (duties of the
orator) -- is not to separate "proofs," the provision of probabilities and
appealing to passion. Ethos and pathos are differences of degree, in terms
of which "we call their hearts (in a court room) to what emotion the case
demands." In effect, duty (not "depravity," on the one hand, not
"geometry," on the other) is the bridge between epistemology and
eloquence, knowing and persuading, ethics and artifice. Cf. Book 2.115.
10 "Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, used to give an object lesson of the
difference between the two arts; clenching his fist he said logic was like
that; relaxing and extending his hand, he said eloquence was like the open
palm."
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Plato and Aristotle, (as Maclntyre points out in After Virtue").11
but which is more widely exploited by Bacon and Dewey. The
institutionalization of rhetoric (for pedagogical purposes) in the
academy (from Isocrates, then diluted but evident through to the
19th-century university) gave it further pragmatic and
competitive solidity vis-a-vis Philosophy. The academy
(Isocrates') furthered "practical philosophy," the study of speech
and politics, form and content, without separation.
8. The essentially moral/epistemological polemic of Plato and
Aristotle against sophistic rhetoric is precisely what highlights,
(by attempting to ridicule), rhetoric's aesthetic powers and
potential to engender social change, to threaten (as well as
support) a "given" order.12 The sophists understood knowledge to
be acquired through disputation not through vision, through what
Rorty calls "conversation" not "mirroring." (This link will
developed in chapter 6.) The sophists, in effect, made knowing
like ethics, a function of public speech situations, a function of the
1 I Maclntyre, 1981, is being alluded to because he draws on this
(pedagogical) side of Aristotle in opposition to the political epistemology of
the Republic, thereby appealing to the rhetoric of narrative judgement
rather than to metaphysical fixing as the appropriate language of social
praxis. In other words, Aristotle is closer to the sophists than is Plato in the
social sense that he preferred the language of "becoming good" to knowing
the metaphysical identity of virtue in advance. To the socratic demand to
find one definition of virtue, he, like Protagoras, enumerates several: the
virtues and the language of virtue fall into the category not of truth but of
narrative praxis.
*2 That the sophists were non-Athenians, collected fees for their teaching
and public displays, were becoming thereby a professional class, and yet
their wandering too prevented them from becoming accountable political
participants, all contributed to their being seen (from a "Philosophical"
standpoint) suspiciously if not indeed as a social threat. Cf. Guthrie,
1971 :esp. Chapter III, "What is a Sophist?".
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normative, the contingent and the stylized. (And yet they resisted
making the category of the "public speech situation" into another
transcendental Foundation to cope — as Habermas, 1982, attempts
to — with this aestheticization of social theory.) (Cf. chapters 5, p.
181 n.17, and 6, pp. 235 & 236 for further reference to Habermas.)
9. Because the construction of discourses was always in terms of a
creative compositional purpose, discourse did not, (contrary to
Aristotle and his analytic, empiricist, and structuralist successors),
become conceived in general, in terms of determinative structural
rules which, for the empiricist strain, find their foundation in the
apolitical (rhetorical) constraints of sense, and which, for the
stucturalist strain, find their foundation in an abstract and
atemporal dialectic (or rhetoric) of differences between signs
(Passim Saussure, 1974. Cf. chapter 4). The model metaphor was
not "grammar" but manipulation, to stir the audience's "will to
believe" in what would be "better to believe."13
10. The "good orator" was, for Cicero and Quintilian, the "central
man" in the same way the poet was for Emerson — for whom
ethics and eloquence were necessary correlates, interwoven
genres. Cicero seeks to reconcile the "ideal orator with the
13 James, 1907 (1981 a):42.
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eloquent philosopher,"14 the intellectual and the citizen, in the
figure of the "dutiful orator" (whom both Plato and Aristotle
feared).15 And Quintilian too attempts to combine "artistic
excellence and moral goodness," making rhetoric the centerpiece
to the training of the citizen, to the whole of education16 — all of
which belongs to the sophistic tradition and to the pragmatic
tradition. Thus, the aesthetic of this eloquence was not confined
to a disembodied and depoliticized kantian faculty of the
imagination (as taken up later by Croce, Collingwood, and the
politically reactionary Scruton). The imagination was, itself, a
figure which coordinated the rational, the moral and the
imaginative with their effective public expression. (As is already
14
— more so in his later work De Oratore (On the Orator) than in his earlier
and more technical De Inventione (On Invention). It is also worth
recalling that, with respect to the question of genre, De Oratore is written
as an essay and (like Plato) in the form of a dialogue (with a realistic
setting), rather than in the style (say) of an epistemological textbook. Nor
is Cicero's Orator in the form of a treatise; it is, rather, in the form of a
letter: an idiom of persuasion rather than proof, committed to a style of
address rather than objective demonstration. And after Cicero's enforced
retirement from political life he consoled himself also with the essay as the
appropriate genre for interpreting Greek philosophy. Cf. D. P. Lockwood, A
Survey of Classical Roman Literature. Vol. I, 1971:esp. 181-186.
15 It is indeed the reissuing of arguments against rhetoric from Plato's
Gorgias, as they are employed in the dispute between Philosophy and
rhetoric and their respective roles in Roman secondary education, which
forms the background to De Oratore. Cf. Kennedy 1980: 89.
16 Cf. Quintilian,. Institutio Oratoria (Education of the Orator), esp. Book 12.1
"The Good Orator must also be a Good Man" and 12.2 "The Morals of the
Orator." On the ethics of discourse Quintilian reverses the Platonic
relationship between Philosophy and rhetoric: ". . . my advice is not that I
want the orator to be a philosopher, since no way of life is more remote
from political duties or from every function of the orator. For what
philosopher haunts the courts, or is a familiar figure in political meetings?
. . . I want my pupil to be a wise man, . . . who shows himself to be a political
figure not by hole-and-corner hair splittings but in the active give and
take of practical life. . . I look forward to the day when some perfect orator
. . . may take over the field of philosophy, unpopular as it is because of its
lofty pretensions, and, coming into its own again, may lead philosophy
back into the fold of rhetoric." Book 12.2.6-10, trans. MacKendrick, in
Classics in Translation. Vol. II, (eds.) P. MacKendrick & H.M. Howe, 1975:359.
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becoming obvious, my interest here is to schematize the
background of the rhetorical tradition in a way which links it to
the pragmatist tradition and, thereby, bypasses the detour which
questions of aesthetics took into 18th-century faculty-psychology
and 19th and 20th-century philosophy of mind.)
As is also becoming obvious, Cicero and Quintilian (and later
Emerson, James and Dewey) are the heroes of this list of rhetorical
virtues through their attempts to bring together -- without
appealing to epistemology or foundationalist theories of
knowledge — the sophistic and Aristotelian traditions of rhetoric
and praxis, aesthetics and ethics. This tradition is an appeal to
pragmatic, non-Dialectical "sources" which are pagan, secular and
relative, not Platonic and mystical, not emotivist and
psychological.17 The mystical and the psychological are two styles
of doing aesthetics which have had great impact on romantic
aesthetics (Croce, 1922) and British psychologistic aesthetics
(Collingwood, 1938) respectively; both of which, from different
perspectives (of a not entirely unshared idealism), converted the
aesthetic into a question of the mental, thereby focussing
subsequent analysis on the philosophy of mind, on bridging
"psychical distances" (Bullough, 1912 [1957]). And it is this which
the rhetorical/praxis tradition criticized in advance (that is, it
changed the subject and undermined the ontological dualism
which produced the "distance"); and which the pragmatist
tradition competed with at the time (Dewey, 1934); and which
17 Cicero writes: "The Sophists are the source from which all this has
flowed into the forum . . Orator. 1942:375.
48
George Dickie's "institutional theory" has more directly aimed at
criticizing in the present (Dickie, 1974). In other words, it is by
making the aesthetic a secondary function of an a priori
Philosophy of "mind" that the rhetoric of essences and of
metaphysically privileged Truths can persist in trying to oust
their own rhetoricity, their own artifactuality. (It will be the
post-modernists who reverse this relation between Philosophy
and the aesthetic, in favor of a non-hierarchicalized and
reciprocally supportive view of the relation between the
philosophical and the aesthetic. Cf. chapter 6.)
2.3 LITERARY RHETORIC:
The transition I wish to make here (on the back of the previous
sketches) refers to the study of rhetoric and rhetoricity as they
become primarily the domain of the writer, and then, later, of the
literary historian and critic, (while remaining the fear of the Truth
seeker). The Philosopher, while busy looking for foundations,
nouns, solid truths and arguments, leaves the literary theorist to
remind him of the centrality of rhetoric, of the tropes and
metaphors which organize the narrative and socio-allegorical
"structures" (or supports) of texts, to remind him of the positive
variety of genres and persuasive manoeuvres exhibited in
Philosophical texts themselves — (as both Paul de Man and
Stanley Fish will argue).
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A key notion in the classical texts of Philosophy, rhetoric and
aesthetics is the notion of mimesis, or imitation. But, in
Philosophy it has traditionally been a trope conditioned to
perform epistemological service. As in the title of Auerbach's well
known book, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western
Literature, mimesis is a trope which tends to retain the
connnection between imitation and representation with some
epistemological theory being the unsuppliable excluded middle
needed to link something which we know to a copy parasitic on
this prior "given." Whereas, it is the interplay between the genre
of writing-about-the-real and the aesthetic "imitation" which
rhetoric explores, without the aid of, or appeal to, a prior and
more real "Form" to which it con-forms. "O Menander, o life!"
exclaimed (probably) Aristophanes, "Which one of you imitated
the other?"
1. In other words, in the poetics of traditional rhetoric, imitation
is dramatic imitation, fictionalized from the start. Be it tragedy,
mockery, or some other "imitational" summary of the
emotional/mythological qualities of a life-type constructed for
some ethical/allegorical purpose, the relation between imitated
and imitation, between Menander and life, (between what Peirce
and the Structuralists later call the "sign" and the "signified"), is
horizontal, reciprocal; it is a comparison between two sides of a
single and constructed distinction which effect each other. The
rhetoric of imitation does not substantiate a neoplatonic, vertical,
ontological and epistemological relation between a changing world
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of aesthetic construction on the one hand and an unchanging
world of metaphysical Truth on the other.
2. Secondly, rhetoricians and poets "imitated" older rhetoricians
and poets. They "imitated" a tradition — (and this was the
predominant ideology of imitation up until the Romantic
movement). Their "truths" were already textualized, part of an
aesthetic tradition. Imitation was, for them, training not
epistemological inquiry, pedagogy not Metaphysics. By imitating,
they acquired technique and social function. It is not that they
imitated the "real world" through the blurry obfuscation of
"opinion," but that the classical "art world" recognized a set of
practices to be performed by those said to imitate. What
mediated imitated and imitation (signified and signifier, in
contemporary jargon) was style, or, a highly stylized and socially
motivated activity. Those who studied with Isocrates (and
likewise with Socrates) learned his philosophy, morals, political
ideas; but above all they learned to imitate his style. And Plato, in
this sense, is indeed a wonderful imitator. (The sophists become,
in this regard, part of the institutional canon which constitutes the
literary genre against which Plato sets up the epistemological
ideology of imitation.)!8
!8 As a way to read Plato within the rhetorical tradition, Dewey writes:
"Nothing could be more helpful to present philosophizing than a "Back to
Plato" movement; but it would have to be back to the dramatic, restless, co¬
operatively inquiring Plato of the Dialogues, trying one mode of attack
after another to see what it might yield; back to the Plato whose highest
flight of metaphysics always terminated with a social and practical turn,
and not to the artificial Plato constructed by unimaginative commentators
who treat him as the original university professor." (Dewey, 1930,
vol.11:20.)
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The twist here, in refering to mimesis as relating most closely to
the constructed (fictional) and instititutional (to do with tradition),
is that the aestheticization of the concept of "imitation," and with
it the concept of "representation," leads not to the question, "in
what way, or how well does art or Philosophy imitate, or
correspond to, or represent the world?"; it leads, rather, to the
question, "with what styles of writing (say) philosophical texts, do
different philosophers align themselves with (or imitate, in the
pedagogical and institutional sense) and why;19 and how do these
different sets of texts stylize, organize and interpret the world
they intend to represent?." This is, I think, the relativizing
significance of "secondary" rhetoric (and later, of contemporary
literary theory) for philosophical aesthetics, and of aesthetics for
philosophy.
19 Cicero (as a precedent for Dewey's rhetorical reading) is also able to
offer a critical but positive reading of Plato precisely by reading him from
within a literary and rhetorical genre (and not within an epistemological
genre) of writing. It is indeed due to its "literary quality" that Cicero refers
(Orator. 1942:337) to the Phaedrus. It is perhaps still with reference to the
Phaedrus (p. 351) that he writes: "Plato was, in dignity and grace, easily
the first of all writers or speakers," and, in this sense, one who can be
imitated. But when referring to Plato and Aristotle as philosophers, the
criteria of criticism are still style and effect: "It is therefore easy to
distinguish the eloquence which we are treating in this work from the
style of the philosophers. The latter is gentle and academic . . . there is no
anger in it, no hatred, no ferocity, no pathos, no shrewdness; it might be
called a chaste, pure and modest virgin." Recalling our previous
discussion on the Phaedrus (p. 23), Cicero's remarks (on "chaste style") are
perhaps a gloss on Plato's metaphysical ambivalence toward eros and its
correlate in Plato's stylistics. Cicero sees eros and "good oratory" as
reciprocally related. Virtue and style are not separable, but quite the
contrary; a more plural and ambidextrous style is a virtue. Plato worries
about the link between sex and style in terms of the figure of the socially
promiscuous rhetorician. Cicero realigns these more postively. A chaste
style and effective political discourse do not make good partners: eros and
politics do. In effect, they go together into the makeup of the rhetorical
genre.
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The discussion of literary imitation by rhetoricians (e.g., Dionysius
of Halicarnassus, On Imitation, written at the end of the 1st
century B.C.) discusses stylistic virtues as a way of judging the
adequacy of ancient oratory. And the later work of Hermogenes,
On Ideas of Style, foregrounded questions of composition, the
choice and use of figures, the ways a model (or different genres)
puts together sentences.20 The question wasn't: "how true is this
or that literature," but, as with Quintillian: "what can the
prospective public speaker learn from the study of literature" --
Philosophy, here, being a model (or genre) among the great
variety of models within the category of "literature."21
Being (merely) a text, eloquent, and/or persuasive has been one of
the central fears and/or bogy men of the western Philosophical
tradition. The paradox is that the notion of textuality is not to be
trusted precisely when this tradition becomes itself so textual,
20 On the role of these two figures within the lineage of the rhetorical
tradition, cf. G. A Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World: 300 B.C.
- A.D. 300. 1972.
21 Quintilian dnstitutio Oratoria. Book 10) combines both Protagoras'
recommendation to Socrates to take up literary criticism rather than
metaphysics (Protagoras. 1986:72; recall pp. 22 - 23.) and Cicero's view
10rator. 1942:315) that philosophy "helps the orator as physical training
helps the actor" ~ as practical aid not as substance or essence. In effect,
Quintilian recomme^ls philosophical texts within the context of the
thorough rhetorical education, under the heading of (Book 10.1) "What to
Read." Plato, in Quintilian's context too, is an example of a stylist not a
truth-teller, of a literary ally not a metaphysical critic. And having just
complimented Plato further under the heading of "kinds of style," he
writes: "As for Aristotle, I hesitate to make up my mind whether his fame
rests more on his factual knowledge, the number of his works, the charm
of his style, the shrewdness of his discoveries, or the variety of his subject
matter. . ." (10.1.83; trans., MacKendrick, 1975:355) But whatever the case,
Aristotle^ importance is not due to his recommendation that the geometry
teacher be considered as the model of the good orator. (Recall p. 42ff.)
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publicational, dependent on the dynamics of writing for its
transmission, as its medium of work. For Judeo-Christian rhetoric
(to continue the historical story), if persuasion doesn't take place,
there is always God to do the work, someone (or something)
external, a word and object to refer to. Moses said: "I am not
eloquent . . the only alternative left was miracle. Let God
persuade. His "word" is the power required. The metaphysical
model for the preacher is then proclamation not persuasion, the
rhetoric (of the presence) of divine logos rather than the
pragmatic rhetoric of the democratic assembly. But the parodoxes
and ironies of this position become all the more illuminating in the
context of the trajectory of a western tradition which has found it
so difficult to look itself in the rhetorical face.
The gospels are a curious genre, and not very "literary." Yet Paul's
apologetics for them function on the basis of his hellenizaton, his
familiarity with rhetorical practices.22 So, when accused of
philosophical/literary simplicity by the educated in Corinth, he
replies: "For the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the
weakness of God is stronger than men" -- some useful and
(unintentionally) ironic oxymorons, which continue, and build up
into a metaphysical argument based on paradoxes and reversals,23
which later develop into the most persistent form of apologetic
22 Cf. R. Bultmann, Per Stil der Paulinischen Predigt und die kvnisch-
stoische Diatribe. 1910.
23 Cf. R. Hepburn, Christianity and Paradox. 1968. "Paradox" is a spacious
and reasonably generous notion around which Hepburn centers his effort
to explain the metaphysical/stylistic requirements of Christian discourse
in the context of contemporary philosophy (theology) of language.
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rhetoric (perhaps the only conceivable form) in the Judeo-
Christian tradition — outside the sword, anyway.
The point is that the metaphysic most inimical to rhetoricization
(Christianity at this stage: the empiricists compete for equal
honors later) was propagated in the early church precisely by
those (like Tertullian and Augustine) who studied and were
professionally employed to teach rhetoric. They used it to
denounce it: and their texts fed on the tension of the "paradox."
Sophisticated allegory, indeed as the classical rhetoricians
discussed it, became (e.g., with Origen) the chief exegetical ploy
(and intellectual pleasure) when needing to interpret and
supplement the simplicity of a biblical text: (I am also wishing to
allude to the notion of "allegory" as it is developed in the work of
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Paul de Man.24) In early Christian discourse plenty of neoplatonic
rhetoric is employed also in order to elevate, and place within the
safety of a text, bodily interests and references in a way which is
reminiscent of Socrates in the Phaedrus. The point is, again, how
fearfully uneasy the recognition of rhetoric made them; and how
persistently its power had to be subdued, got behind, and
equivocated about because of is very usefulness. To wit: the
sophistic echoes (and the need to appropriate them) in Gregory of
Nazianzus' encomium for Basil, who . . .
"was an orator among orators even before the sophist's
chair, a philosopher among philosophers even on questions
of philosophical theory. And, what constitutes the highest
tribute in the eyes of Christians, he was a priest even before
the priesthood. In such wise did all defer to him in
everything. With him, eloquence was only an accessory, and
24 The allusion to de Man has been interjected for two reasons: 1. He takes
up a view of allegory which is an expansion of, but also reiterates,
Quintilian's definition -- "any continuous or extended metaphor develops
into allegory." 2. The use he makes of this in the context of contemporary
literary theory (in Allegories of Reading, 1979) is an attempt to put forward
a set of related views about reading and the rhetoric of reading. He
proposes: that texts function on the basis of root metaphors which acquire
coherence and patterns of association in turn by their function in a larger
allegory; that the notion of "allegory" emphasizes narrative construction
rather than realistic mirroring as the better characterization of our
culture's textuality; that the notion of "allegory" encourages the view that
one level of reading is not exhaustive or exclusive, but, rather that other
readings will be generated and that the reading process will not achieve
closure; and this • view argues that a non-allegorical description is itself an
allegory requiring the extended metaphor of "presence," in terms of which
a description could be "verified." One (of the many) implications of these
views is that an inquiry into reading encourages a shift from thinking that
"this represents or means that" to "this is a morally charged, multi-levelled
story." And de Man encourages the inference that philosophical texts will
usually convey most successfully their root figures (Rationality, Mind,
foundational Truth) when these are not themselves probematized or the
object of inquiry, but, rather, alluded to obliquely as that which gets the
procedure or style off the ground, i.e., when it provides the text's
allegorical or narrative coherence. In other words, one could say, vis-a-vis
de Man, that the rhetoric against rhetoric provides the allegory of truth
with its oblique justification. Cf. also de Man's The Rhetoric of
Romanticism. 1984.
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he culled from it only what would be helpful for our
philosophy, since its power is necessary for the exposition of
thought. For a mind incapable of expression is like the
movement of a paralytic. But philosophy was his pursuit, as
he strove to break from the world, to unite with God, to gain
the things above by means of the things below, and to
acquire, through goods which are unstable and pass away,
those that are stable and abide.25 (My italics.)
In other words, ambitious Christians didn't study the Bible, they
went to schools of rhetoric — Greek institutions sustained by the
Romans who saw their practical utility, institutions which found
easier "translation" into Roman culture than those of the
Dialectical Philosophers'.26
But, one final and irresistible example of the conflict between
style and theologizing style, between speaking through literature
and "speaking directly," between having texts and having pure
(healthy) and unmediated relations, is Jerome's (ca. A.D. 348-420).
He tried, he relates, to exorcise his secular learning, but could not
forego his library. He would fast, then rehabilitate himself
reading Cicero. Reading the "prophets" and their style revolted
25 Trans, by L. P. McCauley, Funeral Orations bv Saint Gregory Nazianzen
and Saint Ambrose. 1953:37,38; cited in Kennedy, 1980:144.
26 I am here sympathizing as an amateur with those professional
historians of rhetoric who argue that rhetoric is a centrally important
"connective tissue" in "the attainment of civil society in the politics and
art of Christian Europe," and especially in its achievement of the
Renaissance. (Fumaroli, 1983:253); and who regret that the tradition of
rhetoric has generally found no voice in philosophical narratives of the
history of western ideas and intellectual style and practice. Cf. James J.
Murphy, "One Thousand Neglected Authors: The Scope and Importance of
Renaissance Rhetoric," and M. Fumaroli, "Rhetoric, Politics, and Society:
From Italian Ciceronianism to French Classicism," in Renaissance
Eloquence: Studies in the Theory and Practice of Renaissance Rhetoric,
(ed.) J. J. Murphy, 1983.
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him, and he'd become ill. While preparation is being made for his
funeral, he, in a dying condition, has a vision and is called up
before the seat of judgement; and while humbly prostrated, eyes
averted, no doubt, from the Great Text (God) about to pronounce
his fate, he is asked to state his "condition:" replying that he is a
Christian. "You lie" comes the answer. "You are a Ciceronian, not a
Christian. 'For where your treasure is there will your heart be
also' (Matthew 6:21). Of course Jerome promised thereafter to re¬
read and rewrite himself: "Lord if I ever have secular books, if I
ever read them, I have denied thee." (After having said this he, in
his piety, no doubt remembered Saint Peter. He had also
promised!)
One allegorical interpretation of this would be that the recognition
that one is what one reads (or, things are how they're written)
must be avoided at all costs. Yet God's reproach is, of course,
nothing more powerful than simply to throw at Jerome a different
text (Matthew's). The metaphysical dilemma or confrontation
between Truth and text is itself a textual drama, and a highly
ironic one at that. The devil is a different book, and a rhetorical
one at that (Cicero's). The fear of death, (as in Eco's The Name of
the Rose), is centered on the fear of a book, on the question of
censorship, on the question of which books we are going to fear
and/or read, and how we will re-read ourselves and our truths as
a consequence. (Augustine is also an instructive example of the
same dynamic: He was converted by the rhetoric of Ambrose;
whose sign of having been converted by the Logos to the Divine
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"Text" was to give up his chair of rhetoric; who nevertheless (in
Against Cresconius) sought to offer a pragmatic justification of the
utility of eloquence; who (in De Doctrina Christiana! makes a
significant contribution both to the theory of rhetoric and
semiotics, (as well as to the reductively thin neoplatonic tradition
of interpretation which associates rhetoric with style, and both
with separable formalistic properties which "aid the Message" or
content); and who, lastly (in Confessions), founds the genre of
"autobiography" — of rewriting one's life to dramatize (through a
highly crafted artifice) the "metaphysics" of the converted
"soul.")2?
But rhetoric is nevertheless (despite its persistence in this history)
made the useful and ever-present underdog to Dialectic, to having
the Truth; as if one got "there" first and acquired language later.
But, if rhetoric remains the hidden support to the possibility of
Dialectic -- from Plato, Aristotle and Augustine through the
Middle Ages to the Renaissance -- this is due less to the
epistemological "victory" of Philosophy than to the institutional
convenience of being able to appeal to the Truth through a
medium (an aesthetic) which, through its very use, acquires
transparency and is not seen as such, as a medium (Gombrich,
2? Cf. Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography. 1969.
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I 960);28 and which can thereby acquire enough social/
institutional power and authority to enforce its monopoly on
Truth-style — a stylistic invisibility and power upon which the
appeal to "Truth" depends. The suppression of rhetoricity in this
period is due also perhaps to the threat which public (primary)
rhetoric posed to the qe^sars and popes. (Of course, with the
advent of the printing press even the "secondary" rhetoric
(Reformation writings) of Luther proved threatening to the Pope,
to the entire political structure of Europe.)
Rhetoricity was suppressed, this argument runs, up to the point at
which the arts of the Renaissance, (in conjunction with the
practical opportunities for speech), opened up again, and with
them the unPhilosophical philosophical tradition of classical
rhetoric. In the mediaeval period, in other words, literary
28 Cf. Gombrich, 1960:ch. 4, "Reflections on the Greek Revolution:" What I
find.^ interesting here is his use of the concept "schema" in both its
worringly Kantian and its positive rhetorical, aesthetic and pragmatic
senses. It is kantian in that an artist's schema is his mental category both
within and without the mind. (And I wish to avoid attributing structures to
the mind.) It is non-Kantian in the instrumental sense reminiscent of
Dewey. A schema is used by the artist to persuade the viewer to enjoy a
visual illusion (or, in the context of rhetoric, a linguistic illusion). Some
schema is necessary to get the process of "representation" going, and one is
decided upon in terms of what will best serve the painterly (or
philosophical) purpose: i.e., it is decided upon rhetorically and
pragmatically, but then for some reason concealed, and its relativity
hidden. Secondly, Gombrich's reporting of the use of schemata (rhetorics,
aesthetic genres) in the 5th-century B.C. awakening of Greek art parallels
the flowering of sophism. And this very parallel between the flowering of
rhetoric and art is repeated in the Renaissance! This willingness to admit
the generative power of style and a pluralistic variety of genres
(schemata), along with the success of creating new and meaningful art
seems more than gratuitous.
Goodman, 1969:71-74, also uses the language of "schemata" to refer to
semiotic systems which guide and are guided by tradition, habit and
familial relations, not by psychology (in the mind) or "the world" (external
objects).
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rhetoric persisted as marginalized, in letters, funeral orations, and
in poetry,29 to be codified by monastic scribes and grammarians.
It made its reappearance occasionally and dualistically to "mold
the tongue," while Philosophy contemplatively "purified the
mind." The rhetoric of the 5th-century B.C. had been an
instrument (as well as a consequence) of social and political
change, in a relatively stable urban environment. But, under the
supervision of Dialectic and Truth, it was indeed a powerful,
public instrument for the preservation of the status quo, and an
ornament in the private life of the cloister.
In contrast, the canonical texts of the Renaissance were
inseparable from, and can best be interpreted in the context of,
the classical rhetorical tradition, both historically and
stylistically.30 That is, (And this is where I want to get to without
leaping too quickly and compromising my pretense to offer some
historically and pragmatically robust lineage to the rhetorical
question ), it is in the context of Renaissance humanism where a
rhetorical understanding of "imitation," (that is, of art, of stylistic
invention), expands itself again, where an artistic schema for
philosophizing reasserts itself, where civic life provides a practical
environment for this plurality to occur, where a forceful and
aesthetically regenerative rhetoric makes an appearance from the
valley between grammar and Dialectic. (And it is out of this same
valley that Dewey's pragmatic rhetoric moves between, (in his
29 On Chaucer as rhetor, cf. J. Murphy, Medieval Eloquence: Studies in the
Theory and Practice of Medieval Rhetoric. 1978:270-87.
30 G. Kennedy, 1980, argues strongly for the case that Quintilian is a major
rhetorical source for the Renaissance.
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day), a stream-lined scientistic positivism and grandly
inconsequential Metaphysics; as does Rorty, later, move from
between the professionalized details of the analytic style, on the
one hand, and the larger metaphysical assumptions and exclusions
of such a style on the other. Rorty continues to write from
between Objectivism and Relativism, from between Structure and
post-structure, between philosophical disorder and repetition,
seriousness and comedy — and all this without elevating Greek as
the only backdrop for such manoeuvres. In other words, the
rhetoric of the Renaissance was classicist, as is the historicist
rhetoric of Heidegger and Derrida — Greece alway "being" the
origin of "proper" Philosophical writing. One of the benefits of the
symbiosis of rhetoric and pragmatic humanism, of James, Dewey
and Rorty, is their use of the vernacular, and their interest in the
practical "pay-off" of Philosophy, in seeing themselves and their
province -- its industrial culture and its professionalized
discourses — as having moved somewhat from the Greek city-
state. And this seems reasonable to me.)
But in the historical narrative being offered, the Italian humanists
were the efficient cause of a revival of aestheticism and
rhetoricism, of the re-publication of actual classical texts, of the
linking of academic talent to public service, (as secretaries,
teachers: Petrarch is the obvious exception.). This is a period in
which rhetoric is absorbed into the aesthetics of literary criticism
(More on the contemporary re-establishment of this link later.)
and the pragmatics of coordinating civic and academic contexts.
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And it is this balancing act which rhetoric (for two centuries)
helped facilitate, and which I wish to continue emphasising. It is
a period in which, for example, Trebizond (1395-1472) could
write his Introduction of Dialectic which (in the good sophistic
philosophical tradition) regarded Dialectic as a "small subject,
useful for one entering into the greater field of rhetoric"31
[where], "with the agreement of the audience insofar as possible,
we speak on civic questions."32 (I am, like Dewey and Rorty,
simply wanting to endorse this particular way of construing
academic sets and subsets, or, of locating worn-out academic
patches in larger social fields.)
This is being narrated not in a spirit of one-upmanship, as a
competition between Philosophy and literature for the field of
Truth, as Danto for example pleas -- a purely representationalist
plea. (More on his rhetoric in chapter 6, esp. pp. 268-275.)
Rather, rhetoric is the fulcrum from which the pendulum between
them swings. Literature and politics, science and Philosophy, from
the 16th to the 18th centuries (e.g., for both Shakespeare and
Bacon), acquire a medium, a genre, in the spaces made by rhetoric,
through its persistence and place in education.33 All these forms
31 Recall Quintilian's hope that the orator might "lead philosophy back into
the fold of rhetoric." (p. 46)
32 Cf. J. Monfasani, George of Trebizond: A Biography and a Study of His
Rhetoric and Logic. 1976:370-372, and cited by Kennedy, 1980: 202.
33 Cf. Baldwin, William Shakespere's Small Latine and Lesse Greeke. 1944,
for the view that Shakespeare's works are a very concrete embodiment of,
if not the greatest achievement of, classical rhetoric. His early education
made him not only conscious of the rules and conventions of rhetoric, to
which he on occasion directly alludes or satirizes, but he fully utilizes them
in his composition "for the highest artistic purpose."
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of textuality manoeuvred for position and identity in rhetorical
and pragmatic ways, depending upon their purpose. But, not one
of them was born without the seeds of rhetoric being implanted in
them, without some sense of the artifice and style which in some
sense gave them their constitution. If they imitated, they
imitated in genres encouraged by a rhetoricized imagination.
Even the advent of the empirical, scientific model of discourse
required a persuasive rhetoric of presentation and apology: in
effect, a ("plain") style.34 How could new facts, without
conversation, without a narrative framework, otherwise acquire a
pragmatic/institutional grip on thought and inquiry? In other
words, a thick theory of rhetoric (a pragmatic theory) is itself a
"theory of communicative action" without transcendentals and
Truth (contra Habermas, 1982), but with, and encouraging of, a
variety of social inquiries and practices (passim Dewey and
Feyerabend).
2.4 RHETORIC AND THE RISE OF THE "MODERN:"
Bacon is, at this point, the critical link between sophism,
empiricism and pragmatism. He was able to talk about old books
and new experimentalist instruments in the same text; and a
powerful rhetoric of use and function linked them "for the
34 S. M. Halloran and M. D. Whitburn, argue that when Thomas Sprat
polemicizes on behalf of the Royal Society against rhetoric ("Who can
behold . . . how many mists and uncertainties these specious Tropes and
Figures have brought on our knowledge."), this can best be read within the
context of a rhetorical argument and an ideological endorsement of the
"plain style." Cf. "Ciceronean Rhetoric and the Rise of Science: Plain Style
Reconsidered," in The Rhetorical Tradition and Modern Writing, (ed.) J. J.
Murphy, 1982:58-72.
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modern world" — that is, Bacon's world: his project was rather
ambitious. This story will concentrate briefly on Bacon's views
and uses of rhetoric precisely because he is too often and easily
embraced as the great empiricist in a way which fails to
contextualize that particular style (empiricism) within his more
generally ubiquitous attempt to establish a persuasive pragmatics
of knowledge, and a rhetoric of social pedagogy. (The story will
refer primarily to Book 2, chapter 18, of The Advancement of
Learning where rhetoric is most directly discussed.)35
"Eloquence prevaileth in an active life . . . [T]he excellency of
examples of eloquence as the orations of Demosthenes and Cicero,
added to the perfection of the precepts of eloquence, hath doubled
the progression in this art . . ." (2.18.1) Rhetoric, for Bacon, is
diffused throughout the structure of knowledge, equal to logic
because of its great practical utility. It is an art best illustrated
(Demosthenes, Cicero) by political oratory. (We should remember
the importance and power of Bacon's own oratory in the
specifically political context of the House of Commons of his day,
where, as Johnson said of him: "He commanded where he spoke,
and had his judges angry and pleased at his devotion. No man
had their affections more in his power. The fear of every man
that heard him was lest he should make an end."35 In other
35 The Works of Francis Bacon (eds.) J. Spedding, R. L. Ellis, D. D. Heath,
1968.
35 Cited in K. R. Wallace's Francis Bacon on Communication and Rhetoric.
1943:4. Nor is it incidental that a century and a half later the philosophical
aesthetics of Edmund Burke's A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of
Our Ideas on the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), was also the work of an
(eventually) important parliamentary orator, albeit echoing neoclassical
"ideas" on beauty, passion and love.
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words, Bacon goes directly to classical rhetorical sources and to
the art and power of political discourse as the glue to a pedagogy
of socially valuable knowledge.
"[T]he duty and office of rhetoric" [is] "to apply reason to
imagination for the better moving of the will" (2.18.2). The
concept of imagination is important, and so too moving the will,
that is, the audience — (a more corporate and less individualized
"will" than James', as we will see in chapter 3, pp. 112-114). This
is to say that purposiveness is essential to discursive practice.
And the imagination (prior to the more transcendentally
psychologistic use of it in Kant and Coleridge) is considered as
central but functional in the suasive endeavor.37 The "duty" of
the endeavor is to "better" our practice, or the will. And the
strategies employed "ought to differ according to the audience" [in
order] "to better inquiry". (My italics.) This is not an
epistemological or ethical reduction of rhetoric in line with Plato
and Aristotle but, rather, even somewhat traditional rhetorical
3 ' Bacon understands the imagination functionally from within
experience, whereas Kant understands it as "grounded, antecedently to all
experience, upon a priori principles." (trans. Norman Kemp Smith,
Critique of Pure Reason. 1929) And Coleridge understands the imagination
as "the living power and prime agent of all human perception." But,
although he appeals to a Kantian idiom of transcendental psychology,
Coleridge's remarks should also be seen in the context of his poetics. In
other words, "what is the imagination?" is illustrated in terms of "what is
poetry?". And both are praised for their synthetic, abstractive and
transformative power. Unlike Kant's, Coleridge's imagination is "both
passionate and tranquil," enpowered in a proto-Freudian way by something
"deeper than consciousness," something partly unconscious. These are
moves away from some Kantian sentiments in the direction of a literary
and not simply metaphysical context, while nevertheless retaining a
primarily psychologistic tenor. (Coleridge citations from excerpts printed
in P. H. Werhane's Philosophical Issues in Art. 1984:210-216. Cf. also Mary
Warnock's Imagination. 1976.)
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apologetics in favor of its positive versatility to open and further
various avenues of debate and inquiry. (This has obvious
resonances with Peirce and Dewey, for whom the only real sin
would be to "block the road of inquiry" with a theory of Truth.)38
So, regarding empiricism, the shift "to study nature rather than
books" (as Kuhn, 1985:173, puts it) is not a shift from textuality to
reality itself, but a shift (as Hacking, 1985:145, puts it) from one
"style of reasoning" to another, a shift from one authority to
another.39 "Nature" is coordinated by that style, not by "neutral
observation sentences." A style (or scheme, passim Davidson,
1973 this time, but still with Gombrich peering through) does not
confront reality, it manipulates it, with words, materials,
whatever, for certain purposes, to produce certain consequences.
If a style of reasoning is "empirical" (and there have been several
of these styles) it will have its own internal criterion (in Putnam's
sense) of what constitutes being empirical, of what constitutes an
38 Dewey's reading of Bacon (Reconstruction in Philosophy. 1948:esp. 29-
3Iff.) centers primarily on Bacon's rubric that "Knowledge is Power," not
simply in the classical sense of power over other men or over ideas, to be
acquired by syllogistic or Aristotelian deduction, but in the sense (which
Dewey calls "modern") that we can have power also over "natural forces."
In other words (according to Dewey), Bacon does not give us knowledge of
"nature" in the form of a method of induction or demonstration, but he
"persuades" us of the instrumental, practical and social value of
manipulating nature over conserving the "knowledge already possessed by
canonical texts."
39 I. Hacking, 1985:146, writies: "... I have no doubt that our discoveries are
"objective," simply because the styles of reasoning that we employ
determine what counts as objectivity. My worry is that the very candidates
for truth or falsehood have no existence independent of the styles of
reasoning that settle what it is to be true or false in their domain."
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object, and what constitutes the larger project and purpose of an
inquiry, and where it fits with other inquiries.40
Bacon certainly attempted to instrumentalize a vocabulary useful
for describing events; but he recognized also that a vocabulary
constitutes and shapes facts and events: with a cosmology, with
prior views of the "objects of inquiry," with prior views of the
"situation of man" who inquires, all riding along too. (This is also
Feyerabend's view of Bacon.)41 Bacon offered a pragmatic
rhetoric in service of the new empiricism, as nonclassical as it was
neoclassical, as political as it was scientific, a rhetoric of "twisting
the lion's tail," that is, of the forceful intervention of man,
40 Putnam, 1981:49-50, writes that "the internalist perspective . . . hold[s]
that what objects does the world consist of? is a question that it only makes
sense to ask within a theory of description. . . 'Truth," in an internalist
view, is some sort of (idealized) rational acceptability — some sort of ideal
coherence of our beliefs with each other and with our experiences as those
experiences are themselves represented in our belief system — and not
correspondence with mind-independent or discourse-independent 'states of
affairs' ... [or with a] God's Eye point of view." But Putnam does not go the
whole rhetorical hog. My reservations are that he attempts to compensate
for the loss of the 'external' with a suspiciously neo-kantian appeal to
"rational acceptability," to our "natural desire" for a "God's Eye View." And
he does this by making somewhat sneaky and empty gestures that will
hopefully, by the default of all the old strategies for achieving
correspondence, and the persistence of such efforts to achieve it
nevertheless, leave us with the need to hold onto at least a "theory of
rationality" as the next best thing to mere "dialogue." Putnam concludes
his book Reason. Truth and History (p. 216) with some very Kantian and
ahistorical-sounding refrains: "Does this dialogue have an ideal terminus?
Is there a true conception of rationality, a true morality, even if all we ever
have are our conceptions of these? . . . The very fact that we speak of our
different conceptions as different conceptions of rationality posits a
Grenzbegriff, a limit-concept of the ideal truth." In other words, Putnam
concludes without letting us in on just how this contrast between "true
conception" and "all we ever have" is to have any force, if all we ever have
is all we ever have.
41 Cf. P. Feyerabend, Against Method. 1978:76.
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inventing instruments to further the suasive power of a certain
genre of inquiry, of writing.42
The historical line-up of unScientific philosophers being
complimented here begins with the sophists, with Gorgias, who
remarked "how astronomers, using "speech and argument" (logos),
manage to dispel men's former opinions [about things of the sky
and upper air] and to implant other opinions which had formerly
seemed incredible and inconsistent with plain facts."43 Galileo,
too, "prevails because of his style and his clever techniques of
persuasion, because he writves in Italian rather than Latin, and
because he appeals to people who are temperamentally opposed
to the old ideas and the standards of learning connected with
them." (Feyerabend, 1978:13). He succeeded because he could
make up for faulty instruments and "inadmissable" observations
with constructive rhetoric. Feyerabend supports this
aestheticization of method and the proliferation of ways of talking
as an improvement in the range and social flexibility of our
inquiries: it is more humanitarian. Nor is it in this regard entirely
coincidental that James' Pragmatism and Feyerabend's Erkenntnis
fiir freie Menschen are dedicated to Mill, to the ironic breakdown
(as James and Feyerabend pursue it) of Truth in the interest of
liberty. In effect, Gorgias and Galileo, James and Feyerabend all
link inquiry to successful rhetoric.
42 Even Chomsky, 1972:9, has stylized the epistemological position of
natural science, urging the "Galilean style" -- this style being one of what
Feyerabend, 1978:73, calls "critical discussion" -- which is also what Rorty
means by "conversation."
43 Cited in Wheelwright, The Presocratics. 1966:250.
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The rhetorical litany of names here is more than a grocery list of
voices which have chanted rhetoricist slogans for positive
pragmatic reasons. It is, I think, a polyphonous force which gets
us over the hope that Truth or Science could (or should) stabilize
meaning and experience, and present Philosophy with its
yearned-for model of propriety and constraint. It is also the
momentum which helps shove us over the modernist hump which
treats this as a crisis, and the "breakdown" as requiring a new le
Corbusier-like edifice of Truth which must have no precedent in
the tradition being renounced. The pragmatic aesthete looks to
wherever he can find some helpful advice: to Gorgias and Cicero,
Bacon and Feyerabend, to old constructions and new
deconstrcuctions, to scientific texts and to literary texts.
But, (the story continues), after Bacon came the "new logic:"
Descartes' Discourse on Method (1667), on the one hand, and
Pascal's De l'esprit geometrique (known, interestingly, also as
L'Art de persuader) (1664), on the other: "A clash over rhetoric "
is clear.44 (And James, in this regard, was persuaded more by the
rhetoric of pascalian wagers than cartesian truths as a form of
discourse). The new logic claimed without irony that the only
sound method of inquiry is that of geometry — also a neoclassical
shadow cast by Aristotle (Recall p. 42.) — which proceeds from
self-evident axioms (of self-representative minds) to universally
accepted conclusions — (a representationalist aesthetic!). Rhetoric
44 Cf. H. M. Davidson, Audience. Words, and Art: Studies in Century
French Rhetoric. 1965:109-140.
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can neither discover nor demonstrate Truth, only further
deception. (Of course this polemic is repeating itself -- an
emotional reflex which fears the connection betweeen emotion,
persuasion, and knowledge-seeking discourses.).
The positive, pragmatic side of the new logic was its power to
create and establish a new and indeed needed form of
communication for the emergence of modern science. But, its
denial of its own pragmatics, in order to ground Truth, was also its
neglect of the no less powerful discourses of politics and
economics involved in this very same (social) emergence of
science. In the 17th century an interest in logic necessarily
involved questions of the province of rhetoric, as much for the
Royal Society as for the French Academy. And Locke, who had
even lectured on rhetoric (at Oxford in 1663), was equally
polemical by the time he wrote An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding (1690). Traditional rhetoric he described as "the
Art . . . (and) powerful instrument of Errour and Deceit."45 What
Locke wanted was to exclude figures of speech and rhetorical
45 Cf. Book 3, chapter 10, "Of the Abuse of Words", section 34, "Seventhly,
Figuarative speech also an abuse of language:" "... if we would speak of
Things as they are, we must allow, that all the Art of Rhetorick, besides
Order and Clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of Words
Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong
Ideas, move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment; and so indeed
are perfect cheat: And therefore however laudable or allowable Oratory
may render them in Harangues and popular Addresses, they are certainly,
in all Discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided;
and where Truth and knowledge are concerned cannot but be thought a
great fault, either of the Language or Person that makes use of them. . . 'Tis
evident how much Men love to deceive, and be deceived, since Rhetorick,
that powerful instrument of Error and Deceit, has its established Professors,
is publickly taught, and has always been had in great Reputation:" A n
Essav concerning Human Understanding, ed. and intro. by P. H. Nidditch,
1979:508.
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"devices" from serious discourse, from "pure speech"46 — an
unfortuante encouragement to that form of philosophy of
language which, like Searle, beliyes it can legislate between two
separate (and/or separable) games, "fictional talk" and "real world
talk,"47 the first game being "parasitic upon" the second — (a
mimetic aesthetic!).48
Then along came Hume to talk Of Eloquence (1743), noting that
"our progress in eloquence is very inconsiderable, in comparison
of the advances, which we have made in all other parts of
learning." Hume extends the growing separation between rhetoric
and science by citing a decline in the former (referring narrowly
to the showmanship of parliamentary oratory like that of a
Demosthenes), rather than seeing the latter (science) as indeed the
former's advance, as a new and pragmatically successful rhetoric.
We now have not a clash over rhetoric but a separation of
rhetorics. This leaves Hume's essay looking less like a robust
theory than a somewhat emasculated medley of obligatory themes
of neoclassical and 18th-century rhetoric: the achievements of the
ancients compared with the English; admiration for the individual
orator and the appeal of elocution (but little concern for public
consequences); the effect of the new logic on rhetoric (already
46 In an earlier section (Book 3.10.23) Locke summarizes his views on the
primary "ends of language:" "First, To make known one Man's Thoughts or
Ideas to another. Secondly, To do it with as much ease and quickness, as is
possible; and Thirdly, Thereby to convey the Knowledge of Things.
Language is either abused, or deficient, when it fails in any of these




seeing them as separate — logic as opposed to rhetoric); interest in
the sublime, and the identification of grand style with genius
(perhaps with envy).
But the consequences of this movement were to elevate a style by
disguising its rhetoricity, by constructing a model (of logic) to be
treated as if it weren't one, as if it weren't a model. With the
advent of British empiricism, one now wanted not a model of
pragmatic rhetoric to analyse the social discourse of science, but a
science of language for discovering modes of arguing that attach
themselves, not, in the end to more language, but to the world
itself. The rather hopeful allegory employed, following Locke, was
that the world wrote directly on the mind before we started
speaking (or writing) about it, as if speech would now follow the
rules of the world. This pushed the question of rhetoric further
into now institutionalized separations, pushing rhetoric into
literature (belles lettres) and science into lettres reelles.
Both Hume and Hugh Blair (Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles
Lettres.49 1783) mention the connection between the need for
rhetoric and having affective oratory in a popular form of
government, but not the connection between the need for a
49 H. Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. 2 Vol., ed. & intro., H. F.
Harding, 1965. Blair is worth mentioning for two reasons: 1. Blair is a
commentator for whom Quintilian is the authoritative figure, and perhaps
the last writer for whom this is the case. 2. He is also deserving of mention,
not because of any amendment he made to rhetorical theory or practice,
but because of his role in sustaining an institutional lineage nearly erased
by the beginning of the 20th century. Blair's lectures were widely
circulated and studied in the U. S. and in Britain, and his work found its way
into more than 50 editions of the complete text and at least as many
abridgments. Cf. R. M. Schmitz, Hugh Blair, 1948:144-45.
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pragmatically effective rhetoric and now having a new language
of science to add to it. So, by the 19th century, the study of, and
the pragmatic connection between, Philosophy and rhetoric,
science and rhetoric, the classics and rhetoric had drifted apart.
In contrast, the movement most sustained by Dewey (beginning
toward the end of the 19th century) is that of trying to
philosophize in a way which does not exacerbate these
professional and disciplinary separations on the basis of an
epistemology which privileges one of them: he, rather,
coordinated them. He understood science as the creation of a style
of inquiry which creates new and effective opportunities for
improved social action and communication; a discourse
aestheticized in the sense that it relates to and arises out of social
experience, not something Transcendent and antecedently True: it
contn butes a useful artifice to human endeavor which enriches
its store of, and application of, "powerful tools and enjoyed
meanings." It was, for Dewey, an art (like architecture) which
persists as both theoretical and practical, rhetorical and political,
useful and fine.50 Perhaps somewhat homely sentiments, but
certainly more modern than mimetic, in continuity with a
nonDialectical tradition of rhetoric which foregrounded the
construction of an improved artifice for achieving a desired
purpose; and not in continuity with the fixed patterns of the
artisan -- such an important model for the social stability sought
50 Dewey: 1929b (1958:258). (These points and pragmatic relations will
return, for example, in the rhetoric and rhetoricity of post-modern
architecture, as James Stirling will build it, and as Charles Jencks will
comment upon it. Cf. chapter 6, esp. pp. 240-241.)
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and consecrated by the Philosophy of Plato.51 So, it is to the
rhetoric of Dewey's contemporaries, to their ambivalent
contributions to the pragmatization of Philosophy and to the role
the aesthetic plays in this process, that I now turn.
51 Dewey, in Reconstruction in Philosophy. 1948:94, writes: "In the social
arts, such a radical reformer as Plato felt that existing evils were due to the
absence of such fixed patterns as controlled the productions of artisans.
The ethical purport of philosophy was to furnish them, and when once
they were instituted, they were to be consecrated by religion, adorned by
art, inculcated by education and enforced by magistrates so that alteration
of them would be impossible." (Whereas Dewey implied, rightly I think,
that we can reverse this relation and appeal to the paradigmatic changes in
the arts as a criticism of this form of philosophizing: there are no fixed
patterns: not for the arts, and not for a philosophy which refers to them.)
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3.1 PHILOSOPHY AND PRAGMATIC WRITING:
Having attempted to lead the empirical, physical "sense" of
modern science up to its own rhetoricity and textuality, and
having attempted to lead the metaphysical "Truth" of Dialectic
down to its, another short story is required to add a narrative link
between them both and the more local history and rhetoric of
pragmatism. "Narrative," here, is used in its confessedly sloppy
sense. Local histories aren't in a position to guarantee or ground
necessary causal relations between persons, events, and texts.
Nor are they privileged enough to be able to preserve some
"identity" between past, present and future work. Nor would
Dewey (nor Rorty, for that matter) encourage us to keep telling
histories if they become a "polishing [of old] tools" as the primary
justification for keeping them.1 But finding a story-teller's art
that can include history and avoid what Dewey called "chewing a
historic cud" implies using a genre of writing which is more
difficult to practice than to talk about the theory which
encourages such practice.2 To avoid nostalgic reminiscence and
1 Dewey, 1916 (1966:328). For "Rorty's Use of Dewey" in this regard cf. J.
Campbell, 1984:175-187.
2 "Under such circumstances (writes Dewey) there is danger that the
philosophy which tries to escape the form of generation by taking refuge
under the form of eternity will only come under the form of a bygone
generation. To try to escape from the snares and pitfalls of time by
recourse to traditional problems and interests: — rather than that let the
dead bury their own dead. Better it is for philosophy to err in active
participation in the living struggles and issues of its own age and times
than to maintain an immune monastic impeccability, without relevancy
and bearing in the generating ideas of its contemporary present." Dewey,
"Does Reality Possess Practical Character?," 1908; cited in McDermott (ed),
The Philosophy of John Dewev. 2 Vol. 1981 :xliii.
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repetitive self-parody implies the use of an historicist artifice
which attempts to make a virtue of unrepresentational writing,
enjoying the somewhat troubling and irresolvable tension
between its respect and its manipulation — its impious fidelity to
things past.
In order to begin writing about pragmatic writing, let us retrieve
again Dewey's writing about reading the writing of Plato:
"Plato's generation would, I think, have found it difficult to
class Plato. Was he an inept visionary or a subtle
dialectician? A political reformer or a founder of the new
type of literary art? Was he a moral exhorter, or an
instructor in an Academy? Was he a theorist upon
education, or the inventor of a method of knowledge? We,
looking at Plato through the centuries of exposition and
interpretation, find no difficulty in placing Plato as a
philosopher and in attributing to him a system of thought.
We dispute about the nature and content of this system, but
we do not doubt it is there. It is the intervening centuries
which have furnished Plato with his technique and which
have developed and wrought Plato to a system."
His reading of Plato (while writing about Emerson) was to allude
to an aesthetic-philosophical tradition which blurs
professionalized distinctions, which uses a style and a vocabulary
operative in more than one disciplinary space, which loosens itself
as a text from the merely exegetical function of reminiscing about
other and older "Philosophical" texts (James, too, was his
precedent here.). His point was not to construct (label, or read) a
text as if it must be a "metaphysical, epistemological, or
ontological" one — implying privileges which transcend cultural
locality; it was to read a text pragmatically, as a critical
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contribution to its cultural milieu, a milieu which always included
non-Philosophers.
This sort of philosphical writing is, in Dewey's texts, a part of the
aesthetic, i.e., an art; in that it is a medium for making, not for
mirroring (or otherwise losing itself in transparency). It doesn't
reflect (epistemologically), it stylizes (purposefully), "integrating
means and ends." This means, generally, that in our "doings and
undergoings" in different social domains there is always a large
amount of style, of artifice and craftiness. Specifically regarding
the philosophical medium, style is an historical conglomeration of
rhetorical devices for arguing and/or ridiculing, elevating and/or
effacing interests which discourses carry (or pretend not to carry)
around with them. For Dewey, the aesthetic is a "category" which
can be more or less tight, more or less rigorous, more or less
metaphorical, but never closed or absolute. It is an "interacting
mode" in all domains of human discourse which doesn't justify
privileging any one of them, or its users, or their style for
organizing the "world."
Dewey's metaphors or figures could be biological and organic: He
was born in the same year as Darwin's Origin of Species was
published, was keen on Huxley, and preferred the language of
"organic interaction" to that of metaphysical "essence" or
"foundation." The organic was the indispensable medium of our
most crude and cherished cultural transactions -- economic and
aesthetic — but not a determinative foundation for them. It could
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not guarantee any form of knowledge (high or low); but it might
help habituate some which worked. Our "biology" was a dynamic
membrane in and out of which different forms of knowledge
(ingrown or not) could pass.
It was through Darwin (the point of controversy in turn-of-the-
century metaphysics in American Philosophy) that Dewey
attempted to construct a developmental, pragmatic logic, rather
than offer a beleagured defense of an already out-moded religion
— a defense which preoccupied Harvard Philosophy, engendered a
great deal of superfluous fervor, offered very tenuous consolation,
and which Dewey simply bypassed as reactionary.
Darwin encouraged a shift from the imagery of and preoccupation
with static absolutes and essences to an interest in specific
transitions and processes, to a vocabulary interested in
articulating changes which served (or hindered) concrete
purposes. What Dewey extrapolated was a concrete functionalism
which could leave the Absolute in Europe or Harvard with the
idealists and transcendentalists: while he attempted to outline a
philosophical language which would register and investigate the
socio-natural conditions which encouraged and/or allowed for the
generation of a wider plurality of levels -- levels of concrete and
"functionally beneficial interactions," operative in different
domains of human activity, discussable in different genres of
writing.
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In other words: No one theory of Causality; no single
determinative Substance; no Peircean "long run" which
teleologically guaranteed direction and the eventual cosmological
conversion of all inquiry; no Roycean Absolute to oversee the
process. For Dewey, Darwin and the notion of "experimentation"
were combined (along with the persuasive help of James) as a
strategy for avoiding this legacy. They combined to encourage a
rhetorical and pragmatic shift which gave philosophy something
else to do, and a style of reasoning with which to do it.3
But Dewey's philosophy of nature was also, and at the same time,
an anthropological story: He was influenced by the work of
George Herbert Mead, and saw analytic and investigative
discourses as cultural practices, as elliptical embodiments of social
interests and relations, as epistemologically interested, therefore,
in the dynamics of human experience. Man might not be the
measure of all things, but it was this practical/social anthropos
who needed to do the measuring. Hence, his language would
always be committed to historical and political metaphors — the
non-theological side of Hegel which Dewey never forgot, and in
terms of which a positivist vision of knowledge was not possible.
The more specific historical location of the normative and
evaluative political vocabulary he used was in the socially
critical/ameliorative side of democratic liberalism, on the one
hand, and in a pragmaticized Marxism, on the other. What linked
this political imagery with his scientific (empirical) imagery was
3 Cf. Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy: And Other Essavs in
Contemporary Thought. 1910:1-19.
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his praise and apologetics for "experiment." He conceived of this
as a general virtue over which science had no monopoly, but some
instructive success; a virtue which implied that not all was well,
that things could be done better, and that "experiment" (political,
scientific, artistic) was the most open, creative and responsive
way to proceed in order to coordinate these different discourses,
and to prevent any one of them from becoming an epistemological
bully. "Experimentation" was a strategy and a figure in the sense
that its use in science did not constitute a specific methodological
discovery procedure of the antecedently real which could be
adopted elsewhere. It was an attempt institutionally to habituate
good styles of intellectual work.
Dewey's metaphors, as part of his pragmatic strategy of writing,
were also ubiquitously aesthetic. His precedents, Emerson and
Whitman, were democrats, philosophers and poets for whom
discursive walls didn't exist, or shouldn't in any absolute sense.
Such walls were written and could be unwritten. With a little
finesse, language from different institutional domains (the
literary, the scientific, the philosophical) did not translate one into
the other so much as, by juxtaposition, loosen and disrupt the
consolidation of any one vocabulary constructed in technical and
social isolation from the others. Dewey's sustained subtext was
always aesthetic in that the worlds with which vocabularies coped
were cultural artifacts not positivist discoveries, and experienced
by their users not verified outside of that culture's experience.
When the aesthetic meant the arts more specifically, then the
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material media used, and the social context and performance
traditions within which these "objects" were made and
experienced, did not form an autonomous domain, untouched by
or unable to touch other social practices to which they might not
"refer" directly. Art objects (like philosophical texts) were specific
efforts at giving form, at shaping and/or criticizing an accepted
form or shape given to bits of our world. But, by virtue of being
activities, they were not passive mirrors or imitators.
And, finally, Dewey's larger allegories were primarily pedagogical,
(in the rhetorical tradition of Bacon, British empiricism, and
Scottish Common Sense philosophy — a more productive set of
texts (for James too) in the development of pragmatism than the
neo-kantianism which absorbed Peirce and Royce). Dewey's
interest in education was both philosophical and programmatic.
He thought that experience was pedagogical in that we made
worlds, and organized discourses to cope with them, and hopefully
to do so in way which would offer more benefits and stability
than whatever had previously been tried. Being programmatic
was an extension of a philosophy of experience which sought to
institutionalize and better secure the training of those procedures
deemed most productive of our relative "successes at coping." (It
was, interestingly, a somewhat crude reception of Dewey's
voluminous work on education which, in Scotland, fueled James
Darioch's (and other Scottish teacher s1 and socialists') attempts to
reform the entrance requirements of Scottish Universities; which
fueled the 1920's controversies over the function of the university
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and of philosophy within it; which helped frame the question as to
whether university education served primarily socially valuable
and practical or elitist and anachronistic functions; which led also
to John Anderson's criticisms of Dewey in defense of a curious
mixture of traditional educational classicism and Calvinist
authoritarianism as a justification of the status quo.)4 Dewey
thought that an interest in learning motivated any relevant form
of intellectual work, that explicit and systematic contribution to
pedagogy was a necessary dimension to such work, and a good
reason for doing the literary/critical work called philosophy.
Hence, (and back to our primary focus) Dewey's
deprofessionalized rigor dedramatises the distinction between
Philosophy and Literature, epistemology and interpretation. What
his (somewhat) "modernist," constructive conscience and Rorty's
"postmodernist" irony ask is: Are Philosophical texts perhaps
grandiloquent but provincial artifacts talking too big (as in
Heidegger); or big lumps of social relations talking too tough (as
the Nietzschean Foucault interprets things); or too-tough-to-read
lumps of etymological professionalism talking (albeit) critically (as
in Derrida); or are such texts more modest but hopeful lumps of
interdisciplinary sentences which are no longer holding out for the
honor and authority of would-be universal Truths? Dewey's art
seems to be the latter.
4 Cf. G. Davie, The Crisis of the Democratic Intellect. 1986, who reads
Anderson more sympathetically, and the institutionalization of a
Philosophy which stands by its privileges to pronounce on "first
principles" more generously.
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For those who want rigor, it can, or course, be a good thing. But it
presupposes a discursive style already shared (and hence a
standard of rigor being accredited by a community). The problem
being when the question of which or how many discourse(s) to
use is unsettled, each offering a different resonance, with
different "empirical" concerns, techniques, cultural histories and
stylistic conventions. (This is the question Feyerabend celebrates.)
In the aesthetic context, rigor, considered analytically or
otherwise, is not a meta-category by which all domains can be
compared, nor a general principle kept externally aside for
reasons of objective measurement. (Wasn't this Harold Osborne's
hoped-for frame of reference for Criticism?). It is, rather, a
rhetorical gesture made in favor of those discourses we find
already operative, illuminating, and sophisticated, a functional
compliment paid to particular forms of notation and
communication and their semiotic use (Goodman) — be those uses
"scientific" or "artistic," be the unit of interest a Searly,
domineering sentence or speech act, or a Derridean story, a more
homely narrative by non-analytic Dewey or a witty one by post-
analytic Rorty.
We narrate and criticize ourselves through stories (big ones like
Christianity and small ones like Camus's "Fall" from the grip of this
big one), through constructing experiments, institutions, and
industries, through the brute and the beautiful. We narrate
through paintings which picture, notes which compose, through
garden, town, and architectural planning which organizes, through
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films and photos which summarize and/or freeze bits of social
experience being attended to, broken up and/or given form.5 As
rather versatile and needy organisms we feed from all these
domains. So, the question of which proposition to assert, or picture
to look at, note or narrative to listen to, criticize and/or promote
are all questions not about what is epistemologically True or
dialectically false. These are questions about what will help us get
what we want and about what we should want, and (for Dewey)
about which deconstructive and reconstructive practices would
improve the odds.
One such improvement would be to recognize philosophical
practice as itself aesthetic, that it is itself writing (Derrida).6 And
(as Dewey said about Plato) it is a way of reading texts. The
classification of the poet as the man of metaphor and the
philosopher as the man of objective Truth, of the noun, is a
classification internal to a rhetoric and an institution. The
oppositions, Truth or rhetoric, objectivity or metaphorical
sophistry, are products of a Philosophical rhetoric. They beg the
question and encourage the philosopher not to learn what it is he
does (i.e., write), nor aesthetically to understand his own artifice
and read it accordingly. (More about what sort of "reading" is
meant here also in chapters 4 and following.) Aestheticizing the
5 These very different modalities of "narrative" are being blurred together
simply to indicate their similarities as aesthetic and non-foundational, and
to indicate that the notion of "narrative" is being used metaphorically to
refer to these domains in a non-ontologically privileging discourse.
6 More on the relationship between pragmatism and the work of Derrida in
chapter 5, esp. pp. 195-231.
85
text and foregrounding the role of the interested reader in the
reception of the text is part of what it is to read pragmatically.
On the reading side, this is just to say that there are different
pragmatic reasons for, and ways, of, reading a text. Philosophers
have tended not to read for images, figures and a plurality of
possible stories. They have dreamt of frisking the metaphors and
figures for an argument, a clear proposition, a truth, for a naked
noun upon which our semantic constructions must be referentially
parasitic -- (a traditional manoeuvre engendered by Aristotle,
according to both Dewey and Derrida; a manoeuvre which wants
to read-off essences and write more than a helpful story, with the
use of more than the latest functioning metaphor). The epistemic
dualism (noun/metaphor, truth/fiction) having been accepted, the
task is to weed out and convert the latter to the former — (it
having been there, hiding underneath all the time). (This pastiche
will acquire some details in chapter 4, as will a defence of pastiche
in chapter 6.)
Dewey, when writing philosophy, had no specifically detailed
analytic technique for separating out true from false sentences,
asocial and innocent nouns from dubiously infected metaphors.
He had no dualism separating poetics from philosophical
propositions. Nor did he have a prose whose generality occupied
any position of ontological privilege (or harbored an Austinian
desire to find a descriptive jurisprudence by which to clean up
(make "clear") his ordinary language). There wasn't anything
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called Philosophy in these senses, and no general "problem of
knowledge" as its basis; no single set of practices; no single
stylistically orthodox institution of great texts. A curriculum could
provide some historical order and professionally encourage a way
of reading and writing: But Dewey's pragmatism, as a style of
reading and writing, could not avoid interacting with the
literature of other cultural domains, (political, scientific, and
aesthetic), be it Emerson or Einstein -- both of whom he wrote
about.
"Language" becomes, therefore, not only (from the philosophical
canon) a Wittgensteinean inquiry, but also (for example) a Joycean
and Nabakovian one. And our semiotic practices and institutions
involve not only language and its conventions; they involve also
the power of the image (e.g., of photography, painting, film), of the
acoustic (e.g., of music), and the power of other social media which
make our worlds. The "aesthetic" is a reminder that these worlds
we experience not primarily as philosophical/ epistemological
knowers (with a fully formed Subject in a free-standing
relationship to a fully formed world). We become made and
corporately do some of the remaking for reasons often
experientially and ideologically camouflaged by theories of Truth
and Knowledge. Talk of art and aesthetic experience is (for
Dewey) talk about how we embody and transmit, criticise and aid,
through different socio-material conventions (like the writing of
philosophy) some of these interests and knowledge-producing
inquiries.
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So, Dewey's local style was not raised to a principle in itself. It
hadn't that forbidden taste of subversion, or the texture of the
overwoven and Derridean -- (a style nevertheless rightly critical
of the cartesian Subject being in full, conscious, disembodied
control of the written work; and rightly suspicious of standard
philosophical conventions of reading and writing which have
predominated in the mainstream institutional (especially analytic)
canon). Dewey's occasionally homely and hard-working New
England style was etymologically less professional, but easier to
read. His models were not the eccentricities of a de Sade or
Artaud, used as grand theatrical metaphors of Western dissent
from the "Tradition," as Derridaean figures supporting the search
for romantic and marginalized moments of resistance (failed
resistance) to the "Whole of Western discourse."7 (Failed, of
course: For how could they escape what by definition is the
"Whole" of discourse?)
Dewey's art was more mundane. He rather liked and respected
the ordinary. He had a rural evenness and humanist hopes which
were reflected in his style. The contrast between philosophy and
7 On Artaud as a metaphor of dramatic resistance to "Western" discourse, cf.
"The Theater of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation," Writing and
Difference. Bass, A., (trans., Intro.), London, 1981. (More recently Derrida
has remained loyal to the idea that, with respect to writing, . . . "it can be
presumed that it is a matter of the whole of the tradition . . ." This
philosophical rubric is still of the grand, Heideggerian sort. But, regarding
this rubric (and Heidegger), Derrida also shows his characteristic mixture
"of responsibility and disrespect," his "filial impiety.") Cf. "An Interview
With Derrida," in Derrida & Differance. Wood & Bernasconi (eds.),
1985:124,125. (interview by Catherine David for le Nouvel Observateur.
1983.)
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literature was institutional not epistemological, treated not as a
basis for another grand theory about the structure (or post-
structure) of all discourse (Of Grammatology).8 It was a question
of preference. The contrast did not refer to one monolithic
conspiracy to erase the metaphor (Derrida's diagnosis), nor to two
separable (epistemological) worlds of truth (Danto's dais);9 it
referred, rather, to two different bibliographies. Their respective
textual industries and social uses might vary. But that variance
does not make one a "Fach" and the other family of texts
suspicious deviants from what is "true in all possible worlds."10
8 Derrida, J., De la grammatologie. Minuit, 1967; Engl. Trans., O f
Grammatologv , 1976.
9 Cf. Danto's "Philosophy as/and/of Literature," 1985. Danto's energetic
homily to the would-be Truth, as the goal of philosophy, is a call to those
hopefuls who remain staunchly worried that the Fellows-after-Truth
(philosophers) must be careful not to keep bad literary-theoretical
(textualist) company.
10 More on Danto's rhetoric in chapter 6. My point at the moment is to
setup briefly Dewey's understanding of the pragmatics of writing in a
"philosophical" genre.
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3.2 EARLY TENSIONS OF PRAGMATIC WRITING:
We need some narrative reference again to history, to Dewey's
most important contemporaries, to fill in further the pragmatists'
picture. They intermittently made reference to the aesthetic, to
the rhetoricity of pragmatism itself; but they wanted to hold onto
beliefs beyond its relativizing reach. James realized this and
wagered in favor of the sort of (religious) belief that his own irony
would have prevented him from trying to ground. So, James
(along with Emerson — who is later revived by Rorty, Bloom and
Cavell) is an important stylistic precedent. It is his prose which
expresses a pragmatic aesthetic. (Although it is surprising that his
own training as a painter and involvement in the literary
theoretical debates of his day did not lead to more detailed
remarks on rhetoric, aesthetics and the arts as an alternative to
science as a paradigm for pragmatizing the Philosophical genre.)
Royce too wrote about the pragmatic while clinging to an Absolute
which oversees. Peirce outlined a semiotic pragmatism while
clinging to Foundationalist dreams which it could never support.
All three wanted a religious subtext along with a proliferation and
extension of strategies of inquiry under the aegis of the new
sciences. Pragmatism, they hoped, would allow them both worlds.
What aligned even their disagreements was a defense of
conventional Bostonian "spiritual" values, while nevertheless
shifting to define belief as a "habit of action" rather than some
abstruse mental phenomenon. The category of "habit," they
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hoped, would get them past Descartes, and be able to do service
for the need to hold old values and sponsor new habits of inquiry
and scientificity. An interest in logic was the predominant
instrument for attempting to formalize these habits — except for
James. But there are also important institutional dynamics which
encouraged this pragmatist genre of writing to develop in certain
ways.
Logic, science, and the growth of the universities combined to
push for a particular form of professionalization; and this meant:
1. the disappearance of the amateur philosopher, the writer/
thinker without institutional affiliation, salary and related
administrative responsibilities.
2. the beginning of a discipline of philosophy circumscribing a
limited field of knowledge in the university, distinguished less by
an interest in public culture than by a preoccupation with special
techniques and a conventionally accepted set of social doctrines.
3. the growth of departmentalism and the concomitant economic
politics which define disciplinary integrity and value in terms of
the number of positions in a specified field the university would
finance, and the number of publications any one member would
amass.
4. And this form of professionalization meant a grooming of, and
placing of, teachers in this field by a competitively intensified
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apprenticeship, leading to the doctorate and a lectureship — (one
hoped).11
The point being broached at the moment is that these institutional
dynamics carried with them aesthetic questions and
consequences. On the back of these dynamics rode questions
relating to a change in written style, its relationship to an
envisaged audience, and how differences in style were to be
received and judged. For example, the popular idiom of James
and the ministerial idiom of Royce have often detracted from their
reputations; while Peirce's technical and metaphysically
anomalous idiom has often added to his. And Whitehead's
mixture of technical, oracular, ministerial and cosmological genres
has often hurt his. Style, along with other interests, is a criterion
employed in such judgements, but usually without being made
explicit or receiving detailed comment; probably because it carries
no objectivist credentials, and privileges no particular form of
argument. It has seemed better to deny the constitutive
dimension of style in striving for trustworthy reference (to objects
and/or texts) than admit its relativity. Nevertheless, the
institutionalization of a distinctly philosophical expertise seemed
to encourage the historical shift to symbolic logic and
epistemology as core genres of the discipline; and with this came
the decline of a public philosophical idiom (of rhetoric, in the
11 Cf. L. Veysey's The Emergence of the American University. 1965, for an
excellent account of the role the development of the university played in
the rise of departmental disciplinarianism. And B. Kuklick's The Rise of
American Philosophy concentrates more specifically on the rise of the
philosophical profession between 1860 and 1930 in view of the social
context of the university.
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classical sense) and the pursuit of non-professional interests. How
one earned a salary became increasingly disjointed from how one
lived.
My direction in this section will be toward Rorty on his way out
the other end of this history of professionalization; which means:
after writing a treatise on analytic accomplishments and their
pragmatic consequences,12 he returns to essays,13 to embracing
the cosmopolitan amateur who doesn't know the conditions of
knowledge: After a period of technical professionalization, he
returns as the edifying kibitzer and sophistic story-teller, finding
his venue in the public conversations of a board of
interdisciplinary intellectuals: After the discipline of Philosophy
has exhausted its role as adjudicator of knowledge claims, in
terms of a limited set of questions about "language," he returns to
art as the paradigm, to the unprincipled writer,14 the producer not
of total systems but of texts, of artifacts. He encourages a post-
Philosophical rhetoric which lets "a thousand flowers bloom."
Dewey is between these alternatives: The philosopher is the
generalist, but the stakes involved in his contribution (or lack of)
are high: The form his work takes is indeed not primarily of any
one sort — he writes books, articles in professional journals, and
journalistically for newspapers; he is indeed on the board of
intellectual conversationalists, but also on the board of the
12 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. 1979.
13 Rorty, The Consequences of Pragmatism. 1982, and elsewhere.
14 Cf. Rorty's "Philosophy without Principles," 1984a.
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teacher's union, and the chairman of the Committee of Inquiry
investigating the Moscow trials of Trotsky in Mexico City:15 His
textual products are not in service of writing a System of First
Principles or of providing the epistemological structures of
knowledge, but he does concentrate on the public, social and
macroscopic powers which effect how easy or difficult any one
flower finds it to bloom.
Two amateur precedents for the rise of this style also need to be
mentioned. Firstly Emerson: He was not an expository thinker.
His speculative products were a function of eloquence, not of a
System or a proof. His was a textual nominalism of
aesthetic/moral objects, the literary/philosophical pursuits of a
man of independent means. Secondly: the "Metaphysical Club" of
the 1870's: Of its six core members, three were lawyers, practical
men who wanted to see concepts in operation, coming out of and
relating more to human action than to "a method of reflection,"
more to behavior than to speculation (Recall the juridical
background of the sophists.). They sought to naturalize "mind" (in
the context of Darwin and Descartes, remember) and view thought
as intentional and functional. Participation in this milieu is in part
what led Peirce to his "pragmatic maxim:" without evidence of
noumenal objects, it was verbiage to argue that they must be
there to ground certain experiences.
15 In 1937, at the age of 78, Dewey was the chairman in Mexico City of the
Commission of Inquiry into Charges Made Against Leon Trotsky in the
Moscow Trials, and highly praised for his skill in this position. He was also
the founder and first president of the American Association of University
Professors.
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3.3 PEIRCE, THE UNEASY RHETORICIAN:
It would be a difficult strain to narrate Peirce's work in a way
which made it tidy and consistent. Between Peirce's persistent
search for a grounded System and the inconsistencies internal to
that search, there sneaks in a somewhat disruptive notion of the
aesthetic, all the more so for being a parenthetical interest which
rests uneasily on the margins of his work, to be called upon when
the acquisition of Truth requires some imagination -- (More on
this following.). Peirce's grand Systematic project and his concrete
contributions to pragmatist semiotics, his attempt to extend the
categorical absoluteness of Kant and the common-sensism of Reid,
are all uneasily combined in a Peirce who was part scholastic
puritan and turn-of-the-century Bostonian, writing in a variety of
idioms which are, even for the sympathizer, difficult to
disentangle (or blur in a way which is to his credit).
He sought a theory of a priori universal categories, a foundational
role for mathematics, and a substantive definition of truth which
could, on the other hand, be phenomenologically and
experimentally verified. But he could never cover all of the
metaphysical loans he took out to generate and support the
systematic whole he wished to provide. The axis upon which one
can turn Peirce's work is his "Kantian fusion of idealist and realist
themes" in an attempt holistically "to place all human
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experience"16 ~ an attempt on the one hand to make man himself
a sign and a user of signs (a rhetorician), and on the other, to
make him the knower of the nature of all true signification (a
Dialectician).
Most of Peirce's output is in some way about the semiotic, about
the inquirer, about "representation," and about the languages used
to elicit the world. (And this (Peirce's semiotic) seems to me to be
his implicit aestheticization of representation, of reference, of a
philosophy which investigates these questions.) More specifically,
his semiotic is a theory of thought (and mind), a detailed theory of
inference, and a theory of the "nature" of the signs we use for
both. The ambition is to ground the links between realistic
representation and convention, between the object and the
"interpretant" as managed by different types of signification.
What Peirce attempted was to outline the "ultimate aims of
inquiry," and to do so through a theory of categories "discovered
(from his) study of signs."17
To say that "all thought whatsoever is a sign"18 was a way of
overthrowing cartesian intuition (a job which the Structuralists
will reinforce), of eliminating one "non-sign" candidate that might
have contributed to thinking. And elaborating the sign rather
than the intuition eliminated also its corollaries: introspection,
universals, and other occult entities now deemed simply
16 C. Hookway, 1985, develops this account.
17 Cf. Peirce, Collected Papers. 2:227-306.
18 Peirce, Collected Papers. 6:421.
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unnecessary. What took over mental self-doubt was inquiry and
scientific doubt: for, "doubt was an irritation, a stimulus to action;
doubt was a struggle to reach the reposeful state of belief, and
this struggle [is] called inquiry." Then follows the dig at Descartes:
"the mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does
not stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief. There must be
a real and living doubt, and without this all discussion is idle."19
And this pushed Peirce toward his pragmatic theory of meaning:
"Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then,
our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of
the object."20 In other words, Peirce needed science, and,
therefore, he needed to get past Hume's skepticism about
induction. He needed realism, and Kant's help to make this
compatible with religion — with moral belief.21 But, to hope that
we would through inquiry achieve realism led to a communal
idealism to prop up the hope that we (the community of inquirers
-- scientists being the paradigmatic community) would indeed
eventually get "there:"
For, "[t]he real ... is that which, sooner or later, information
and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore
independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very
origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception
essentially involves the notion of COMMUNITY without
19 Peirce, "Illustrations of the Logic of Science," in Popular Science
Monthly. 1878, Cited by B. Kuklick, 1979:118.
20 Peirce, Collected Papers. 5:402.
21 Kant's Critique of Pure Reason was certainly Peirce's sacred text, to
which he devoted three hours per day for two years in a penitential
attempt to master it. I admire the patience.
97
definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of
knowledge."22
To get to the real, Peirce required a theory of the "outward clash"
— that which would connect perception, cognition and belief, in
order to establish the relation between "the credible" and "the
fallible," the real and the interpreted, and to connect the
particular and the general as they were brought together,
according to Peirce, in the sensory character of experience, i.e.,
through the "outward clash." Peirce's problem is in developing a
theory of inquiry which would consult the clashed-with world
and!or one's inquiring fellows in the "regulative hope" that the
same abstract ("natural") laws would govern the convergence of
both domains. He wanted two rhetorics eventually to collapse
back into one: he wanted the discourse of constructing, making
and using (signs), once let out of the bag, to collapse back into the
discourse of discovering permanent and substantial Truth from
the point of view of God.
To account for this collapsing in service of the growth of
knowledge, Peirce made recourse to a theory of induction and
"abduction." "Quantitative" and "qualitative" induction were the
tests of knowledge. Abduction decided what was worth testing.
And the "proper" use of both were meant to ensure the
eschatological "convergence of opinion," that is, if we test long
enough. For Peirce, induction involved "sampling," the long-run
optimism that we would succeed, and a belief that the principle of
22 Peirce, Collected Papers. 5:311.
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self-correction inhered in the process.23 Objectivity, then, would
be achieved due to the "altruistic" and "disinterested" (Kant again)
inquisitiveness with which the rationally inspired imagination has
(especially in mathematics) always proceeded. One can here (as
elsewhere) easily detect the progressivist cosmology always
creeping into even the most analytically detailed of Peirce's
analyses. In an attempt to square a highly rationalist metaphysic
with the "critical commonsensism" of Scotland then taken up in
Harvard, Peirce ends up appealing to the vague and occult
grandeur of evolutionary explanations.
And all of this Peirce attempted to hold together under the one
rubric: "pragmatism." He wanted to be pragmatic and to hold out
for verificationist proof of his metaphysical realism, to be
pragmatic and hold on to an uncompromised religiosity.
Pragmatism (or "pragmaticism"24) was to be a rule-following
technique for unpacking specific propositions and an arbiter of the
general laws of the universe. It was to provide an "objectively
correct system of classifications" while appealing to a rhetoric of
metaphysical belief for constitutional support which was far from
the level of objective proof. Peirce wanted philosophy to find
support from the a priori and the experimentalist, to share the
thoughts of God and those of the selfless and contrite
23 According to Lauden, 1981, this is standard ^^-century rhetoric about
the nature of science — and Peirce certainly indulged in it.
24 In order to retain his authority over the conception of the "pragmatic"
and keep it out of the "literary clutches" (primarily of James), Peirce made
a curious appeal to the "ethics of terminology" as a justification of his
rights to the notion; and he then coined the word "pragmaticism," which
he thought would be "ugly enough to be safe from Kidnappers." Collected
Papers. 6:414.
observational inqi^rier, linked holistically by one grand
evolutionary semiotic. Peirce, in effect, wanted to deal only with
"problems capable of investigation by the observational methods
of the true sciences:" yet, to fill in the gaps, he held on to an
evolutionary belief in a world which "becomes an absolutely
perfect, rational and symmetrical system in which mind is at last
crystalized in the infinitely distant future"25 — It is theology
which we observe here.
Such were the historical and methodological sentiments which, in
the figure of Peirce, got a pragmatic rhetoric off the ground, but
handed it back to the dreamy world of the Dialectician. Peirce
indeed denied that reality is wholly determinate, that there is a
reality corresponding to every question, (or style of questioning),
that might arise. But he did not consider, therefore, that there
was no one genre of writing which could line up the ones that do
"correspond," or adjudicate and exclude those that do not. If there
is no determinate reality, then it is not reality which determines
or constrains the nature of the signs we use (the structualists, too,
will suggest); nor will it determine a single genre -- defined as
literary or scientific — which is to count as truly Philosophical (the
post-structuralists, too, will suggest).26 "Real" questions are real
conventions generated by and satisfied by the genres within
which they are constructed and institutionalized. And these are
assessed not by comparison with the world itself, but in terms of
25 Pierce, Collected Papers. 6.33; and cited by Hookway, 1985:262.
26 Cf. chapter 5.
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their semiotic performance, in terms of the work they do (Dewey
and Rorty will suggest).27
It is the tension between the rhetoricizing and grounding
discourses about signification which seems to have led to quite
different readings of Peirce, and later, of pragmatism. Rorty
(1961) offers a generous reading which places Peirce in the
stream and philosophical mood leading to the later Wittgenstein,
reading Peirce as advance repudiation of the developments of
empiricism toward logical positivism.28 But later (Rorty,
1982:161) he is a would-be foundationalist contributing only the
name "Pragmatism" to a style of writing which would overthrow
the one-genre, one-game-in-town view of philosophy -- a view
Peirce nevertheless retains and does not repudiate.29 Rorty (like
Goudge, 1950) finds two Peirces, identified by two different ways
of reading him, and by refusing to weld them together, by
refusing to force unity, to provide one coherent argument. Peirce
can be read either in terms of his concrete suggestions to semiotic
theory (Eco, 1977 and 1985a; Skagestad, 1981) or as a
27 Goodman, 1969:244, also takes the line that neither reality nor an attitude
or state of mind (interested in the satisfactions of "inquiry") are
foundations which "mark any significant difference between the aesthetic
and the scientific."
28 I think there are indeed a great many specific textual parallelisms
linking Peirce and Wittgenstein, and more general Peircean themes which
resonate throughout the Investigations: the encouragement to investigate
signification in the context of use; the relativization of cartesian intuition
(pains and feels) as a way to dignify the self by placing it behind language
or linguistic convention; the attempt to prevent the attempt to get at
essences behind signs as the task of philosophy. For example, cf.
Wittgenstein, 1976: nos. 355, 496, 503 and 562 for some epigrams which bare
a very close family resemblance to many of Peirce's statements.
29 Although Rorty's Consequences of Pragmatism. 1982, is itself a take off of
the title of a paper by Peirce, "Consequences of Pragmatism," 1906.
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transcendental System builder (Apel, 1980) complete with a
pervasive cosmological fantasy (Hookway, 1985). In other words,
the interest and rhetoric of the reader is crucial here as the
provider of a schema by which Peirce is to be "represented."
This is where Dewey ends up: purposeful readings, be they of
Plato or Peirce, are rhetorically persuasive attempts to undermine
Philosophy written (and read) as a genre about Truth. He
attempts, rather, to read Philosophy as a conglomeration of genres
about good (or bad) ways of supporting or criticizing purposeful
discourses. (Deconstruction reads foundational texts as always
containing figures and metaphors which themselves undermine
foundationalism. To this Dewey adds a motivation for
undermining them in certain ways and for certain purposes.) It is
Peirce's use of the aesthetic which, I think, illustrates both his
texts' self-deconstruction (when trying to keep the aesthetic -- the
imaginative — in, but then out of, the act of representation); and
his marginal use of the aesthetic (like Royce's later) can also be
read in a Deweyan manner, as an attempt superficially to
harmonize conflicts and gloss socially uncomfortable tensions with
a congenially individualized rhetoric of creative imagination and
with neoplatonic images of harmony, unity, and contemplation.
In other words, I support the schizophrenic reading of Peirce.
And I wish to highlight his parenthetical use of the aesthetic in
order to draw out its power to frustrate his foundationalist mood.
Peirce did not view the aesthetic consistently as an historical,
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stylizing and relativistic activity but more often as a category. For
him, the aesthetic did not imply charting changes in style,
perspective and interest; nor did it imply the recognition of
reversals of priorities between, say, content and form, between
the subject to be imitated by painterly technique and/or the
medium and technique becoming the subject. Peirce viewed the
aesthetic as a general category (Kant again) which related "a
multitude of parts [so] as to impart a positive simple immediate
quality to their totality."30 He never made his aesthetics talk to
art but, rather, to a Philosophy of the structure of experience; not
to the disruptive movements of the "artworld" that were to
challenge old "unities" of "simple" experience but to genteel
contemplation which immediately pleased; not to the art of
breaking down or fragmenting perceptual/conventional
orthodoxies — the hallmark of avant-garde aesthetics — but to the
achievement of "totality," a totality recuperative of all conflict —
social and aesthetic -- by conceptual/legislative fiat into
arbitrarily separable domains. This is the Kantian/analytic
traditon, not the pragmatic tradition -- which would view the
aesthetic as a participatory dimension in a wide, untotalizable
range of socio/rhetorical practices.
The following four points indicate the role the aesthetic plays in
Peirce's texts: 1. Peirce's semiotic was more rhetoricizing and
relativizing than his aesthetics -- a place where one might have
expected (as in the work of Goodman) an easy alliance. In terms
30 Peirce, Collected Papers. 5:132.
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of his semiotic theory, signs were constructs, things we make, in
terms of which "[t]he actual world cannot be distinguished from
the imagination by any description."31 Semiotic discourse could
not metaphysically disassociate fiction and reference, imagination
and description, signs and symbols. Reference was a semiotic skill
(an art, if you will) which denied its being secured in wholly
descriptive terms.32 Peirce's semiotic, therefore, like James'
figurative and ironic prose, best exemplifies an aesthetic theory
and implies a rhetoricized practice, which together frustrate
(deconstruct) any chance of rehabilitating a single genre of
writing, or a single style of signification — (archi-writing, Foucault
would call it), which could sneak past conventionality to a
disinterested Foundation which determines those conventions and
the socio-historical changes they undergo.
2. On the margins also of Peirce's theory of perception is the
artful, and a surprising analogy to film: that impure genre of
vision, sound and motion; a mixer of genres, like perception itself.
A "percept is much like a moving picture accompanied with
sounds and other sensations;" and later in the Pragmatism
lectures: it is "an image or moving picture or other exhibition."33
This is a telling use of the aesthetic, of a very new art form, which
operates reciprocally and persuasively to recast a view of
31 Peirce, Collected Papers. 3:363.
32 Goodman (1969 and 1978) is an example of someone who extends the
nominalist implications of Peirce's work on signs, and in association with
the aesthetic — two mutually relativistic theoretical allies connected in our
"languages of art," connected interdependently in our various traditions
and habits of semiotic practice, connected in our various activities as
"world-makers."
33 Peirce, Ibid., 5.115; and cited by Hookway, 1985:156.
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perception in terms of the aestheticized, the constructed, the
performative and exhibitive. Tied to this performative and
generically mixed analogy with film is the positive value Peirce
attributes to the traditional understanding of the aesthetic -- as
maker of experiential wholes. The aesthetic functions as a
repository of figures that relate to our active framing of
experience, to our purposeful power to organize perception
through interest.
In Peirce, creeping out from underneath the structure of sense is
artifice, the artifice involved not only in how we perceive, but
also, therefore, in how we write about perception, in how we
choose genres for the writing or exhibiting of philosophy. These
extensions of the aesthetic follow out of Peirce's own remarks, so
long as the use made of it does not (as it occasionally does in
Peirce) fall back into a faculty-psychology which cordons the
aesthetic off in the mind as a supplement to the austerities of
being a good rationalist. In other words, the aesthetic is
"bracketed" (Husserl) when it begins to look too threatening to the
rationalist enterprise of getting beyond artifice to foundations.
Peirce appealed to the aesthetic and the imaginative as functional
in achieving perceptual unity in experience because he wanted to
accommodate Reid and Kant: he wanted to have a commonsense-
like and imaginatively adaptable relation to the world which
resisted making either the world itself or the inquiring mind
structurally pre-determined; and he wanted to be assured that
our imaginative procedures would nevertheless follow some
1
systematic, moral and rational plan back to God -- the ultimate
Determiner. He wanted openness (the aesthetic) and closure (the
divine). But the aestheticization of the production of unity built
into the process the notion of stylization, and a dynamic which
allows for changes of style. The metaphor of structure lost its
rhetorical power as it became an artifact, becoming an
unSystematic crack in Peirce's Kantianism.
3. But the most hopeful and abstract of Peirce's epistemological
appeals was to mathematical reasoning: to that "iconic" and
representational discipline which "resembles" the "vital world."
Mathematics was understood as the manipulation of an
"isomorphic diagram" of the real world, and elevated as the a
priori foundation to any conceivable world. But even in this most
pure and deductive of disciplines Peirce saw that it required the
imagination, that it required invention to generate
experimentation with its icons.34 The aesthetic is brought in as
the impetus to play, to modify and transform mathematical
diagrams. Again, although mathematics is the foundation, the art
of mathematics sits on the margin as its motivating and
progressive power. And it must remain on the margin so as not to
dilute or threaten its purity with the fictive and playful qualities
and implications of art-talk -- always the Dialectician's worry.
This need for the inventive imagination is especially clear for
34 In Peirce's tripartite categorization of the sign (as "icon," "index,"
"symbol"), the "icon" is closest to pure representation, to the world. The
"index" refers causally (smoke and fire), but not representationally. The
"symbol" is the most variable, conventional and meaning-laden of Peirce's
sign relations. Cf. Collected Papers. 2:274-306.
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Peirce when assessing the historical developments of geometry,
where abstract figures have been created and imaginatively
stretched beyond what was implied in their original conceptions.
In other words, the imagination is required to account for radical
alteration, for the very performance of transformation. A rhetoric
of the aesthetic and imaginative is required to generate the
development of paradigmatically different mathematical models.
But the very rhetoric of history, invention and paradigmatically
variable styles of "resemblance" relativizes the iconographic
epistemology which Peirce is hoping to attribute to the
mathematical. Here again is a "clash of rhetoric." Allowing the
aesthetic to come off the side lines would undermine Peirce's
would-be center, his rhetoric of foundationalism, which only an
ontology of mathematics divested of the aesthetic could achieve.
Mathematics was the root of Peirce's allegory of knowledge, the
allegory of the monastic scientist pushing around symbolically
disembodied icons in support of the key sign of achievement: the
Foundation. Yet, it is this allegorical reading, concentrating on
Peirce's fear of the figurative, of the rhetoricity of the project,
which exposes the aesthetic as a necessary category, even as a
methodological requirement which Peirce firstly needed and then
needed to marginalize and keep at a distance.
4. As a "pragmatist," Peirce still wanted more than "seductive
persuasions:" he wanted "scientific proof."35 Interestingly, his
35 Peirce, Ibid., 5:468.
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first attempt to offer it in 1878 in "How to Make our Ideas Clear"
he himself later repudiated as a "merely rhetorical defense." He
wanted it both ways: to read himself rhetorically and as beyond
rhetoric; to justify pragmatism in terms of improvements in
behavioral habits and their success, but also as having achieved
something beyond the relativistic scope of behavioral categories
and habits of action -- which could err and err perpetually.
Neither behavior nor argument (precisely because of their
interdependence) are watertight proofs of a theory. So, Peirce
admits that what was a proof is now rhetoric, but not that what
ever one comes up with in the "long run" might be "merely" useful
or good rhetoric for encouraging successful habits of action. In the
end he still wants a teleological escape which only a larger
cosmological closure can ensure. He needs a "web of belief" which
always outruns the range of his own "proof." But, rather than
acknowledge the artifice, the fictive and rhetorical utility of such
speculations, he attempts to argue within the self-effacing rhetoric
of the "proof;" but it continues to show its face as metaphorical
and rhetorical. So, with respect to 1. Peirce's semiotic, 2. to his
aesthetic analogies for describing perception, 3. to his appeal to
the imagination of the "foundationalist" mathematician, and 4.
with repect to his reference to his own rhetoric as failed proof,
Peirce, despite himself, strengthens the relationship between the
aesthetic, the rhetorical and the pragmatic.
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3.4 ROYCE, JAMES, AND UNSTABLE GENRES:
Kant, with a dose of the pragmatic, is also between almost every
line of Royce's articulation of our "nature" as inquirers. We have a
dual nature with a "given" consciousness (transcendental idealism)
which wills and spontaneously acts and constructs in the interest
of practical achievement (pragmatism). These two styles are
conjoined only in order to complete the Kantian project of posing
and answering the "most fundamental" question, not of the
relation of the knower to its object (as if this weren't enough), but
of relating every conscious moment to absolute consciousness —
the "Universal Consciousness." This (He) is the unifier of past,
present and future, of past error and future reconciliation with
Truth. And this is where idea and object become One -- the
fulfillment of Kant's two (the phenomenal and the noumenal).3^
In other words, (read rhetorically and aesthetically) the only
method which could guarantee ultimate resolution, for Royce, was
to posit a point of observation from the perspective of a third
person, from a place we never are except as narrators, story¬
tellers and theologians. Royce offers a story in which the
narrative structure is provided by "logical necessity," which, in
turn, posits the key character, Universal Consciousness. This
third-man argument personifies a perspective always beyond and
always present (for the idealist), absorbing finite creatures ("the
fragments") into the Absolute ("the Whole"). This is in the
3 6 This is a condensed version of the argument of Royce's The Religious
Aspect of Philosophy. 1885.
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tradition of that genre of ontological narrative made canonical by
Anselm, Augustine and Aquinas, a genre which looks sooner to
meta-persons than to real persons as the locus for, and resolution
of, philosophical/epistemological drama. The point is that this
genre requires that these conventions of narration (logical
necessity, Absolute Consciousness) function as Method and final
Truth: thus, does Royce appeal to the aesthetic.
This Philosophical style aestheticizes itself further in that the
"absolute world-soul," which reconciles and absorbs all anti-theses
between individuals and the social order, defines a realm of
artistic/contemplative perfection evoked primarily in the
neoclassical language of unity, harmony, tranquility and sublime
peace — demonstrable, of course, by "rigorous logic," against
which "there is no counter-argument."
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But the better hidden connection between Royce's Philosophy and
his narrative efforts are illuminated by his disastrous novel, The
Feud of Oakfield Creek. About this novel Santayana wrote: "What
a failure. . . ; he knows so much about the Universal Consciousness
that he has forgotten what individual consciousness is like."37
What is interesting here is that Santayana's irony obliquely refers
to a direct exchange of narrative convention between Royce's
Philosophy and his fiction, and the failed omniscience of both.
Both operate in a style too elevated to make space for
individuation, conflict and ambiguity. His training in a
Philosophical genre which posits an abstract, omnipresent and
disembodied Absolute, when transposed to his novel, left his
writing unable to fill in the complexities of a human scene.
Obversely, it was the 18th and 19th-century conventions of the
novel, of the distanced and omniscient judge and narrator, which
underwent an effortless change into Philosophical clothes. Royce's
philosophical appeal to the third person viewer and knower is also
an appeal to this novelistic narrator — the everpresent overseer.
It is the extension of an aesthetic convention, a convention of
writing, which makes Royce's Philosophical style intelligible,
which lends "credibility" to the Absolute and to a plot of ultimate
(conceptual) redemption. The third person view resolves the
"paradoxes" and conflicts by its very distance as their describer.38
And it is the very visibility of conflicts and anti-theses which,
37 Cited in Kuklick, 1979:143.
38 Kierkegaard explicitly avoids this implication by not narrating with one
voice, but, rather, by writing dialogically, by supplying a variety of
subjects and authors to better establish the irresolvability of paradox, irony
and conflict by a rational/conceptual meta-narrator. I mention
Kierkegaard and his narrative technique now also as preparation for a
more interesting comparison between him and James which follows.
according to Royce, require the intervention of the Absolute, of
One who knows, of One who relates and unifies consciousness and
object. Royce's Philosophy functions on the basis of aesthetic and
rhetorical conventions of third-person narration asked to do
metaphysical and epistemological work. (So much for Royce. He
deserves more, but the story doesn't permit it here.)
James was the more consistent at intentionally blurring
philosophy and literature, at ironically relating technical concepts
and disarming metaphors, at commenting on Systems and also on
the psychologies or personalities which needed to promote them.
And he did so for pragmatic and persuasive reasons. Regarding
the aesthetic, there is more than a gratuitous connection between
James the studied artist and painter and James the gifted
scientific observer of "nature;" between the character of his
philosophical exhortations and his skill as a prose writer. He was
as knowledgeable of the 19th-century art world as he was of the
19th-century life sciences. And these domains and talents mixed
(as we will see in his philosophy of mind). James was willing to
make assumptions, but not without irony and awareness of their
artifactuality. Assumptions were "for the present -- until next
year." He was, in other words, a pragmatic rhetorician whose
style aestheticized the appeal to foundations by performing
exchanges and substitutions between the language of Truth and
the languages of parody, of making, of making fun.
112
It is James who conjoins (rhetorical) form and (philosophical)
content in a way which is positively indistinguishable, and who
stylistically embodies an avowed pluralism in his narrative
technique. He was, unlike Kierkegaard, a half-hearted believer
and a whole hearted aesthete who thought the best he could do
was produce a prose whose irony, persuasiveness and popularity
would be the best criticism of the idealism of the day.39 I
mention Kierkegaard here because his reading of Hegel is very
similar to James'. Kiekegaard thought that Hegel would have his
first real reading by the inhabitants of the moon.40 James was
less generous: such an "overweening tendency to theorize," "such a
perfect delirium of theoretic rapture," could not be limited by that
which merely orbits the earth.41 This is James' way of making
reference simultaneously to Systematic metaphysics and to
persons who write such metaphysics. It is the basis of these
rhetorical ploys, the philosophical transpositions they effect, and
their consequences for questions of genre which the following
comments will attempt to highlight.
It was Charles Renouvier (1818-1903), a french neo-kantian,
through whom James read the all-pervasive Kant, and through
whom he was persuaded not to partition mind into faculties of
understanding, reason and imagination. (More on Dewey's
relation to Kant in chapter 4.) Nor would James follow this by
3 9 Cf. Kierkegaard's Either/Or for a dramatisation of his ambivalent
relation to the aesthete and his hope that the believer is the more robust
character.
40 Cf. Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript. 1974.
41 Cf. James, 1897 (1956:263-298).
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partitioning language and philosophical writing into distinct and
parallel genres of categorical abstraction.42 And James could not
go along the route of British empiricist psychology, which made
mind, when not simple and passive, then an associationist
mechanism for the disinterested collecting of ideas. James, often
plagued by depression and illness, rather thought there was a
highly interested form of consciousness requiring great effort and
will to accomplish anything at all. In other words, the brain had
"an indeterminate nervous system" (said James the biologist); and
consciousness was "a sort of atmosphere in which Reality floats
and plays" (said James the pluralist and aesthete).43
42 James, 1909a (1981b: 109-110), wrote impatiently and ironically against a
philosophical stylistics which suffered from its having inverted a concern
for abstraction over experience. "The pragmatist himself has no objection
to abstractions. Elliptically, and 'for short', he relies on them as much as
anyone, finding upon innumerable occasions that their comparative
emptiness makes of them useful substitutes for the overfulness of the facts
he meets with. But he never ascribes to them a higher grade of reality. . .
Meanwhile it is endlessly serviceable to be able to talk of properties
abstractly and apart from their working, to find them the same in
innumerable cases, to take them 'out of time', and to treat of their relations
to other similar abstractions. We thus form whole universes of platonic
ideas ante rem, universes in posse, tho none of them exists effectively
except in rebus. Countless relations obtain there which nobody
experiences as obtaining . . . [I]f we take the universe of 'fitting', countless
coats 'fit' backs, and countless boots 'fit' feet, on which they are not
practically fitted-, countless stones 'fit' gaps in walls into which no one
seeks to fit them actually. In the same way countless opinions 'fit' realities,
and countless truths are valid, tho no thinker ever thinks them.
For the anti-pragmatist these prior timeless relations are the
presupposition of the concrete ones, and possess the profounder dignity
and value. The actual workings of our ideas in verification-processes are
naught in comparison with the 'obtainings' of this discarnate truth within
them.
For the pragmatist, on the contrary, all discarnate truth is static,
impotent, and relatively spectral, full truth being the truth that energizes
and does battle. . . Essential truth, the truth of the intellectualists, the truth
with no one thinking it, is like the coat that fits tho no one has ever tried it
on, like the music that no ear has listened to. It is less real, not more real,
than the verified article; and to attribute a superior degree of glory to it
seems little more than a piece of perverse abstraction-worship."
43 James, 1920:205.
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Consciousness was "a stream of flights and perchings," not a
bundle of discrete Humean instances collected together by a
doctrine of associationism, and not an already ordered Kantian
hierarchy of prussian categories. The point is that James' stream-
of-consciousness view had its stylistic correlate in a prose both
technical and at play, at home in biology and in literature (also in
Henry's), using different discourses which floated toward
temporary perchings, and opened up again as rhetorically
indeterminate.
His epistemology, like his style (and this is precisely the
relationship or parallelism which the question of genre explores),
was not representationalist, but voluntaristic. Knowledge was a
function of what people desired, what they could, by effort of will,
habituate and communicate in a medium which accomplished
more when it failed passively to copy.44 Between the world and
action was a "middle stage [of] thinking . . . , only a place of transit,
the bottom of a loop." In this loop, consciousness did its best to
sneak in some interventionist re-action and resistance, "for
behaviour's sake."45 Hence, we acquired knowledge as a function
of motivated and "selective attention." Onto-categorical
oppositions, like inner and outer, internal and external, found and
made, (like all other such provisional constructs of the
epistemologist) were functional categories in the purposeful and
44 James, 1909a (1981b:51): "If our symbols fit the world, in the sense of
determining our expectations rightly, they may even be the better for not
copying its terms. . . Those thoughts are true which guide us to beneficial
interaction with sensible particulars as they occur, whether they copy
these in advance or not."
45 James, 1897 (1956:113-114).
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stylized construction of knowledge, looping flexibly back and forth
into each other along a continuum.46 James writes:
I, for my part, cannot escape the consideration, forced upon
me at every turn, that the knower is not simply a mirror
floating with no foot-hold anywhere, and passively
reflecting an order that he comes upon and finds simply
existing. The knower is an actor, and co-efficient of the
truth on one side, whilst on the other he registers the truth
which he helps to create. Mental interests, hypotheses,
postulates, so far as they are bases for human action --
action which to a great extent transforms the world — help
to make the truth which they declare. In other words, there
belongs to mind, from its birth upward, a spontaneity, a
vote. It is in the game, and not a mere looker-on . . ,47
(James' italics.)
James was too much the post-cartesian pragmatist to see
knowledge as requiring certainty first, of the self below or of God
above, before it could accomplish anything. And he was too much
the post-darwinian scientist to see nature as an antecedent chaos
requiring some cosmic/rationalist glue to prevent it all from
falling apart. He was also too much the post-kantian (and pre-
analytic) writer to think that an objectivist and disinterested style
of writing could or should close (or worry about closing)
ontologized gaps (between world and language, noun and
metaphor, the philosophical and the aesthetic) which another
(abstractionist) idiom had produced in the first place. James
46 Dewey, when articulating this "continuum" in his early psychology
essays, refers less to the role of individual personality in such looping
procedures than does James.
47 James, 1920:67. I quote this in order also to allude to Rorty. Although his
philosophy of mind has written its way through the psychological
nominalism of Sellars and the philosophies of mind of Nagel, Putnam etc., it
retains strong echoes of James in its reference to making rather than
mirroring.
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thought of a conceptual scheme of knowledge as that which
survived because it was a tool of successful orientation, not
because it derived from mind (contra Kant) or from confrontation
with objects (passim Davidson). If our scheme "imitated," it was a
pragmatically useful "imitation" (interpretation), functioning by
means of and for the sake of deeds, of activity. This action based
scheme, he saw as rooted not simply in similarity or resemblance
(part of the now defunct imagery of "mirroring"), but rooted as
much in difference (recall note 44), rooted in a purposeful
teleology interested in what we could do and what consequences
would follow. Schemes were rhetorically useful not dialectically
True. Gorgias would have approved.48
Logic was, in James' day, the abstractionist game by which one
sought to prove an epistemology, a truth, or a scheme. (Both
Peirce and Royce made such attempts.). And it is the point at
which James the pragmatist remixes genres, mixing psychology
and logic, the descriptive and the normative, the abstract and the
embodied, in the context of experience:
"Our critics say that when we are asked what truth means,
we reply by telling only how it is arrived-at. But since a
meaning is a logical relation, static, independent of time,
how can it possibly be identified, they say, with any
concrete man's experience, perishing as this does at the
instant of its production? This, indeed, sounds profound, but
I challenge the profundity. I defy anyone to show any
difference between logic and psychology here. The logical
relation stands to the psychological relation between idea
48 James alludes, indeed ironically, to his own (failed) sophistry, (his
failure to persuade), at the end of his dialogue with the ANTI-PRAGMATIST in
The Meaning of Truth. 1909a (198lb: 159).
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and object only as saltatory abstractness stands to
ambulatory concreteness. Both relations need a
psychological vehicle; and the "logical" one is simply the
"psychological" one disemboweled of its fulness, and reduced
to a bare abstractional scheme."49
The genre of logic breaks its own laws of purity in order to have
something to talk about. It isn't a genre unto itself. It requires a
"vehicle," the full expression of which is a mixing of genres,
abstract and "psychological," relating to persons and actions, in
motion, in time, in flux: a stream of genres to relate to a mixed
bag of experience. James' measure of the technical genre was how
much light it shed on less arcane matters: its moral helpfulness.
To talk about a genre of abstractly describing as distinct from that
of justifying was either to make a distinction without a difference,
or to set a problem that had no solution, and, thereby, generate a
genre of writing (about schemes) which made no contact to
concrete experience.
When pressed, then, for criteria of choice between systems, styles
and truths, he always left the issue purposefully hovering
between questions of temperament, questions of the aesthetic
49 James, 1909a (1981b:85-86). I am interested in the alliance between
classical pragmatism and contemporary literary theory, and Hayden
White's view of classical logic provides an instance, albeit a technical one.
In Tropics of Discourse. 1986:3, he writes that "the model of the syllogism
itself displays clear evidence of troping (what James calls "being arrived-
at"): The move from the major premise (all men are mortal) to the choice.
of the datum to serve as the minor (Socrates is a man) is itself a tropological
move, a 'swerve' from the universal to the particular which logic cannot
preside over, since it is logic itself which is being served by this move.
Every applied syllogism contains an enthymemic element, this element
consisting of nothing but the decision (James' "psychological relation") to
move from the plane of universal porpositions (themselves extended
synecdoches) to that of singular existential statements (these being
extended metonymies."
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demands and sensibilities a style of thought satisfied, and the
question of which positions worked better for pursuing particular
and related consequences in action. His doctrine/style together
form a mixed genre of the personal and impersonal, the private
and public. When one is preparing for the last argumentative
strike against a grand, public and impersonal theory, out comes a
remark on its producer's psychological needs. Miinsterberg's
system was not only wrong, he was "stiff."50 Systems acquired
personification, as tough-minded, or tender-minded, effete, and
inexperienced. Yet, the closer we get to the psychological, to
individual consciousness, the more it spreads itself out into
traditions, habits and public streams, into more un-resting and
irresolvable dualities. The closer we get to the System, the sooner
we find a subject; the closer we get to the subject, the sooner we
see an impinging and public world on the horizon. James moves
50 For James, Miinsterberg was a figure who conflated conceptual
artificiality, congeniality to the academic social order, and both with an
anal temperament. About Miinsterberg's grand congress on Kant and its
400 international speakers, James wrote that his program was "the
perfectly inevitable expression of the [academic] system . . . , an artificial
construction for the sake of making the authority of professors
inalienable, no matter what asininities they may utter, as if the
bureaucratic mind were the full flower of nature's self-revelation." (cited
in Perry, R.B., The Thought and Character of William James. 1935:471.
Nature was not philosophy's foundation, or what philosophy (as
institution) mirrored: and James wrote accordingly.
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between them without producing unity51 (like the aesthetically
neoclassical Royce), but also without fear that the inter-textual
play with which they make each other is threatening. (This is the
"pragmatic temper.") James saw such interdependent stylizing of
persons and worlds as positive, and his technical/ironic rhetoric
embodied the swinging which such pluralism implied.
One should parenthetically mention Miinsterberg (a colleague of
James') also because of his very early and interesting work on
film. He is also a vehicle for pointing out that a sustained interest
of most of the early Harvard lot was eventually to ask their
philosophical idiom to offer some form of public commentary on
non-technical issues, and to address the arts as media of
significance to a philosophy wanting to display a thorough
understanding of socially important discourses other than science.
51 This is, again, one of the many striking parallels between James and
Kierkegaard. They were both ironic believers; both were committed
paradoxically to the concrete individual subject and to its insubstantiality
and impotence; and both were un-linear and anti-Systematic stylists,
dramatists, writers of dialogues, as a result of, and as a metaphor for, this
situation. James' notebooks often have an existentialist ring to them, and,
like Kierkegaard, they are preoccupied with the will, sometimes with
suicide and death as its act of liberation, and with artifice and intellectual
creativity as its alternative compensation. Their style simultaneously
parodies over-indulging in the dilemmas of the individual subject,
ironizing against the grandiloquent tone of both the Absolute and
romantically glorified Subjects of 19tla-century metaphysics-poetics. Real
conflicts were, for both James and Kierkegaard, not epistemological but
ethical. Hence, philosophical writing about real conflicts was primarily an
act of communication, not through rationalist abstraction but through art:
That the language of pathos (of affect) was inseparable from technical
vocabulary in such communication served to aestheticize the art of
philosophizing.
(Paul de Man is a contemporary literary theorist who also argues for the
relation (via Romanticism) between epistemological and affective
discourse, without final separation or resolution of one into the other. But
(indeed, like the Romantics), he treats this "parodox" or "dilemma" as some
sort of absolutely "deep," opaque and unapproachable trauma in the
literary psyche. Cf. The Rhetoric of Romanticism. 1984.)
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This is the milieu in which Miinsterberg was led, already by 1916,
to write a book on film: The Photoplay: A Psychological Study.52
His interest was in treating it, indeed, as an art form, as an
illustration that what was a popular idiom was not too undignified
for philosophical reflection (p. 17), and that a new art form could
ride on the back of an essentially technical/mechanical
achievement -- (an aesthetic-industry relationship which neither
Victorian nor romantic aesthetics would treat kindly). He made
acute comments on the relation between an idiom which
"represented" in a realist-fact sense and symbolized in an idealist
sense (p.23). Film was not seen as a mirror of an outer, external
world but, rather, as mental. He saw film in terms of its
intentional and organizational capacities. In other words, he
associated the movie and mind, associating, thereby, specific
technical details with specific mental processes: e.g., the cutback
(flash back) with memory, the technical manipulation of space-
time causality with the overcoming of the same by consciousness
(pp. 41-58).
Miinsterberg thought that the film's aesthetic disrepute in 1916
reflected a bad theory of art — (No disagreement here.). Film,
indeed like art more generally, he understood not as imitation, but
as transformation -- (an echo of James and Dewey, of much
pragmatic theory of art and science), as purposefully selecting and
remodelling the features it attended to (p.63). The film was well
suited not so much to documentary but to dramatic, even
52 i am following Kuklich's references to the book; Kuklich, 1977:213-214.
121
allegorical, narrative. This was Miinsterberg's way of inverting
standard criticism of its mechanization and a way of treating film
as a triumph of mind over the laws of the "external world," of
causally determined real-time narrative (p.95). He saw film,
therefore, as a pre-figuration of the eventual cultural victory of
absolute idealism, of the overcoming of "outer" nature by the "free
and joyful play of the mind" (p.100). (Interestingly, he rejected
sound and color in film as developments precisely because they
would bring film too close to the natural world.) The point to this
interlude on Miinsterberg is that the themes, here, of art as
transfigurative and transformational, as accepting of and
manipulative of changes in mechanical technology, as selective
and socially implicative narrative, are all issues thematized in the
pragmatic theory of the day, despite Miinsterberg's hope for their
re-absorbtion into idealism.
1
3.5 GENRES WHICH STABILIZE: WRITING ON SOCIETY:
Aside from Dewey, none of the aforementioned local precursors of
pragmatic writing were socio-political thinkers and critics of any
stature, or public rhetoricians as a consequence of their non¬
technical interests and "overbeliefs."53 This was left to the non-
Harvard pragmatism of Dewey, G. H. Mead, Sydney Hook, and
later, to the contemporary remodelling of pragmatism in the
comparative work of Richard Bernstein. (Bernstein attempts to
make contact between the continental tradition of social
philosophy (Marx, Sartre, Habermas and Arendt) and the
pragmatist work of Peirce and Dewey via the concept of
"action."54) The point is that Peirce, Royce and James began
implicitly to relativize and destabilize the foundational priorities
of Philosophy (through semiotics, aesthetics and pragmatics), but
they also stabilized a certain distance between writing philosophy
and engaging with concrete social problems. As was mentioned on
p. 90, this was due to the conjoined power of the
institutionalization of philosophy as a distinct discipline and the
concomitant understanding of what sort of genre of writing best
exploited its grand importance and, therefore, its distance from
other domains of life and work. The result was thin social
philosophy.
53 "Overbelief" is James' word for a "perspective on the universe" — what
the German's call "Weltanschauung;" and it is a jibe at empiricists and
rationalists whose theories o v e /"determine the "facts" they "discover"
without admitting that their theories do just that: overdetermine.
54 Cf. R. Bernstein, especially Praxis and Action. 1971.
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Royce's worry about "Community" was metaphysical,55 and when
made concrete, it was a trivial and cliched rhetoric of "alienation,"
couched in a vaguely edifying and moralistic discourse. Royce
had:
1. no analysis of the specific conditions causing particular sorts of
social problems within the grand "Community."
2. no vocabulary for writing concretely about the distribution and
extension of specific formations of power and how they
manoeuvred the structure and development of the economy.
3. little concern with the patterns of interest represented and
sustained by public politics and party machinery.
4. and Royce had little contact with the texts of historians and
economists. This meant that he had no grasp of the history of the
American political economy regarding both its internal and
international construction and power, and, therefore, no apparatus
for assessing institutions (like the university) and their role in this
history. In the context of the genre of abstractionist metaphysics,
"lesser" realms could barely make an appearance in Reality.
James was aware of a "labor question," but not of a social problem
regarding the distribution of wealth and the violence of turn-of-
the-century industrial culture. Social amelioration was sensitively
personalized primarily in the metaphorics or poetics of
inwardness and Emersonian self-realization -- a genteel poetics
itself for distribution to, and the consumption of, an upper-class
market. Texts which, indeed, referred to social conflict, resolved it
55 Cf. Royce, The Philosophy of Lovaltv. 1908.
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in a cozy blanket of belief and easy wisdom, and ignored the
vocabulary of ideology with which Dewey was familiar.56 James'
encouragement that dispute between rich and poor be dealt with
in a spirit of "tolerance and good humor" produces readable texts
and constructive sentiments, but few pragmatic consequences.
Royce did write out of an interest in social cohesion and duty. But
Royce's Philosophy of Lovaltv repeatedly uses an uncritical
rhetoric of martial virtues as those best suited for expounding the
issues involved in such loyalty — to a "cause," to "duty," to
"service and discipline", all revealingly illustrated in war. The
concepts of horror, on the one hand, or of criticism, on the other,
are tellingly absent. In "The Moral Equivalent of War," James
went further than Royce into the psychological subtleties of
attempting to sublimate the "martial spirit" (already disassociated
from material-national interests), while nevertheless preserving
"[m]artial virtues . . . [as] the enduring cement [to] social
hardihood."57 But neither Royce nor James (nor Peirce) borrowed
or produced a social discourse concerned in the same way with
"transformations" as were their aesthetics, as concerned with what
groomed social relations as with what stylized philosophical
56 Roth, R. J., 1962, also interprets Dewey, wrongly I think, in terms of this
set of texts on self-realization, packaging Dewey as an American cliche
promoting the development and fulfillment of individual personality, to be
evangelically exported for the benefit of the rest of civilization: Dewey is
"the main spokesman for whatever America has to offer the world" (p.2) . . .
in order to "gain recognition as an influential factor in the development of
civilization and culture." (p. 4).
57 James, 1911:287-88.
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progress. And in the background of Harvard pragmatism's failure
is how they generally understood the genre of philosophy.58
Firstly, the model philosophical genre of Harvard achieved its
purity, stability and importance in proportion to its distance from
social debate — unlike the sophists. The Harvard lot had a
hierarchical view of the various branches of philosophical
discourse -- logic, epistemology and metaphysics always being
prior to, and the rational basis of, our understanding of the world.
The asocial rhetoric and mathematical order of the technical
discourses were the grounding gambits required before the rest of
culture could be grasped and/or altered. Thus, they provided a
constant deferral of application of a socially relevant rhetoric by
first understanding philosophy as a genre that defined itself as
prior to such social interdependencies, as prior to rhetoricity.
(Dialectic again.)
To the extent to which the genre of political and social writing, or
the rhetoric of social amelioration, was got round to, it glossed
over the institutions of power which arbitrated (or ignored)
dispute, couching its gestures in the rhetoric of a late Calvinism of
individual-moral concern. To achieve Truth as pure and/or as
provable, the model genres at Harvard were logic (symbolic)
58 It is strange that in Kuklick's The Rise of American Philosophy Dewey
receives a dismissive exit already in the preface, and never makes it back
into the book; although Kuklick's own criticisms of the "public philosophy"
of both James and Royce are in terms of what Dewey did and they failed to
do. Furthermore, James himself, in any single chapter, relies on Dewey
and mentions him more often than one finds in the whole of Kuklick's book
-- a book which has more interest in the long run for historians of Harvard
than for historians of American philosophy.
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and/or natural science (verifiable, if we had long enough). This
was to the exclusion of public rhetoric — the context in which the
question of genre can be asked in an applied, pragmatic and
pluralistic way. James, of course, argued for pluralism, and his
artifice went a long way in achieving it, but his concerns remained
primarily those of the Bostonian gentry.
A second reason for the lack of socio-political philosophy was due
more specifically to textual habit and tradition: it was a
generation working its way through Kant's Critique, through the
essentially technical, ahistorical and apolitical problems it
generated, and through the conventional protestant morality it
supported. Kant set an agenda which set off looking for
"ontological" structures, and not for their social histories. Whereas
Dewey was closer to the historical and political dimensions of
Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind:59 whose logic, therefore, was tied
to the social values it, at some point, would have to associate with;
and whose science was only interested in "verification" to the
extent to which "observable" consequences for social action were
involved -- achieving, thereby, not Truth but new sets of
problems, vocabularies and methods for continuing inquiry.
Thirdly, the centralizing and professionalizing milieu of Cambridge
led to the first generation of successful big time academics,
protected by and uncritical of a social order Harvard so skillfully
groomed and represented. Dewey, by contrast, was at Johns
5 9 More on the relationship between Dewey and Hegel in chapter 4.
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Hopkins, Chicago and Columbia (amongst other places), places
without the same centralizing sociological (financial) gravity so
helpful in forming an orthodoxy of style -- as speculative Berlin
and structuralist/post-structurlist Paris have sometimes been able
to achieve. Nor were Dewey's activities as philosopher and writer
productive of or parasitic upon a unified view of the philosophical
professional, determined by a single set of concerns, to be pursued
by a single style of work.
The intellectual style of Harvard eventually neglected the
challenge of social philosophy, treating the genre of philosophical
writing as much as a refuge as an instrument of greater
explanation. Partly because Dewey was not in Cambridge, did not
come to philosophy through Kant, and whose philosophy was from
the start a blurring of genres — poetic, political, scientific, and
above all pragmatic, one can find references to social theorists like
Marx, Weber and Durkheim never mentioned by Peirce, Royce or
James. To mention Mill (as James did) is not to come very far into
the 19th or 20th centuries of social philosophy, of socially robust
rhetoric. The behavioral consequences that James encouraged
philosophy to think was its "pay-off" were left without much
social clothing. This left Dewey to ask, still in unison with the
rhetoric of Bacon: where do we see the fruits?. His answer: in
the "lived experience," and in its criticism -- philosophy being "a
generalized theory of criticism." The point here is that
"experience" and "criticism" are purposefully sloppy and ordinary
words which leave open "the order of things" (Foucault): they are
more aesthetic notions (experiencing, criticizing, and re-
experiencing) than epistemological categories; political and
pedagogical notions rather than mental meta-categories;
experimental notions rather than ontologically a priori categories.
They refer to different yet interrelated genres of (critical) activity
and writing. This mixing of domains and the resulting conceptual
ambiguities are not for lack of semantic discipline, but in
recognition of the lack of a semantic rule of law which could
constrain such mixing from happening (as Derrida too will argue).
This lack of constraint encourages the positive spill over of
meaning for the benefit of a rhetoric of application and use --
always flexible, in process, for the relating of various discourses.60
60 Dewey was aware of the difficulty of connecting philosophically useful
concepts and ordinary language, and of his failures when trying.
Regarding the notion of "experience," while preparing a new edition of
Experience and Nature in 1951, he wrote to Arthrur Bentley of changing
the title to Nature and Culture: "I was dumb not to have seen the need for
such a shift when the old text was written. I was still hopeful that the
philosophic word "Experience" could be redeemed by being returned to its
idiomatic usages — which was a piece of historic folly, the hope I mean."
(Cited in Ratner, 1964:643.)
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4.1 SPARRING WITH LITERATURE AND STRUCTURAL ARTIFACTS:
Dewey's point, then, was not that we don't know things, but to ask
what sort of an experience knowing is, "how things are
experienced when they are experienced as known things," as
artifacts: and what purposeful variety of critical-descriptive
genres will help express this. In effect, fiction and description, art
and knowledge, interested stories and methodologically rigorous
reference are not ontologically separated, but different genres of
activity and behavior, distinguished for pragmatic reasons. Dewey
wrote to Bentley: "If I ever get the needed strength, I want to
write on knowing as the way of behaving in which linguistic
artifacts transact business with physical artifacts, tools,
implements, apparatus, both kinds being planned for the purpose
and rendering inquiry of necessity an experimental transaction . .
(Dewey's italics.) Epistemology and aesthetics come together
in that we know through constructs and their affect and effect,
through artifacts and their power and persuasiveness. The model
is not nature or mathematics but art and criticism.
In the context of his own rhetoric about "nature," "experience" and
"science," and despite his structural jargon about the "organism" --
about that which always persists in our transactions, Dewey (in
1930) thought that it was when the "social sciences and arts
become the objects of reflective attention" that there would be a
1
— a rather awkward sentence cited in Ratner (ed.) 1964:387.
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new "synthetic movement in philosophy" — not rallying around
"Realism," but around products of culture. And it does appear that
questions about the nature of reading and writing texts, about
styles of reasoning, about the rhetoric of rationality, about the
persuasiveness of theory, about theorizing through literature and
the arts, are precisely those interests (relativizing social and
aesthetic interests) involved in the rapprochement between
Continental and Anglo-American philosophy. Habermas and
Foucault pay attention to cultural complexes in the genesis of
powerful discourses like science and rationality. Continental
r
structuralists and post-stuctualists, (like Said, Fish and Bloom in
the U.S.: de Man is somewhere in between), pay attention to
"textuality" and the problems of interpreting literary-cultural
signs. The semiotics of Cassirer, Goodman and Eco also attend to
questions of signification. And with Derrida, Cavell, Danto,
Margolis and others, questions of art — novels, paintings, films —
have become more fruitful than asking how philosophy and
mathematics and physics are related. In other words, there is a
lot of very differentiated modern dress refashioning issues
consonant with the pragmatism of Dewey.
In this chapter, then, I wish to concentrate, firstly, on the shift to
art as area of interest and model for theory, and the way in which
Dewey prepares for this shift (more thoroughly than the
pragmatic predecessors of the previous chapter, but in occasional
difficulty when trying get out of his own naturalist metaphysics).
Secondly, I wish to assess this shift as it encounters, is recast by,
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and forms selective alliances with the powerful and influential
movements within structuralist, post-structuralist and other
literary theory. And I wish, then, to move to a broader notion of
the aesthetic, less preoccupied with idealized questions of
"textuality" and language and more concerned with "worldly"
problems of interpretation and criticism.
Dewey's pragmatism, then, will be made use of because it was and
is an attempt to talk contextually, to decenter an institutional
image (as epistemologically founded/grounded) of philosophical
discourse. It is a bid to use philosophical talk (writing) as
criticism more than demonstration, as pluralistic and
constructively ambidextrous, rather than the repeated right-arm
attempt to hunt down metaphysical, acultural constraints to
center discourse. The foundationalist's terms of the debate, (that
we either supply grounds or risk irrationality), makes the
pragmatist wonder at how such grounded transcendentals could
possibly be provided, how much longer we need restate this
"problem," and why one is moved by the motivating pseudo-fear
that we could otherwise suddenly be left unfunded, without
things to attend to, without practical and functional discourses to
inhabit which simply get on doing certain things anyway. He
would rather ridicule the foundationalist dream, especially as it
gets circumlocuted by the honor the foundationalist attributes to
his own stylistics: "But this is argument, rather than (merely)
"good criticism" and "artful" or "useful talk"."
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Post-structuralist literary criticism will, in this context (and in the
following chapter), provide a useful sparring partner because it
seems to be a form of intellectual work and writing where this
sort of aesthetic pragmatism is practiced. It is a local style of
behavior which exemplifies this shift in metaphorics from
epistemology to pragmatics, from "finding" what is "in" texts (or
"in" the world) to producing readings and writings with the help
of what is not "in" the text, with "things" about which the
"world'V'text" might be silent, or interested in marginalizing or
excluding. Such writing essays a shift from the metaphysics of
"imitation" (Plato) to the general function of imagination (Dewey),
from the metaphysics of "presence" (Heidegger) to the
metaphorics with which we construct "presence" — in its absence
and/or "differance" (Derrida). Such literary theory proposes a
shifty slide from "here-is-my-object talk" to "here-is-my-
contextual-grid talk" (Foucault). For talk, they write, is not sited
in any one original place, Subject, or meta-source.
And aesthetics will form the counterpoint to this general post-
structuralist narrative because it was a focus by which
pragmatism (Dewey) dismantled the dominant images of
Philosophy (as "representation" and "True Knowledge," rather than
as artistic interaction and useful). Aesthetics was for Dewey not,
as was more often the case, a philosophical amendment (Kant,
Hegel, etc.) to an a priori system which needed an aesthetic theory
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to round off its claim to highbrow and Systematic completeness.2
It forms the counterpoint also because literary metaphors are not
the only ones available to do this philosophically "deconstructive"
work, literature is not the only medium of cognitive experience,3
and it is not a large enough skewer around which to wrap critical
questions regarding the non-literary dimensions of contemporary
social and political experience. (On the non-literary pragmatics or
rhetoric, for example, of music [with reference to Schonberg and
Copland], cf. chapter 6, pp. 247-263.) The metaphorics of
"textuality" — (a hangover from structuralist linguistics), in order
for the "play of difference" to continue, need some opposition; and
aesthetics and rhetoric more generally can offer something
functionally broader than that which e.g., Derrida as critic
provides. (Edward Said, for example, will be mentioned as a
proponent of intercourse between text-talk and world-talk,
"between" which criticism has its function. The prepositional
locating of "between" is not intended to rehabilitate an
2 This jibe fails, of course, to differentiate the many and important ways in
which Kant and Hegel differ in their appeal to the aesthetic, in terms
either of a Critique of the structure of judgement (Kant) or in terms of the
historical "Erscheinung" of the absolute Geist (Hegel) respectively. But
both propound a view of the aesthetic which stands or falls in terms of the
credibility of the System in which it receives its (subordinate) function. As
R. Bubner writes on Hegel: "Die Aktualitat der Hegelschen Asthetik kann
gewiB nicht aus ihrem systematischen Anspruch abgeleitet werden. Denn
mit diesem Anspruch steht und fallt das Verdikt liber das Ende der Kunst.
Kunst last sich in das philosophische System nur eingliedern, wenn ihre
eigentliche Stunde voriiber ist." (Hegel, Asthetik I/II, ed. & intro. R.
Bubner, 1977:16-17.) For a pragmatically integrative (non-a priori)
approach to aesthetics and philosophy, and a contemporary use of
Deweyian themes regarding them both as mutually related, open and
culturally emergent products (without the aid of the absolute Geist), cf. J.
Margolis, esp. 1980, Art and Philosophy.
3 As Goodman, 1984:9 reiterates, the notational systems, and our experience
of those systems in the other arts is no less cognitive (contra the Kantian
tradition of aesthetics) than is our relationship to philosophy, literature
and science.
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ontologically parasitic relationship between "text" and "world-
itself.")4
4.2 CULTURE, NATURE AND ART:
Dewey often felt the need to connect his naturalistic vocabulary
and his cultural-historical vocabulary in a rhetoric seeking "the
generic traits manifested by existences of all kinds."5 And these
traits were to be synthesized by the figure of the philosopher who
discovers these "large and constant features of human sufferings,
enjoyments, trials, failures and successes together with the
institutions of art, science, technology, politics, and religion which
mark them. . ."6 He was, as Rorty (1982:73) points out, using the
genre (of old metaphysics) he wanted out of. But I think it is the
use question — the use to which "metaphysics" gets put — which
indeed helped him out; and it is his interest in aesthetic questions
which helped him make the artifice or genre (of metaphysics) an
expendable one.
It is not that Dewey thought such generic-traits-metaphysics was
the philosopher's primary task. For such traits were "sure to turn
up in every universe of discourse." His point was that such
4 Cf. E. Said, esp. "Interview with Edward Said," Diacritics. 6:3, 1976:41; and
"The Text, the World, the Critic" in Textual Strategies (ed.) Harari, 1979:161-
188 for his discussion the importance of being able to generate critical
discourses which do not neglect the relations between literature and the
social power-discourses it interacts with.
5 Dewey, 1929b:412.
6 Dewey, 1927:59. This was written in response to Santayana's review of
Experience and Nature and his remark that a "naturalistic metaphysics" is a
contradiction in terms. Cf. Schilpp, 1939.
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"definitions" of traits (what metaphysics achieves) can only be a
vague "ground-map" for further "criticism, elaborating base lines
to be employed in more intricate triangulations."7 Rorty sees a
tension here between generic-traits-talk and therapeutic criticism
-- or criticism of the tradition — which has to be resolved in the
interest of strengthening the rhetorical hand of the pragmatist to
chide philosophers away from their old self-adulating games of
"discovering large and constant features," and mythologizing the
philosopher as someone who specializes in so doing. I think Rorty
is right. But even after Dewey is more thoroughly rhetoricized, he
still seems committed to a somewhat broader set of cultural
games than is Rorty.
Rorty writes that there is "a recurrent flaw in Dewey's work: his
habit of announcing a bold new positive program when all he
offers, and all he needs to offer, is criticism of the tradition."8 This
is correct but misleading. When Dewey becomes both positive and
concretely constructive, especially in his political and educational
writings, he is not trying to write professional philosophy, to give
it one grand program. (Recall, p. 81, Dewey's pedagogical
rhetoric.) That is, when he did offer programmatic suggestions, it
was not in the genre Rorty rightly criticizes. In this sense, Dewey
did offer more than "criticism of the tradition" precisely by
writing about things other than the philosophical tradition, and by
criticizing those who do not. Dewey had already led the
7 Dewey, 1929b:413. (My italics.)
8 Rorty, 1982:78.
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traditional horse to water and Rorty is still basking (indeed
elegantly) on the beach.
But, of course Rorty's criticisms of Dewey are more precise, and
his eventual encomium not reduced by them. Dewey, in
Experience and Nature, was indeed after a "structural" jargon
which would not encourage unbridgeable discontinuities between
the vocabularies of biologists, psychologists and social critics. But
in so doing, there was (according to Rorty) a "return to Lockean
modes of thought [which], under the aegis of Darwin, betrayed
precisely the insight which Dewey owed to Green: that nothing is
to be gained for an understanding of human knowledge by
running together the vocabularies in which we describe the causal
antecedents of knowledge with those in which we offer
justifications of our claims to knowledge."9 In one way this is
right. But another and, I think, more useful reading of Dewey
highlights his work on just how the tradition has indeed conflated
these two forms of writing, how often "causal antecedents" jargon
was located and used apologetically to justify social jargons, social
interests, and how this is at some point a mistake. But Dewey also
held that this running together is purposeful, (and not a
"contradiction in terms," passim Santayana), when these jargons
begin to refer to each other for pragmatic support, when both
become social rhetorics for the achievement of some mutually
beneficial purpose. That is, if the former (causal jargon) is
considered an epistemologically grounded jargon, the mixing with
9 Ibid.: 81.
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normative jargon is confused and dubious; if the former is itself
confessedly value-laden and rhetorical in the first place, then it
might not always be confused. Dewey thought both were social
practices for solving specific problems; and this is the level at
which "continuities" between these jargons was sought. And this
continuity ties Dewey not primarily to Locke (and the assimilation
of higher "ideas" to lower "feels"), but more to Hegel and the
historical continuities involved in any nature/culture-inquiry; in
any socially useful explanatory-justificatory strategy (without, of
course, the pantheistic teleology which Hegel's Absolute provided).
Rorty has Dewey hoping to provide a grand scheme of "generic
traits," and scheming to be both naturalistic (Lockean) and
transcendental (Hegelian) in order to achieve it.10 Whereas, I
think his interest was in a rhetoric of social amelioration which
simply did not have an adequate excuse for leaving anything out:
and in this sense Rorty is right to call him "Hegelian" too. For
Rorty, the importance of Dewey is his treating the "cultural
developments which Kant thought it was the task of philosophy to
preserve and protect as simply temporary stopping-places" for
experience and inquiry:
"Kant thought that there were three permanent data of
philosophy: (1) Newtonian physics and the resulting
conception of a unified science centering on mathematical
descriptions of micro-structures; (2) the common moral
consciousness of a North German Pietist; (3) the sense of
delicacy, of playful freedom from the imperatives of
scientific inquiry and moral duty, offered by the eighteenth-
10 Rorty bases his comments primarily on the one text: Experience and
Nature.
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century aesthetic consciousness. The aim of philosophy was
to preserve these cultural accomplishments by drawing the
lines between them (preferably writing a separate book
about each) and showing how they could be rendered
compatible with one another and made "necessary."
Philosophy, for Kant, as it had been for Aristotle, was a
matter of drawing boundaries to keep scientific inquiry
from interfering with morals, the aesthetic from interfering
with the scientific, and so on."11
For Dewey, on the other hand, (like the historicist side of Hegel in
some respects), 18th-century physics, the contrite believer, and
the theology of the Sublime, were expendable local periods in the
modernization of experimentation and inquiry: discourses in the
history of a culture which could now talk about all of these
without separating them from one another into distinct onto-
categories.12 Dewey regarded the quest for rational order, moral
imperatives, and an analytic of Beauty as different in kind only if
one thought of rational order as "accuracy of representation," of
morality as the imperative to universalize the conventions of the
province, and of beauty as "purposeness without purpose." Dewey
did not offer point for point rebuttal of Kant's period pieces, (or of
any one elses "timeless" arguments), he simply left the 18th
century for his own.
Rorty is right to point out that Dewey was after big fish, and that
he didn't offer the "more precise" and "dialectically skilled"
deconstructions of specific problems that Rorty praises the
followers of either the early or the later Wittgenstein as having
11 Rorty, 1982:85-86
12 This is also the critical thrust of Goodman's nominalist and relativist
semiotics.
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achieved. And with good reason. Dewey was investigating a
culture which was not itself producing these specific problems:
problems which the legacy of an already tired tradition had left
behind (like the mind/body problem). He was encouraging
philosophy to be an art which could change its stylistic model:
away from physics and truth-as-copying. He was also criticizing
the cultural and institutional formations which supported the
20th-century rise of a philosophical style trying to free itself from
value in order to achieve fact: and making only negative
achievements. As Putnam writes in "After Empiricism:" "The
accomplishments of analytic philosophy are primarily negative: it
destroyed the very problems with which it started by successive
failure even to determine what would count as a solution."13
We now had philosophy without substantial problems, or solutions
to the ones it thought were worth analysing, nevertheless carrying
on in a mannerist tradition with a style disengaged from larger
social questions, and benefiting by not assessing the cultural
environment which supports and markets the continued
production of useless analytic artifacts. The point is that when
Dewey exchanged the model of clear representation (and its
legalistic expertise) for the model of experimental art, he put
philosophy in a position to engage in the indisciplinary pluralism
required of a genre without foundations. Rather than competing
to write the wittiest history of a played-out style, he suggested
places to go which were neither True nor eternal: not on the basis
13 H. Putnam, "After Empiricism," 1985:28.
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of a "metaphysics of experience" (Rorty's accusation), but because
the philosophical artifice ought to make contact with as wide a
range of experience as possible (Dewey's recommendation).
Dewey did not say that talk of "generic traits" would make
philosophical criticism of culture more "scientific," more
"fundamental," or more "deep" than the criticisms of minority
leaders, novelists, or school teachers. He wanted the game to be
played by as many as possible. And if too few were playing, then
philosophy had something to criticize.
Rorty too, in talking about Dewey, makes the shift from the
naturalist to the artist (the encomium):14 "Dewey's work is one of
those [great] achievements. It is great not because it provides an
accurate representation of generic traits of nature or experience
or culture or anything else. Its greatness lies in the sheer
provocativeness of its suggestions about how to slough off our
intellectual past, and about how to treat that past as material for
playful experimentation rather than as imposing tasks and
responsibilities upon us. Dewey's work helps us put aside that
spirit of seriousness which artists traditionally lack and
philosophers are traditionally supposed to maintain."15 Rorty
does not in the end blame him for occasionally coming "down with
the disease he was trying to cure"16 (when using traits-talk). The
selective alliance Rorty forges with Dewey (as critic of the
tradition, offering a change of vocabulary, increasing our





discursive space) is a good one: one which has links extending also
to the most important continental attempts to aestheticize our
philosophical texts, to move from nature to art and culture, to
change our vocabulary. It is in these senses that pragmatism
converses with structualism and post-structuralism.
1
4.3 THE RHETORIC OF THE STRUCTURALIST TEXT:
One can make mention of structuralism in the same sense as one
does the analytic. The analytic broke itself down, and a post-
analytic pragmatism came back with ironic vengeance.
Structuralism too succeeded by producing its offspring: post-
structuralism. I will summarize briefly and vaguely some tenets
of, and consequences of, structuralists' work: their success at
focussing a form of attention and instituting a style through these
tenets — (their rhetorical success); and their failure to make
structuralist linguistics a foundational discovery procedure to
prove them — (the pragmatic consequences). As examples of both
I will focus briefly on Roman Jakobson's applications to, and
impact on, literary criticism: on our understanding of a text. And
I will discuss briefly Levi-Strauss' efforts to universalize
"structure" as a technique for understanding mind and culture as
the products of this ubiquitious (idealist) "structure": a text (or
structure) he put in everyones head. In this narrative, Jakobson
will play the role of the empiricist, the atomist, "discovering" the
fundamental units which govern what gets made with them. And
Levi-Strauss will be the Dialectical figure, setting up grand
oppositions into which all consciousness and its cultural products
can be mythologically united. Roland Barthes and Stanley Fish
will be the helpmates who provide literary criticism with a way
back to where pragmatic criticism had been waiting: at the
crossroads of a non-foundational pluralism, where texts are
members of interpretational communities purposefully producing
different readings, structured not by "deep structures," but by
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"interpretants" (as Peirce put it).17
Structuralism (like analytic philosophy) also begins with a "science
versus literature" slogan. It is interested more in determinative
structures than in pragmatically expansive and edifying
interpretations. Structuralists are concerned not so much with the
meanings of individual works as with the linguistic conditions of
meaning altogether; not so much with single texts and pragmatic
contexts as with the linguistic operations upon which literature
and culture themselves are based. "New Criticism" wanted to
constrain interpretation to "the text itself." Classical structuralism
wanted to go even further back: to the structure of language itself
which produces texts. And the method for so doing was to be
provided by linguistics (primarily Saussure and Jakobson). So, the
success or failure of the program would depend on one's
interpretation and use of the linguistic model: and these varied.
But this "euphoric dream of scientificity" (as Barthes himself later
called his relationship to structuralism), once turned metaphorical,
did nevertheless provide some important insights into our
understanding of texts. (Structuralism has a different trajectory
in anthropology which I will only allude to through Levi-Strauss
17 For a view of "structures" very close to Dewey's in its reference not to
linguistic structures, but to open and developmentally maleable biological
and organic "structures," cf. Jean Piaget's S true tural i sm. and also his
Genetic Epistemologv. As compensation for my very crude and abbreviated
narrative about structuralism (I am, after all, wanting to go elsewhere), I
refer the reader to three of the most useful theoretical, and already classic,
commentaries regarding literary structuralism: Fredric Jameson's The
Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian
Formalism (1972), Robert Scholes' Structuralism in Literature: An
Introduction (1974), and Jonathan Culler's Structuralist Poetics (1975).
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in order to highlight the value of pragmatic questions over
structuralist and formalistically linguistic ones.)
Some of the fundamentals by which a diffuse set of structuralists
would recognize each other were: 1. Cultural phenomena, (like
texts), are not material objects or constrained and localizable by
analogy to such objects. Texts convey meaning by use of signs:
not through realist analogues or representational icons, but by
(unnatural) semiotic conventions.18 2. And these signs do not
have essences (remember Peirce) which mirror the world. They
receive their intellegibility in terms of a network of relations. 3.
The assumption required to get the rhetoric of structure off the
ground was that there must be an underlying system of
distinctions, generative oppositions and rule following conventions
(forming a code) in order for meaning to be possible. 4. And
following this assumption is the requirement that there be a
discovery procedure (provided by linguistics) which will allow
that structure to be elaborately detailed and (mimetically)
represented -- (another imitational aesthetic). 5. This having
been accomplished, it can then be applied to literary artifacts
(which Jakobson attempted to elaborate), and to all mental and
cultural processes (which Levi-Strauss attempted to elaborate).
The dualistic rhetoric on which the enterprise rests is Saussure's
formalistic separation of langue from parole. The former is the
1 8 Again, the reader will notice in the following many parallels with
Goodman's work, and also the reciprocal proximity between a form of doing
philosophy and doing literary theory -- as structuralists pursued it.
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"underlying" system, the metapersonal rules -- a formal and
abstract set of oppositional differences. The latter refers to the
concrete emanations of the System, to behavior: the specific acts
and utterances in speech and writing. (The separation runs
parallel to Chomsky's distinction between competence and
performance.) The distinction is also already methodologically
invested: langue is the generative set of rules which can, of
course, be formally reproduced by the patient taxonomist.
Saussure's interest is not to discover properties of objects or
events, but to discover the differences between signs within a
given system: not positive entities but related series of abstract,
ahistorical and oppositional terms. (The Saussurian principle of
the code rests on the notion that "matter is only the instrument of
signification, not the signifier itself."19) Following on from
Saussure, both Jakobson and Levi-Strauss will make these
(idealized) binary oppositions the universal grammar of mind and
the foundational syntax of all cultural products and meaning
(including music, says Levi-Strauss). Levi-Strauss wants to
unmask the "laws of symbolic thought," and Jakobson, the




4.4 LeVI-STRAUSS READING AND WRITING STRUCTURES:
Levi-Strauss, like Dewey in the previous sections (4.1 and 4.2), is
concerned with the distinction between nature and culture, and
with how we write about it. But if Dewey sometimes appears
more Lockean, Levi-Strauss appears more metaphysically
Hegelian: in the sense that the distinction between nature and
culture is no longer a variable and concretely interactionist one
(Dewey), but a dialectical opposition reiterating itself
(structurally) in the same way in every culture and in every
mind. I will look briefly at The Raw and the Cooked as that which
attempts to mirror the structural opposition between the natural
and the cultural, as that which attempts to set up a style of
reading and writing structure as one meta-logic uniting all
cultural domains in one linguistic (Saussurean) text-in-the-mind.
Meals, it seems to Levi-Strauss, have a structure. Can it be that
culinary patterns and interests reflect thoughts rather than
purposeful practices? Do we organize certain foods in certain
ways not so much because they are good to eat but because they
are good to think, not pragmatic habits but mental structures?
Yes, Levi-Strauss would affirm. Foods are signs selected to convey
cultural messages rather than practical proteins.20 (Remember,
signs do not have positive properties but only oppositional
differences from one another.) Every community (and every
20 My discussion here follows M. Harris, 1980: especially 188-190.
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mind) unconsciously sends out messages coded in the medium of
foods and their preparations.
The fundamental contrasts in this culinary semiotic are those
between cooked, raw and rotted foods. Elevated (or reduced) to a
linguistic and dialectical principle, cooked foods communicate in a
language aligning the product on the side of nature or on the side
of culture. Levi-Strauss writes that boiled is aligned (structurally)
with the cultural side, because to boil requires a pot, a barrier of
water between the fire and the food. Roasting is a nature-sign
because food and fire are in direct contact. The structural formula
is:
roasted : boiled : : nature : culture.
The opposition between the raw and the cooked is a code for the
distinction between nature and culture: voila!
This also explains why guests would receive roasted foods (they're
associated with nature) and close kinsmen get the boiled (they're
the center of one's cultural life). With this universal mental
formula (linguistic structure), Levi-Strauss purports to support a
prediction about cannibalism, both when strangers and relatives
are being eaten. Kin are culture, so they ought to be boiled;
strangers are part of the nature side — to be roasted. (The logic
here being dialectical, Levi-Strauss does not explain why things
could not be the other way round.)
1
Of course someone was bound to test this and see if cultures
perform rather more in terms of prevailing pragmatic conditions,
or indeed in terms of Levi-Straussian structures, if they perform
with different signs for different contexts, or indeed with one
differential metalogic dualistically separated from even an
interest in those contexts. And Paul Shankman found that in a
sample of sixty cannibal societies, seventeen boiled while twenty
roasted; and six both boiled and roasted. Twenty-nine of them ate
out (ate strangers -- what Levi-Strauss calls "exo-cuisine") and
twenty-six ate in (ate relatives — "endo-cuisine"), and five did
both. But not only did they, contrary to Levi-Strauss' structures,
vary their preparations: for those who only used one form of
preparation, being good pragmatists, they baked! "The most
obvious finding of this study is that Levi-Strauss' exclusive focus
on the roasted and the boiled has been spoiled by the natives who
have discovered a veritable smorgasbord of ways of preparing
people."21 In other words, the art of cooking is not the same as
the art of linguistics. If asked whether structural oppositions are
resolved for the myth or for the native (cook),22 Levi-Strauss
chooses the former; for he does "not aim to show how men think
in myths but how myths think in men, unbeknownst to them."23
The pragmatist, in contrast, would argue that cultures cope with
signs. Levi-Strauss has transformed coping into a linguistic game
of mental imagery. But on the contrary, when fuel is short, then
21 Shankman, 1969:61, cited by Harris, 1980:189.
22 Boon, 1972:97, cited by Culler, 1975:150.
23 Levi-Strauss, 1969:20; and cited by Culler, 1975:150.
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(in Asia) rapid frying is the method. When Indian woman are
working in the fields, cow dung provides cool and long-lasting
flame for slow cooking.24 What Dewey saw as a "variety of
discourses and practices in communities adapting to different and
changing situations," Levi-Strauss reads (and writes) as "the
structure of the human mind." But,
"what does this matter? For if the final aim of anthropology
is to contribute to a better knowledge of objectified thought
and its mechanisms, it is in the last resort immaterial
whether in this book the thought processes of the South
American Indians take shape through the medium of my
thoughts, or whether mine take place through the medium
of theirs. What matters is that the human mind, regardless
of the identity of those who happen to be giving it
expression, should display an increasingly intelligible
structure as a result of the doubly reflexive thought
movement of two thought processes acting one upon the
other, either of which can in turn provide the spark or
tinder whose conjunction will shed light on both."25
All myths become the parole of a general mythological langue
(Saussure again). Platonic Dialectic (with echoes of the Meno
above) returns in the Form of langue. That is, Levi-Strauss' own
thoughts become the evidence of the Dialectic process. The
thoughts of a well fed idealist become the explanation of how
other people attempt to eat. And applying linguistic structures
becomes the technique for reading: reading not only what other
people do, but how they must think. The more pluralistic and
multiplied our discursive strategies, the more they all look the
same: like one Mind. Levi-Strauss argues that ". . . if the human
mind is determined even in its creation of myths, a fortiori it is
24 These are Harris' counter examples, op.cit, 1980:190.
25 Levi-Strauss, 1969:13 (My italics.).
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determined in other spheres as well."26 Here one reads how
structuralist linguistics has been transformed into idealist
structures, into a single discourse, a single mentalistic text, into an
elevated play of oppositional signs.
The linguistics kills two birds with one assumption: it provides not
only the discovery procedure; it also solves the problem (by not
asking the question) of the intertranslatability of multiple
discourses and practices into the one meta-theory. Structure has
become Levi-Strauss' myth, put in everyone else's head. History
becomes assimilated to language, and pragmatic questions are
begged. Questions like: why a community chooses one discourse
rather than another; why one functions or works well and another
badly, powerfully and/or weakly; and why a change is made
(presuming there are historical changes) which institutionalizes
the survival of one discourse and the death of another. (This
orientation of Levi-Strauss prefaces post-structuralist practice in
many important respects. Post-structuralists, as we will see,
deconstruct structure, pluralize and aestheticize discourses, and
make interpretation (of cultural phenomena and of texts)
indeterminate: but they do not contextualize the "play of the
signifier" in terms of the pragmatic issues of why certain
discourses develop rather than others, of why the game is played
with different conventions in different cultural spaces. In other
words, an elevated textuality remains dominant; language in toto
remains the dilemma. Philosophy may be a literary art, but an
26 Levi-Strauss, 1969:18.
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eternally repetitive one because it problematizes language
"itself.")
So, Levi-Strauss elevates the power of the mind and unifies its
products by appealing to an underlying semiotic structure which
places these products within a differential system of signs
provided in advance. Studying culture (and its artifacts) becomes
analogous to studying a linguistic system; and this is where
structuralist literary criticism would agree. In this sense, looking
at unwritten myths and at well written poems becomes the same
thing: i.e., looking at the products of a formal system. That is,
Levi-Strauss and Jakobson (in a moment) are instituting a style of
reading: on the basis of a rhetoric of fundamental codes,
grammars and oppositions. (As we will see, (chaper 6.) Schbnberg,
much "modernist" theory, and many Anglo-American syntax-
driven aesthetic theories share the same predilections.)
1
4.5 JAKOBSON, AND REFERRING TO FICTIONS:
But what sort of grammar is this? How does it structure its
products? And how does linguistic analysis discover this
grammar and its operations? Or, could it be that this grammar is
itself an interpretational fiction, which, by being referred to,
forms the basis of a certain style of reading and a genre of
writing? Could it be that it is itself an artifice, a literary conceit,
used to read and place other literary artifices, another attempt to
escape rhetoricity through description, through describing
something (a foundational code or system) which is the basis of all
(literary) rhetorics or practices? What, then, does structuralism
tell us about the sort of text linguistic analysis wishes to be
considered as when it purports to be a describer of the nature of
literary texts? (The same questions arise, of course, in the context
of speech act theory, as it worries about the nature of fictional
reference, truth functions, and the "mimetic nature" of literature:
speech-act theory already being sure that it knows how to refer to
what is distinctly "non-literary discourse," and that it is itself a
non-literary discourse. But the following discussion will follow up
the implications of structuralism primarily because its post-
structuralist critics do more interesting things with it and,
consequently, with philosophy than those that are being done
with speech act theory.)
Parenthetically: The speech act theories of Searle (1969),
Beardsley (1970), Ohmann (1971) and Pratt (1977), when
1
formalistically applied to literature, share a great many
similarities to structuralism, and earn the same rebuke. The
pragmatic criticisms of speech act theory made by Fish (1980),
Margolis (1980) and Rorty (1982) are good cases in point. Searle
wishes to idealize a distinction which will separate literary from
non-literary discourse, and simultaneously institute a descriptive
genre that will arbitrate between them: philosophy of language.
On this basis, Beardsley writes that: "A poem is an imitation of a
compound illocutionary act." (My italics.) And Ohmann follows
the refrain: "[A] literary work is a discourse abstracted, or
detached, from the circumstances and conditions which make
illocutionary acts possible; [a literary work's] illocutionary force is
mimetic. "27 (My italics.) Pratt makes gestures in the more
pragmatic direction of distinctions of genre and practice, only to
conflate such differences with different speech acts: the same
story.
Performing background support for the project of setting up
neatly distinct speech acts are the vague and homely "maxims" of
Grice: "Do not say what you believe to be false. Do not say that
for which you lack adequate evidence. Avoid obscurity of
expression. Avoid ambiguity. Be brief (avoid unnecessary
prolixity). Be orderly. Be relevant. Make your contribution as
27 Ohmann attempts to make the notion of "style" explainable also within a
theory of illocutionary force. In this regard, "[w]hat is important about
Ohmann's errors is that they are always honorable and attractive; that is,
they are made in an effort to stretch the theory so that it will do things we
would like it to do: . . ." Fish: 1980:226. In other words, it is by attempting to
absorb the various functions which different discriminations of style serve
into formalistic speech-act units that one sees how easily style eludes the
procedure.
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informative as is required (for the current purposes of the
exchange). Do not make your contribution more informative than
is required."28 (Recall Aristotle's restrictive recommendations to
the rhetorician, p. 28.) These moral-linguistic manners then
appear in the guise of analytic speech acts and rules, which
philosophers, presumably, recognize as "normal" and
conscientiously embody, and which count as the mark of their
distinction from literature. Thereby, (with a few adjustments, and
even more suspiciously) we end up with a system to be applied to
bodies of work (literature) which violate this (stylistic) order all
the time; which flaunt or construct their own evidence, exploit
amwbiguity and disruption, and mix their "speech acts" mercilessly.
Borges not only purposefully mixes his acts, he undermines the
assumption that one could (or should) separate them out and,
therefore, stabilize and establish a style of writing (of philosophy)
which professionalizes such misguided performances. He tells
hybrid stories, of history and of histories of books, each making
the other and reversing each other. He speaks (writes) with
straight and grand metaphysical propositions out of the mouth of
Leibniz, parodied to the point of the absurd in the form of the
short-story miniatures in which they appear: grand metaphysical
miniatures. He writes about a culture (who knows where) in
which "[tjhey judge that metaphysics is a branch of fantastic
literature," in which a philosopher's "book which does not contain
its counterbook is considered incomplete."29 His precursors are
28 Margolis, 1980:242, culls these from Grice's "Logic and Conversation," in
Syntax and Semantics Vol 3, (eds.) P. Cole & J. L. Morgan, N.Y.: Academic
Press, 1975.
29 Borges, 1964: "Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius", pp. 34,37.
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Zeno and Kafka, Berkeley and Chesterton. To "sort this out" with
distinct speech acts would produce a most inappropriate rigor.30
Margolis also alludes to Borges (as do Rorty and Derrida) and
comments that neither Searlians nor structuralists have "supplied
us with a viable scheme of speech acts, on the basis of which we
can say with any confidence which rules or maxims must obtain if
discourse is to proceed felicitously. . . [I]t is impossible to show
that all or most apparent violations entail incoherence or
irrationality."31 To this, Rorty adds that the search for speech acts
which will distinguish literary from non-literary discourses is still
a reiteration of the dream of distinguishing second-order language
in literature from first-order language about the world, and a
dream about a discipline and a meta-genre of writing (Philosophy)
which would be in a position to adjudicate (Dialectics again). To
this, Fish adds a purposefully illustrative joke, using speech act
discourse not as a supplier of analytic structures but as a most
"prestigious story,"32 as a drama, even as the central dilemma of
Shakespeare's Coriolanus. Fish persuades us that it is a "Speech
Act play" about the rules of conventional performance (or
30 But not to .worry: Austin's own distinction between "constatives" (to
describe truly or falsely) and "performatives" (the performing of an
action) do not endure his own exploration of their separability.
31 Margolis, 1980:243, 244. To this one could add that the more useful and
modest hope, that Searle be able to distinguish between novels,
philosophical speculations and advertisements, (let alone fiction and fact,
with the use of speech-act theory), leads one to question what sort of
heuristic function it could have. At best it constructs laborious ways of
trying to distinguish different genres of linguistic use which we
distinguish more easily without its help: i.e., through pragmatically
assessed genres. (More on the issue of replacing the notion of "speech act"
with the notion of "genre" in chapter 6, pp. 275-292.)
32 Fish, "How to Do Things with Austin and Searle: Speech-Act Theory and
Literary Criticism," 1980:239.
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"performatives"), about the social price payed for obeying or
ignoring those "rules" if one wants to be recognized as a member
of the community. Speech acts, in Fish's text, become hermeneutic
allegories about belonging, not classificatory facts discovered by
philosophers and imitated by literature or literary criticism. And
speech acts, in Rorty's text, are the creations of another
(epistemological) attempt to establish a style of writing
philosophy safely on the side of the non-literary, unbiased and
descriptive.
And this (to return to structuralism) is also where Jakobson would
like to be. He is sure that:
"Any unbiased, attentive, exhaustive, total description of the
selection,—distribution and interrelation of diver se
morphological classes and syntactic constructions in a given
poem surprises the examiner himself by unexpected,
striking symmetries and anti-symmetries, balanced
structures, efficient accumulation of equivalent forms and
salient contrasts, finally by rigid restrictions in the
repertory of morphological and syntactic constituents used
in the poem, eliminations which, on the other hand, permit
us to follow the masterly interplay of the actualized
constructions."33
This is indeed somewhat surprising, and very hopeful: keeping
alive the ambition that a method will escape its own rhetoricity
by describing rhetorical or literary structure. This is achieved,
firstly, by being "unbiased, attentive, [and] exhaustive." And we
can be all of these by following a method which produces a
complete inventory of the patterns objectively present in the text:
and all of this without having to worry about the relevance or
33 R. Jakobson, 1968:603.
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value of these "unexpected" discoveries. But, by being asked to
perform certain linguistic tricks on certain fictions, we are, at the
same time, induced (not asked) to accept the legitimacy and
prowess of a style of work which wishes to be recognized as
something more: as the describer of the objective constituents of
some other kind of writing: poetry.
This double ingenuity, of attempting to escape one's own generic
relativity by descriptively proliferating the constitutive units of a
"different" kind of product, a poem, is what structuralism does.
But not without some interesting consequences. While reading,
for example, Shakespeare's 129th Sonnet, Jakobson searches for
and, of course, finds a grammatical parallelism, foregrounds it as
the center of the poem, and infers from it a semantic and
thematically inappropriate conclusion. What is interesting here is
not simply that the structural positions, symmetries and
subsequent analysis, are displaced (in importance) by the
1
thematic considerations through which we read them;34 nor
simply that in this specific instance Jakobson's distributional keys
unlocked an implausible interpretation. (As Kuhn points out,
finding mistaken details is not enough to make a theory, or style
of reading, "incorrect" or uninteresting.) The problem is that
Jakobson seems persuaded by his interpretation precisely because
it has been discoverd by "unbiased, exhaustive total description of
[these] . . . syntactic constructions [and] striking symmetries:" i.e.,
by linguistic analysis.
So, it is not the prowess of the method which is in doubt. On the
contrary, it seems that with a little technology and ingenuity one
34 Cf. R. Jakobson, 1970:esp. 18-21; and J. Culler, 1975:71-74 for a close
analysis of Jakobson's reading of this sonnet, and how he uses syntactic
constructs to draw dubious semantic conclusions. The sonnet is as follows:
Th'expense of Spirit in a waste of shame
Is lust in action, and till action, lust
Is perjured, murderous, bloody, full of blame,
Savage, extreme, rude, cruel, not to trust,
Enjoyed no sooner but despised straight,
Past reason hunted, and no sooner had,
Past reason hated, as a swallowed bait,
On purpose laid to make the taker mad.
Mad in pursuit, and in possession so,
Had, having, and in quest to have, extreme,
A bliss in proof, and proved, a very woe,
Before a joy proposed, behind a dream.
All this the world well knows, yet none knows well
To shun the heaven that leads men to this hell.
By analyzing strophes II and IV (italics) as structurally parallel and
equivalent constituents, Jakobson connects 'on purpose laid' to 'the
heaven', thereby interpreting (deducing) that heaven's sovereign is the
rascal who deliberately dangled the bait. It is the prioritizing of the
parallelism which produces the dubious reading. The parallel between 'to
make the taker mad' and 'leads men to this hell' convinces Jakobson that
the fault lies with this unknown culprit (heaven), rather than (say) with
men (the takers) who seduce themselves by not being able to move from
one kind of knowledge to another: from knowledge of the bait to
knowledge of how to prevent themselves from swallowing it. And Jakobson
has followed suit, swallowed his own bait. He refered to a "syntactic
structure" but slid over to a semantic conclusion. And this conclusion is
certainly open to question.
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can indeed "discover" numerous patterns and oppositions. But, it
seems also that what one "discovers" (syntactic units) may bear
little relation to the overall effect (semantic consequences) of the
poem. Again, the pragmatic test of these distribution patterns
takes place in the context of what we thought of the poem before
we knew the structuralist was reading it. It is this which tells us
if he is using his taxonomies, oppositions and distributions (or his
list of different speech acts) correctly (that is, relevantly and
persuasively). Poetic effects (passim Jakobson), like cultural
effects {passim Levi-Strauss) are what need to be explained (or at
least methodologically considered). And these effects, or
consequences, always seem more complex, indeterminate and
open ended than (syntactically reductive) metaphors of
"structure" imply, or which that genre of writing which hunts for
such "structures" admits. (By "effects" and "consequences" I mean
that what the reader draws out as a message (or as messages, or
as meaningful relationships between "units") loops back to help us
locate relevant units in its construction. Understanding of the
"whole" helps reciprocally to discriminate the relevant parts
which "determine" it. Jakobson wants (as R. Scholes, 1974:27, puts
it) "a single universal description of communication acts" on the
basis of his "discovery of syntactic essences:" essences which
themselves, once dualistically separated from semantic effects
(from meaning and the consequences a reader draws from such
meaning), cannot then suddenly be called upon to supply a
universally determinitive foundation for those varied effects.)
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For structuralism to work as a practice, to form an institution, it
needed a discovery procedure: it needed to construct a grammar
which would in different hands achieve identical results (i.e.,
achieve science). But this classificatory procedure has
experienced "repeated failures." As Chomsky argu^es: "it is very
questionable whether this goal is attainable in any interesting
way, and I suspect that any attempt to meet it will lead into a
maze of more and more elaborate and complex analytic
procedures that will fail to provide answers for many important
questions about linguistic structure."'35 The point here is not only
that one might fail, but that the dream to work out such
procedures might raise the wrong and most useless problems: it
might set up a style of work in service of an "unwarranted belief"
in complexity of the wrong kind, especially when this structuralist
35 N. Chomsky, 1957:52-53, and cf. Culler, 1975:21.
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vocabulary is applied to literature and other culturally emergent
artifacts and processes.36
When the structuralist technology has success, locates "facts," and
produces acceptable conclusions, this is only when they conform
to what we already tacitly know (about reading various sorts of
texts). Some foreknowledge determines what can be "discovered."
Converting this into a formal representation might work, but only:
1. when such work is done on a closed corpus (and texts have
kept opening up again with only a little concerted effort). 2.
when the desire is to construct inventories of elements or units
(useful indeed in warehouses, but less so in the "generative" and
"transformational" context of flexible and dynamic linguistic
(aesthetic) practices — modernist and post-modernist literature
being just such a context of practice which uses and is about
36 This critique parallels Margolis' pragmatist view of Goodman's complex
and technical uses of semiotics. Goodman moves from a post-carnapian
formalism (The Structure of Appearance! to an interest in the "languages
of art" without asking how and why and in what circumstances certain
good and/or bad and/or different ways of symbolizing emerge. Goodman's
interest is in achieving a "systematic discourse" within the nominalist
context of an ontological relativism, but this is achieved irrespective of the
pragmatic and cultural contexts within which semiotic practices function.
In other words, Goodman assesses "works" too much in terms of questions of
(notational and stylistic) identities CLanguages of Art), separated "from
aesthetic interest, from cultural intention, and from the emergent and
shifting powers of historically contingent communities." (Margolis,
1981:426) It is good (I think Margolis would agree) to have a vocabulary
which asks how symbols relate systematically to other symbols and systems
of symbols, so long as it does not neglect the questions of why and in what
circumstances and for what pragmatic reasons we attend to and
functionally valorize the ones we do. Goodman's legislative wit is itself an
important intellectual style which has provided the analytic tradition with
a (non-epistemologically foundationalist) way to talk about science and art
at the same time, but still within the limitations of a primarily taxonomic
rhetoric. (More on this issue with respect to music and post-modern theory
and practice in chapter 6.)
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language).37 3. when one's goal is to relocate all usage in terms of
elevated relations of opposition (as if, a la carte d<s Levi-Strauss,
food must be either roasted or boiled rather than (like a theory)
perhaps only half-baked).3 8 and 4. when one is fond of
mathematics and wants a calculus to produce all possible
combinations of a notational system; (which requires an enviably
large amount of patience and intelligence, but produces a
functionless amount of complexity).
4.6 STRUCTURALIST CONSEQUENCES:
Structuralism has nevertheless produced a set of positive critical
moves which have resonated widely in the literary-philosophical
institution around it. As Rorty uses Dewey (recall p.l40f.), so
Derrida and others use structuralism: to criticize the tradition,
offer a change of vocabulary, and increase our discursive space.
1. One important shift has been the structuralist reading of the
sign, not as having a property but as constituted by its difference
(within a given system) from other signs. Derrida drops the
givenness (of the system) and sticks to difference in his analysis
of onto-philosophical texts which attempt to provide themselves
with a foundation on the basis of the priority of one sign (its
property) over and against another. A foundation, Derrida writes,
can only be approached through writing, through the difference
37 It is interesting to note that structuralists seem to have found their job
easiest when concentrating on the canonically stabilized literature of the
tradition, where meanings were already well established and tacitly
operative while they were uncovering their "determinative" structures.
38 Cf. Harris, 1980:188 for an elaboration of the joke.
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between two signs: neither of which can take on a determinate
function without being frustrated by its partner through which it
is able to mean anything. When structuralists shift from
ontological identity theories to semiotic concerns with differential
relations, foundationalist identities (and identity theories) are
made fluid, left oscillating indeterminately between signs. A
singular and self-representative identity always breaks down into
a dual relation between signs. Between the sign and what it
signifies is always a gap which identity theories try to close
precisely by using what opens it: the sign. Structuralists want, of
course, to focus, not on meaning but on what they say structures
it. Derrida does not adopt the separation of structure from
meaning; but he does adopt the criticism structuralism makes
against the possibility of achieving full meaning, of a sign, and/or
of an interpretation of a set of signs (texts, scores, paintings,
buildings -- whatever). Full meaning would posit what Derrida
calls a "metaphysics of presence," which harbors the desire to find
a truth (or truth function, or single meaning) behind every sign, a
moment of "original plenitude" when, (like Peirce's "index"), form
and meaning, structure and world, word and object, were
simultaneously present in the sign and to consciousness --
indistinguishable, foundational. (For Peirce, of course, there was
always a fundamental incompleteness to every sign, requiring an
"interpretant" and an inquiry to complete it.)
2. Structualism's shift from the subject to signifying systems also
served the function of relativizing and rhetoricizing "intention."
1
Conscious intention was no longer the a priori provider of
language, of its order, its meaning or its force. On the contrary,
the subject was produced by the force field of signifyers. (In
France this too was another swipe at Descartes, and also at
phenomenology and existentialism.) The subject was
"decentered," as Foucault would argue: signification could no
longer be identified with, and/or mastered by consciousness.
Through this decentering, the world of language, for post-
structuralist theory, becomes and remains the exemplary
dilemma, the philosophical totality over and against which one
seeks to establish a style of meaningful reflection and criticism.
This refrain, that man is a sign, is, in its pragmatic guise, a
Peircean one: in its more metaphysically ponderous mood, a
Heideggerian and Derridean one too. Heidegger claims: "Die
Sprache spricht, nicht der Mensch. Der Mensch spricht nur, indem
er geschicklich der Sprache entspricht." (Language speaks, not the
man. Man speaks only insofar as he artfully bespeaks
language.)39 The point here is that this indeterminate "totality,"
once seen in a post-analytic (Rorty) and post-structuralist
(Derrida) light, becomes, not the object of worry but the medium
of art and play: the question is not "how is it (language) attached
to the world and how can I as a subject master it?" but, "how well
and for what can it be used?": "there is no getting out of language
to the world itself or to the "I" itself, so what can we do with the
worlds and I's that are made with it?" It is through this interest
in the "artful" which eventually helps both Heidegger and Derrida
39 Heidegger, 1957:167. (My emphasis and my translation: and it is a
somewhat sloppy recommendation.)
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into a new (albeit exceedingly difficult) philosophical idiom which
moves away from "givens" in the structure of the subject, which
stops postulating a consciousness above language, and stops
making the subject that which structures philosophy. (Not new, of
course, to Wittgensteinians. But it seems that it is a recent
phenomenon that philosophers read both Continental and Anglo-
American philosophy in order to relativize and rhetoricize its
stylistic commitments. And it is structuralism which has had a
larger impact on just how philosophy (or any text) can be read as
a literary product, as an act of "troping.") (More on this in chapter
5.)
Regarding the more extended consequences of, and literary-
philosophical uses of, structuralism, there have been four major
effects: 1. The "decentering" of the subject within a semiotic
decenters the author too. Texts are then read not in terms of how
their producer controls them, but in terms of other texts: in terms
of the intertextual relations which produce authors and texts.
Both are dissemminated equally into a destabilized network of
signs. 2. The loosening of language from naturalistic and causally
essentialist explanations into differential and semiotic relations
helped literary criticism out of cause-effect talk. That is, it helped
it to justify its distancing from literary history and biographical
criticism as ways to answer questions of textual causality. By
extrapolation, philosophical-literary critics too, like Rorty and
Derrida, loosen their texts from the intellectual history of ideas
(but not without concern for that history), in order to push in the
1
direction of different and more ironic narratives about the
tradition, and about textual-causal propriety. They treat a
philosophical style not as that which belongs to a sacred author or
a controlling subject, but more as that which belongs to the critical
discourse which taunts it. Their authors' names and biographies
become figurative hooks on which to hang ecclectic and critical
stories: (as we have seen, both Kant and Wittgenstein are good
examples of names which function this way (as stylistic figures)
for Rorty; as do Nietzsche and Heidegger for Derrida). 3.
Structuralism also established a jargon, (some of which is already
in Peirce), which could itself be used figuratively and ecclectically
for discussing philosophical-literary works: sign, signifier and
signified; structure and grammar; differential and oppositional
relations. It provided a repertoire of different concepts to help
get away from determinations of truth and meaning as the only
acceptable goals of analysis. 4. It also provided, of course, an
instructional program for studying all cultural artifacts as signs, as
part of a semiotic investigation. It instructed also, therefore, to
treat cultural phenomena as functions of language, as texts;
thereby extending the range of literary analysis beyond highbrow
poems to include anything that made an appearance in language:
philosophical texts, advertisements, novels. A structuralist like
Barthes would try his hand at all of these: no single one being
treated as a special case, for special competence, subsisting
outside of the reach of the linguist's rhetoric.
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Structuralism's achievements, then, were not to be found in its
discovery procedures, but as a set of metaphors, as a provocative
set of questions, as a style of work and writing. Jakobson's
"distributional analysis" of syntactical structures failed to reveal
relevant semantic and thematic effects. Greimas' algorithm for
the discovery of semantic effects started with smaller units which
were then unable to explain the (wholistic) meaning of the larger
ones. He left out the reader who interprets from the whole to the
unit. (This is Eco's criticism: Remember who reads.) Todorov
indeed applied linguistic categories more metaphorically and
pragmatically to produce a "grammar" of narrative and of plot
structure which would accommodate different narratives and plot
structures. But he simply rediscovered his categories always
hiding where he looked. Linguistics was a "method" used to reject
evaluation and to produce rigorous irrelevance.
The strength of structuralism was its development of a form of
attention which produced its own opposition: not a "deep" and
ubiquitous structure, but plurality, indeterminacy and post-
structuralism. Structuralism, like analytic philosophy, made its
theoretical fiat, rigor and discipline the proof of its limitations.
The codes and rules it discovered were those of its own artifice
and style: not the conventions of literary or philosophical texts,
but a way of reading them. And it is this form of attention, of
how communities of readers make texts to perform certain
theoretical functions (again, as Dewey remarked, p. 4, about the
ways in which we could read Plato) which structuralism
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engendered. The more specific consequence was the shift from
"deep" principles (structuralism) to a "play of surfaces" (post-
structuralism); but, unfortunately, they left out the pragmatic
"middle." The text (philosophical or otherwise) became, as Barthes
wrote, like an onion: "a construction of layers (or levels, or
systems) whose body contains, finally no heart, no kernel, no
secret, no irreducible principle, nothing except the infinity of its
own envelopes — which envelop nothing other than the unity of
its own surfaces."40
That is, Structuralism paradoxically highlighted the force and
power of a text to escape the closure of its own theory, escaping in
more than one direction. And this occurred by its focussing on
what eluded it: tiny, varied, multifunctional "units" of language as
experienced by communities of readers.41 Barthes, therefore,
decides to opt out of "the law of method" and to phrase for
literary criticism what Feyerabend is simultaneously articulating
for the "natural sciences:" a rhetoric "against method."
"Some speak greedily and urgently about method. It never
seems rigorous or formal enough to them. Method becomes
Law, but as this Law is deprived of any effect that would be
outside of itself (no one can say, in the "human sciences,"
what a "result" is) it always falls short. ... As a result, a
work that unceasingly declares its will-to-methodology
always becomes sterile in the end. Everything takes place
inside the method, nothing is left to the "writing,". . . the
40 Barthes, "Style and Image", in Literary Style: A Symposium, (ed.),
Chatman, S., 1971:10. (also cited by Culler: 1975:259.)
41 Fish writes in this regard: "The experiential point [a pragmatic echo] is
realized only through the agency of the structure it subverts, which
becomes, in effect, the vehicle of its own abandonment." Cf., Fish,
"Structuralist Homiletics," 1980:194.
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searcher repeats that his text will be methodological, but
this text never arrives. There is nothing more sure to kill
research and sweep it off into the leftovers of abandoned
works, nothing more sure, than method. At some point one
has to turn against method, or at least to treat it without any
founding privilege."42
Whereas Fish opts for the excluded pragmatic middle: "In
Aristotelian terms, everything is middle , even where there are. . .
all the formal signs of a beginning and an end."43 He opts not for
the structuralist's single grammar of all language, or for Peirce's
single logic of inquiry, but for Dewey's "communities of inquiry"
(or interpretation), justifying their arts (and artifacts) not by
metaphysical arguments about their natural origins or structural
beginnings, but justifying them perpetually from the middle, as
rhetorical, as always already being used and interpreted.
Structuralists, like speech act theorists, write about an underlying
system; and they read fiction as a problem because it must be
based on it, but differently and more elusively than "normal
discourse." The criticism, though, is not that there are no
structures (formal or otherwise), but that there are always
structures, always "linguistic artifacts with which we transact
business for the sake of inquiry" (Dewey), always useful fictions
with which communities refer (Vaihinger), always a plurality of
"structures" useful for certain purposes, through which we always
already know the difference between the sentences, "Holmes lived
in Baker Street." and "This is a suspended illocutionary act."
without having to convert the difference into a theoretical
42 Barthes, Tel Quel. 47, 1971:9-10. (cited in Harari: 1979:10.)
43 Fish, Ibid., p. 195.
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separation between the literary and the non-literary. In other
words, there is no a priori structure in the head (Levi-Strauss), or
in language (Jakobson), which a privileged meta-genre of writing
(philosophy) will discover without having produced it in the
process. The consequences the post-structuralist writer-critic
draws from this is that philosophy too is a style of writing, a genre
of literature; that it is an artifice to be read and written about in a
mood which doesn't imply that, (with a little more rigor,
seriousness and fidelity to the tradition), Truth will be just around
the next page, or that we will do a better job for our culture if we
keep doing things the same way.
In this regard, the works of Borges are, for both Rorty and
Derrida, illustrative examples of what post-Philosophical writing
can be like; where "the universe (which others call the library)"44
which is sought and built is not outside or prior to language. But,
nor is Borges therefore less committed to re-reading that genre
called philosophy in the interest of a good story. Borges mixes the
genres; he plays them off against, with, as intertwined to, each
other; he proliferates grand systems in short-story miniatures
which ironize their illustrious histories. There is no lack of
structures to refer to, but, rather, a multiplicity of stories or
fantasies to refer to, to read and write on their behalf: and as a
representative of Truth, no one is less absurd than the other. The
edificational power of a Borges story depends on the genre of
philosophy, on its voluminous efforts (and ironic failures) to
44 This is the first sentence in Borges' "The Library of Babel," op. cit., 1964.
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escape artifice, to escape the book and the counterbook.45 The
structuralist, ironically, produces texts about an underlying text,
fictions about the basis of fiction, theories about reading for
something behind the productive act of reading. The casual shrug
of the pragmatist is in recognition that the failure of structuralist
(and speech act) work to provide a foundation for literature is also
a failure to provide one for themselves: but the shrug is also in
recognition that they are playing a rhetorical game which is
optional. They write in a genre in which they recognize each
other, as writers and readers using certain conventions, a certain
vocabulary, playing out a certain game of distinctions: but, having
disengaged all minds and signs (Levi-Strauss) from any context of
cultural function and use has also disengaged their work from the
social arts and discourses most dear to the pragmatic rhetorician.
4^ It is in this sense, as Umberto Eco and John Barth argue (Cf. chapter 6.),
that Borges proposes a post-modernist aesthetic — mixing genres ironically
without any one of them coming out on top.
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5.1 PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT PRINCIPLES: WRITING CRITICAL
TEXTS:1
What the contemporary pragmatist and the post-structuralist
literary critic have in common is not finding it worrying that our
critical tasks might not have something "deep" or general and/or
ontologically constraining in common — (No Carnapian foundation
in science and, therefore, no unitary frame of reference for an
Osbornian science of criticism).2 To tease this out of the tradition
the pragmatist (e.g., Rorty) reads James and Dewey, and the
continental philosopher (e.g., Derrida) reads Nietzsche and
Heidegger. The latter tradition has more rhetorical volume
(Nietzsche); the former is more dapper (James). The latter tends
toward cultivating an idiolect, the former toward sociable
conversation. The latter prefers Wagnerian soloists, the former a
many-parted Mozartian lyricism. In effect, the pragmatic style
has a context which links it to social conscience, to conversational
partners, and to a "community of interpreters:" (a theme linking
Peirce, Royce, Dewey, Rorty,3 and in contemporary literary
1 Lifted from Richard Rorty's "Philosophy Without Principles," Critical
Inquiry. March, 1984.
2 Osborne, H., still seems to lament the absence of a "proved foundation" for
criticism, as if the hope had been rewarded elsewhere (in science); in
Aesthetics and Criticism. 1955, and more recently in The Art of
Appreciation. 1970. Cf. also Margolis, "Prospects Regarding the Science of
Criticism," 1985:esp. 126-126.
3 Cf. especially Rorty, 1985, "Solidarity or Objectivity?," for a pragmatic
account of the loss of objectivity (and an immediate and foundationally
epistemological relation to no nhuman reality) as the gain for the
community seeking to improve the practices of human reality.
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criticism, Fish).4 But both groups read texts, not objects. Their
interest is more artful than epistemological, more active than
principled by a priori "givens." In other words, interpretation
does not need "outside constraints, for it always brings along
enough of its own." (Cf. Fish versus Abrams.)5
What is being questioned is that when philosophers begin to talk
about "their" texts they often begin to "look" like objects for
exegesis more than for criticism. That is, they prefer things to
have a non-text (or, as Peirce put it, a non-sign) analogue to which
their texts refer, hoping that their stylistics ("argument") still
carry some descriptive privileges, because constructing an
argument within a technical discourse is different (categorically)
from telling a story within literary discourse. The hope is that the
latter is rhetorical and the former is constrained by the non-
rhetorical, that the genre of representing how we represent (of
systematically ordering our "languages of art") is what
philosophers do, while critics talk about "mere" non-referential
writing. These philosophers don't seem to be as happy coming to
critics as they are when critics come to them for knowing advice
on what real-world (or, in Goodman's case, "rightly ordered")
discourse is like: as if we have "discovered" what these languages
are, we're just not quite sure what those other "parasitic" or (in
4 Cf. especially Fish, S., "Interpreting the VARIORUM," in Is there a Text in
this Class?. 1980, 171-172; and "Change," in Tamkang Review. 14, 1984:277-
296, for his pragmatist account of "community" as the context within which
changes and stabilizations of interpretation and interpretative technique
are located.
5 Cf. M.H. Abram's "The Deconstructive Angel," Critical Inquiry. Spring,
1977, and Fish's "not to worry"-response, in "Is there a text in this class?,"
op. cit.y p. 321.
Goodman's case) "less careful discourses" (they call them
"fictions") are. (Cf. Searle versus Derrida, and Rorty's report of the
mismatch.)6
The pragmatic critic sees philosophy too as a genre of writing
(Derrida),7 a heterogeneous genre, not an epistemological one; a
genre with a social history, not a pristine innocence (Dewey).8 The
polemic here is against those philosophers who think they have
been bequeathed a set of special problems, ontologically
necessary, metaphysically given, and/or anthropologically
transcendental (Nagel),9 over and against those philosophers who
have an institutional set of texts which they interpret and
criticize, read in interesting and useful ways or in old and
parasitic ways, by doing good or bad criticism. Literary-culture
critics, on the other hand, turn "philosophical" when they talk
generally about such operations as criticism and interpretation,
when they write less about one world found than about
interpretational world-making (Goodman). ^
6 J. Searle, "The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse," New Lit. Hist.. 1975; R.
Rorty, "Is There a Problem about Fictional Discourse?," Consequences of
Pragmatism. 1982; "Deconstruction and Circumvention," Critical Inquiry.
September, 1984:esp. note 12.
7 "From Philosophy, rhetoric." writes J. Derrida in "White Mythology:
Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy," Margins of Philosophy. 1982:209.
(Orig. 1972).
8 Cf. Dewey, The Quest for Certainty. 1929, (a quest he urges is not innocent,
and should be given up).
9 Cf. T. Nagel's Mortal Questions, and his respect for ". . . the deepest and
oldest of them.", 1979, xii.
N. Goodman, Wavs of Worldmaking. 1978.
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Both the critic and the philosopher become pragmatic insofar as
they acknowledge that there is not any one vocabulary which
captures something generally necessary and True about all of our
different critical tasks, which are after different things, being read
in different ways. In other words, from the philosopher's canon:
they are rather skeptical about finding an original Heideggerian
phonetics of Being, groaning in Greek (occasionally in German),
which constrains or contains us in one lump as "deep" readers
(listeners). And from the literary critical canon: if one wants
some identifiable Hirschian (i.e., Husserlian)11 Text or a single
Abramsian epistemology and logic for the interpretation of textual
"objects," then the pragmatic/critical proposal will sound
positively Stanley Fish(ey). In both the pragmatic and literary
critical camps the interest is in the possibility of being
disagreeable; and the "objectivist argument cannot supply a
coherent account of disagreement" (Fish).I2 To the agreeable this
proposal is not worryingly relativistic, but pluralistically
constructive.13 We can accomplish more by worrying
1 1 Cf. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation. 1967, The Aims of
Interpretation. 1976. Hirsch hopes that "objective interpretation" is
possible in terms of a distinction between "meaning" and "significance:"
the former being determinable, and the latter being a negotiable value in
relation to other things or contexts. This epistemological dualism is
Husserlian in that the distinction (meaning/significance) is dependent on
the claim that "if we could not distinguish a content of consciousness
(meaning) from its contexts, we could not know any object at all in the
world." (1976:3) In other words (Husserl's), texts ("intentional objects")
have an "objective meaning" determinable as a "content of consciousness."
This "science" is appealed to because Hirsch is convinced that we need to
know "the right interpretation," rather than rest with achieving simply
good and/or agreed upon interpretations. While Hirsch is polemicizing for
this need, the pragmatist (e.g., Fish and Rorty) thinks the latter is not only
all we'll get, it's all we need.
12 Fish, op. cit., p. 338.
1 3 One of the pragmatically "healthy minded" calls this a "robust
relativism." Cf. J. Margolis, "Robust Relativism," 1976:37-46.
1
metaphysically and ontologically about less. This is philosophy
without principles, and with, therefore, the potential to be good
and novel criticism.
5.2 PRODUCING TEXTS RATHER THAN DISCOVERING TAXONOMIES:
The question is then: what is a text; and in what ways are
pragmatic and post-structuralist critics allied in their
understanding of "textuality," in placing the literary at the center
of critical discourse — (indeed because it will provide no center,
and admit to no single model of production or interpretation)?
The rhetoricians relativized objects to schemas and styles;
pragmatists agreed, and contextualized schemas to what we make
and use rather than to what we find and obey. Structuralists
added that what we make and use are literary products, texts.
What they could not add was a vocabulary which captured the
"nature of a text." They opted, therefore, (as post-structuralists)
for a positive rhetoric of how we continuously remake texts in
constructive ways (as artifacts), how we structure and unstructure
texts as active readers. And Roland Barthes is an important figure
who exemplifies this transition in the relocating of (philosophical,
or other) texts, not in terms of their correspondence to some other
reality (or to an author's intention), but more radically in terms of
dislocating texts from the assumption that they have some given
internal coherence which works to exercise itself on some
otherwise unformed or unforming ideal (external) reader.
1
In this regard, Barthes makes seven pointed suggestions as to the
dynamics involved in constructing what one might call a
(philosophical) text. And he theorizes explicitly on the basis of not
having a basis. As a consequence of the breakdown of traditional
epistemology, Barthes is drawn to extend its fallout to the
problem of how we constitute the very texts we are left with as
the leftover loci of our failure to identify something foundational
and objectifiable.
1. Firstly, a text is not an object. That is, it is not an atomically
numerable and stabilized formation. It is, rather, constituted
"within a methodological field," "experienced (and this is the
pragmatic resonance) only in an activity, a production."14 Like
Trebizond in the Renaissance, who contextualized Dialectic within
a civic field of interest (cf. p. 62), and Dewey, who put it within a
field of social action, Barthes understands texts as contextualized
within a vacillating field of other texts, in a roaming scene of
cultural discourses, in which a Quine, for example, can become a
deconstructor of analytic assurance and/or a reconstructor of
14 Barthes, R., "From Work to Text," in Textual Strategies, ed. Harari,
1979:74,75. (The following six points are also culled primarily from this
text.)
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empiricist hope; but he cannot be intelligible in either case except
within the web of others' corroborating or critical texts.15
2. Texts (like artworks) do not necessarily fit into ready-made
genres. Rather, they are often motivated to, and read in terms of
the motivation to, subvert categories which take on the character
of the a priori. The polyglottal voices of Joyce are written out of
many genres -- the Homeric, the Aristotelian, the Irish --
separately ready-made, together subverting the ready-made. He
writes in order not to be a "realist," like Nietzsche not to be a
Metaphysician, and Rorty not to be a Philosopher. In other words,
even when read within an available genre, the "modern text"
(when produced by the "modern reader") is the attempt
(especially in French theory) to subvert the given order of
precedent. (Barthes' model (and Derrida's too in some respects) is
Bataille, in the same way as Emerson is Dewey's: poets and
philosophers, neither one nor the other, but, by subverting the
onto-generic difference, both. (For French theory, "subversion" is
synonymous with what is quintessentially "modern" — a context
15 In other words, the author too is a figure whom the critic constructs, on
whom he hangs his reading: and as was already mentioned on p. 166, this is
precisely how Derrida and Rorty read. And following from this, it seems
that Quine can be read in either or both of the two aforementioned ways, as
deconstructor or reconstructor. For example, in Quine's (and Ullian's) The
Web of Belief, no analytic foundation is being explicitly proposed, but the
alternative "web of belief" is talked about less in terms of the constructive
power and social/textual dimensions of "the web" than in terms of
encouraging the hope that smaller units of "empirical evidence" and
"judicious application of logic" can still be appealed to as the decisive
factors in adjudicating between competing beliefs. I am not saying this is
wrong, but that the book can support some very different readings
depending on the other texts it is read in the context of: in the context of
Carnap, it reads as a sociology of knowledge; in the context of Rorty, it reads
as a didactically late analytic appeal to watered down canons of empiricist
logic.
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in which reading the traditon is understood from the start as a
cultural competition to resist precedent. When referring to this
adversarial position, as will become clearer in chapter 6, I will
refer more specifically to "modern/st" sentiment, rather than
simply "modern.")16
3. A text is a system, but without beginning or end, without
"closure," always being interpreted and open to new
interpretations which "decenter" older ones (to use the jargon). To
wit: the Nietzsche industry, and the difference between the
American (Kaufman and Danto to Nehamas), the French (Deleuze
and Derrida to Foucault), and the German (Adorno and
Horkheimer to Habermas) reopenings of Nietzsche's prose;
openings which are themselves the demonstration of point 2.:
That is, they are being performed through the interplay of the
destabilized genres of philosophy and literary theory — (or, in
16 It is Lionel Trilling who dubbed the "modern" (in literature) as the
fostering of an "adversarial culture." Cf. "On the Modern Element in
Modern Literature," 1966.
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Habermas's case, due also to his worry about this destabilization
and interminability).17
4. What follows is that a text is plural, not because meanings are
ambiguous, philosophers don't eschew all their metaphors, and
poets don't keep their illocutionary acts straight; but, as Barthes
reminds us, because a "textus" is itself "woven," an interweaving
of other texts (what Derrida calls a "fabric of grafts"), quoting
without quotation marks. And quoting is itself not mimetically
representational, but selectively refashioning, a reading of
readings, not restricted by notational structures, but by the
histories we tell of the threads which precede and exceed the text.
("Excess" and "supplementation" are key notions (tropes) used to
express the layerings that texts compound onto themselves, as
I7 Cf. Habermas, "The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Re-
Reading Dialectic of EnlightenmentNew German Critique. 26, 1982:13-30,
which centers on the different trajectories Horkheimer and Adorno, (of
the "Frankfurt School"), and the French post-structuralists (by whom
Habermas means Deleuze, Foucault and Derrida) take when reading
Nietzsche. For Habermas, the question of how we read the nature of
"enlightenment reason" hangs precisely on how we read the paradoxical
nature of a "totalized critique" (Nietzsche's) which attempts an
"assimilation of reason to power with a theory of power which, instead of
truth claims, retains only the rhetorical claim of the aesthetic fragment."
Habermas' hope is that one can salvage something of "enlightenment
reason" from both Horkheimer-Adorno and the French by proposing a re¬
reading of Nietzsche (which is where they all go "wrong"), and by
presupposing an "ideal speech situation" which can not be assimalated
totally by the coercions of "power-discourses" (Foucault). I would
sympathize with Habermas' worries if "reason" were indeed something
communities suddenly stopped bothering to construct, and/or if some point
outside those communities were available from which one could distinguish
"our reason" from "the ideal and uncoercive speech situation." But it is
because communities always do construct or take up this space, that it
seems unnecessary to hypostasize a transcendental "ideal speech situation"
as an "inescapable pragmatic presuppostion." The working assumptions of
speech situations (like reading situations) are pragmatic precisely because
they are not groundable by transcendentals, closable by "texts themselves"
(passim Barthes), or escapable by recourse to an ideal (external) speech
situation. (On Habermas' view of the "post-modern," cf. chapter 6, p. 214ff.)
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opposed (directionally) to the metaphorics18 of "uncovering" and
"laying bare" some elusive "core" to a text: In other words, the
jargon of (interpretational) addition rather than subtraction or
(taxonomic) reduction characterizes the post-structuralist
plurality of texts.)
5. A work — (an aesthetic notion which Barthes attempts also to
open up through his discussion of the "text") — is caught up in a
process of "filiation." That is, we tend to place works into
"external" categories, cultural histories, and geographical locations
as ways of identifying them. And we, thereby, allocate the
meaning of the work to an author, to an "internal" and generative
control over the range of allowable interpretations.19 What is
epistemically and hermeneutically loosened when the work
becomes a text is the indeterminability of what is external and
what is internal, of what is outside and what is inside a text.
(Derrida expresses this as the "folds" of a text, being turned inside
out and outside in.)20
6. When a work is considered as a "text" it is also an object of
"consumption." Both Barthes and Derrida refer to this multi-
18 "Metaphorics" is just another ge neral term (like "narrative") to refer
positively to a vocabulary and a style which cohere; but also to refer
"negatively" to such a vocabulary and style as having certain root images
without foundations, which do not correspond to anything other than what
they become when written out and applied.
19 Cleanth Brooks, in The Well Wrought Urn. 1947:159, resists the idea that
he might be "discovering" complexities not intended by the author (poet)
on the "basis" that "the poet knows precisely what he is doing," and,
therefore, that Brooks knows precisely what the poet knows: Quite a feat.
20 More on Derrida and his application of a "textualist" reading of the "self-
consuming artifacts" of philosophy following.
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functional image; in one sense because it is an economic metaphor,
a market image. This implies that a work is acquired and
circulated through a public machinery (not the artist's "intention"),
and is accompanied by a (reviewer's) rhetoric which makes it
available for consumption and use. And what profession does not
have a (journalistic) format for providing this function of
paraphrasing (or photographing, quoting) to mediate the work's
public dissemination? But the image (consumption) is also used to
break down the traditional distance between the writer and the
reader, the work and the reception (and the concomitant
"problem" of how to bridge the "gap" when psychologized, and
made into a problem of discrete "minds" meeting, as in
Collingwood). A work is consumed in the sense that the reader
takes part in producing the text, in completing it (like Peirce's
interpretant completes the function of the sign). Consumptive
refashioning is also an image of what the critic does. As art
transfigures and refashions "the world," so too does the art of
critically reading "the text" transfigure it.
7. Another aspect of Barthes' many suggestions, and one which
links him to the arts and to the sophists, (that is, to Plato's and
Aristotles' worries about them both), is the notion of "pleasure."
The choice of a text, and of the context within which it is read or
reworked, is "linked to enjoyment" (jouissance). This is the (gallic)
flip side of saying that language is not pinned down and
constrained by some non-human reality to which it conforms.
There is room for play, for signifiers to circulate amongst
1
themselves; that is, the work is not exhausted by linguistic
analysis and serious argument. The pleasure,21 the game, as Plato
says, is part of what moves him to convert Socrates to writing
(Recall p. 26.), and moves many to read the effort. Enjoyment,
Barthes holds, is one of the post-modernist consequences of
exchanging theories of Truth for skill at reading, of exchanging
obsolete "messages" for good taste, epistemology for aesthetics; or,
in Dewey's terminology, it is a consequence of "exchanging static
essences for enjoyed meanings and artifacts."
21 Barthes distinguishes, in this regard, between jouissance and plaisir.
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5.3 AESTHETICIZED TEXTS AND PRAGMATIC READERS:
If philosophy, then, is not a finder of a priori "objects" but a
maker of texts, then "philosophy (writes Dewey) is inherently
criticism:"22 And the pragmatist is interested in being a "worldly"
critic (Cf.Said.).23 His canon is not restricted to that of the
literature department or the philosophy department, because a
text is not a possession or a "thing." Making it such a closed and
singular unit would be asking that it be offered as the new
replacement for the lost, autonomous, contextless "object" of the
Epistemologian. Barthes writes that a text is to be understood as
something constituted within the activity of criticism. For, as Fish
writes, "[w]e do not have free-standing readers in a relationship to
an equally free-standing text" (Fish).24 The need to objectify the
text, to make it a self-sufficient and constraining closure, is the
concomitant "cartesian anxiety" (Bernstein) that there is a free-
roaming contextless Subject whose noumenal agility needs
phenomenal amounts of objective constraint. The point is that
these two fabrications entail each other, and fall at the same time
— within the community who reads and writes them.25
22 Dewey, "Existence, Value and Criticism," Experience and Nature. 1929,
Dover Edition 1958:398.
23 Said's "worldly" criticisms of Ricoeur (p.165) and Riffaterre (p.166) as
summarized on p. 188 strongly parallel Dewey's "worldly" criticism of
metaphysical philosophizing: Said, op. cit., 1979.
24 Fish, S., "How to Recognize a Poem When You See One," Ibid, p.332; and on
p.327 he writes: "Interpreters do not decode poems; they make them."
25 Bernstein, R., Bevond Objectivism and Relativism. 1983, offers a good
pragmatic assessment of the surplus urgency of an inflated "cartesian
anxiety" which worries about how (epistemologically and ontologically) to
relate the reader (subject) the the text (the object).
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What many find ambivalent about Fish's brand of interpretational
pragmatism is that he doesn't lament the loss of a theoretically
unified view of interpretation or of the text, that he treats the
seriousness of the lament with ironic levity, that he doesn't want
to reconstitute a golden age of science and order. He treats the
fear of a relativistic apocalypse as already lavishly redundant and
leveled out within already operative and eclectic styles of
interpretational practice. The multicentered text is part of a
multicentered culture. The superfluity of denying this in theory
or in style is what gives Fish's work the insouciance of the self-
confessed pluralist without even a sense of the antagonism so
dear to dialectical and modernist aesthetics. He is a gleeful
Gorgias in post-modern garb who works hard not to achieve the
wrong thing: an objective basis which a theory discovers and
enforces, rather than a useful rhetoric which a community finds
persuasive.
The point here will not be simply to keep kicking the dead (or at
least haggard) horse of foundational epistemology (through vague
images of textuality), nor simply to say that art is the leftover or
new model by default. It will be to say also that post-structuralist
literary theory, like post-modern aesthetics and (pre- and) post-
analytic pragmatism, are parallel rhetorics about the loss of an
intellectual-cultural center which a discourse (philosophy, say)
cannot, and should not try to, recover. They are styles of work
which do not try to rehabilitate the old hope of a center with the
new jargon of structure: "The structure of X is . . ." is not only a
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question that is not being answered; it is not being asked. And
not asking it is not something to be worried about, but, rather, a
"worry" to be circumvented in favor of the production of a
different sort of "text:" i.e., what Quintillian called the rhetorical,
Dewey the experimental, what Rorty has called the conversational,
and Fish the persuasive. The more specific interest in Fish's work
has to do with the use that can be made of his writing about
literature for the writing and reading of a philosophical text. That
is, literary theory talks about reading and writing, it foregrounds
the assumptions in terms of which much reading gets done. It
simply helps thematise what philosophers practice but usually
don't thematise: i.e., their conception of a discrete text as that
which "contains" what it is they try as readers to understand and
extract — the "argument."26
The pragmatic-literary proposal is that the entities which
populate a text (like those which populate a world to which texts
"refer") come into being as communally useful presuppositions, as
discourse-specific entities. So, when asked what we are now to do
with the old constituents: author, work, genre and canon (like
rational, sensible, truthful and argument), the answer is, nothing.
The point is to tell a story about what these categories have been
an attempt to provide, and to ask if they are responsible for
26 The text has been opened up in the sense that "the distinction between
text and context is impossible to maintain (Recall Hirsch, p. 175 n.11.) and
cannot be the basis of demarcating alternative theories with their
attendant consequences. In short, no text reads itself, and anything you
decide to take into account — any supplement (Recall Derrida, p. 181 f.) -- is
a text;" in Fish, "Consequences," Critical Inquiry. March, 1985:446. (My
parenthetical reminder of Hirsch, and of Derrida's notion of the
"supplement").
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providing the sort of service asked of them. They are not being
"falsified," but fictionalized. They may not be less useful because
they weren't found, but made. They may not be "necessary
fictions" (in Vaihinger's sense), but in some specified context,
"superior fictions" (as Fish puts it). So, when the philosophical
aesthetician says that a certain (indeed sensible) feature of a
work, or the rationality of a discourse, is independent of an
interpretational model and prior to it, these are not two steps in
an argument: "they are one assertion said twice," in a rhetoric
looking unnecessarily for a way out of itself, out of its own
productivity. When reading a philosophical text, therefore, as
rhetorical, the question[s] of independence and priority do not
arise; for they are precisely what the text bring into view, and
fictions (constructs) to which a community of agreeable readers
gives assent.
The dream of finding independent and prior formal facts (non-
fictions) from which we build up to discourse, interpretation and
criticism has got it backwards. We are already using an
interpretationally skilled discourse before we go hunting for facts
and formal units. As we saw regarding Levi-Strauss and
Jakobson, the conclusion is not that there are no formal patterns
("entities," "properties," or "analytic concepts" -- passim
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Mothersill27), but that there are always such; now you see these,
now you don't, depending on our models and what they are after.
In other words, the conventional categories of literary discourse
(poem, poet; novel, novelist), like those of philosophical discourse
(the argument, the man of reason; the system, the systematizer)
make available the things about which they speak. These are not
27 Mothersill's recent Beauty Restored. 1984, proposes a conceptual analytic
which presents a very elegant and closely knit neo-Kantianism, refereeing
essentially Anglo-American philosophical aesthetics only up to about 1969,
(but in the context of an indeed very broad range of historical
prefiguration: Platonism, scholasticism, Kantianism). My difficulty is that
a conceptual analytic "works" only when it is uninterested in history,
when it disembodies the "concept" from the vicissitudes of criticism and
use, when it already takes for granted that philosophy is accomplishing
something by "aufheben[ing]" "a rational principle," (as if this had ever
been what settled controversy). The point here is not that "beauty" cannot
acquiesce into "a formal definition," become "timeless" (as Mothersill
writes), especially when one, by failing to specify a context, means any and
all contexts: but what do we gainl. In this sense I am arguing what
Mothersill would call "the anti-theorist position," but not because aesthetics
is in a bad way and can't raise itself to the level of "systematic discourse," to
"Theory," but because it is never any worse off than the philosophy which
writes it: and philosophy cannot unify or elevate itself with an act of
Theory and then treat another domain as its understudy. Do we, as
Mothersill holds, "need a definition of aesthetic predicates," if this means
achieving them by leaving their varied artistic contexts behind?
Mothersill produces an admirably thorough, updated and repolished relic, a
superbly "dysfunctional" clarity. What does "a definition of general
aesthetic predicates" accomplish but the restoration of a style of writing
Philosophy (re-writing Kant) which is still concerned to offer this sort of
performance? Her (Kant's) project, to get off the ground, only requires
"that we agree, at least on the necessary conditions for applying the
predicate . . ." Well, if this were agreed upon, we wouldn't have any dispute.
For the analytic apparatus to get going it takes as its basis the problem it
said it was going to solve. It starts by drawing boundaries the crossing of
which is precisely what we (communities, especially competing aesthetic
communities) do, and what makes the conceptual extraction irrelevant; but
worse, it is as if it is only by drawing such artificial boundaries that we can
come up with a genuine and big enough question to call philosophical, as if
only a form of conceptual essentialism (the restoration of "beauty") could
restore its utility to aesthetics, make both properly "theoretical." What I am
polemicizing against is making aesthetics the lackey of this form of
philosophizing, rather than making this form of philosophizing an
expendable art, one which our communities of interpreters do not find, and
have never actually found, the "basis" for what they do.
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given generic standards and standards of adjudication, they are,
as Dewey put it, negotiable and "ongoing accomplishments."
Bernstein's notion of the "cartesian anxiety" and Fish's of
"worrying about losing constraints" point out from different
directions the same confusion between pragmatic and
metaphysical dependencies. The worriers assume that the "text
and the reader are independent and competing entities whose
spheres of influence must be defined and controlled."28 Even
Barthes' (and Derrida's) argument for the total indeterminacy of a
text is still a metaphysical argument for the irreducibility of the
intertextual to the textual object; for it is communities of readers
which already provide context for the occasional "perchingsas
well as the "flights" (James) toward indeterminacy, which
interpretations and, therefore, textual "objects" undergo.
The revival that Dewey's philosophy undergoes in Fish's literary
theory has to do with the point that when writers about meaning
set up the problem of how it gets determined, this can only
become a problem if there is a point at which the "subject" finds a
determination has not yet been made: There is no such point.29
What Abrams, amongst others (e.g., George Steiner) worry about
(when attacking Derrida) is that the reader might somehow
linguistically and socially lose touch, get lost. They are trying to
make old cartesian Philosophy a necessity for ongoing criticism,
28 Fish, "Introduction; or How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love
Interpretation," Is There a Text in This Class?. 1980:12.
29 Cf. Fish, "Is There a Text is This Class?," Ibid., p. 310.
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converting creative literature back into used up philosophical
assumptions.30 They are in that tradition (community) which
produces an ontological distance between one's receiving of an
utterance and the determination of its meaning,31 and then
worries about how to re-close the gap they made. The pragmatic
post-structuralist is not challenging them with a more correct
theory of the subject and/or the object; he's consoling them (in the
style of James). There is no gap to worry about. No meta-
constraints are required to fill in a ditch which communities never
leave empty.32 (Or, as James put it, a more abstract coat isn't
needed if we already have one which fits. Cf. p. 113, esp. n42.)
What Goodman writes about logic when he is looking particularly
pragmatic is what Fish (like James) writes about interpretation: in
effect, that all this may look like a circle, but it is not a vicious
one; rather, "this circle is a virtuous one. ... A rule is amended if
it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is
rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend."33 In
other words, Goodman's "we," the community, doesn't let one (all
the way) down; it makes it unnecessary to say how it is we ever
begin (to interpret),34 to say what "prior" and "independent"
30 Cf. Fish, "Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts,
the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes without Saying, and
other special Cases," Ibid., p. 268.
31 Cf. Fish, "Is There a Text in This Class?," Ibid., p. 318.
32 Fish's point ("Undoing the Case for Reader-Response Analysis," 1980:164)
is that "you make sense ... as soon as you can." There is no delay. This has
to do with what Barthes, in Writing Degree Zero, calls "the spontaneously
functional nature of language."
33 Goodman, Fact. Fiction and Forecast. 1955:67.
34 Cf. Fish, op. cit., p. 167.
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foundations "ground" such practice, or what it is which makes a
version change, or what sort of argument or practice could
"reveal" the "hidden" truth responsible.35 The variety, like the
stability, of texts and styles of working with them are functions of
the spaces which the strategies of our interpretational
communities engender. Interpretational change and/or stability
is not a function of the world itself nor of the text itself prior to
being read: they are the very shape of reading.36 Fish's point is
that if a community believes, for example, in only one text, say,
the search for the fundamentally True (Dialectic), or the rational
discovery of the Real (Science), then the strategy they employ will
be forever writing it: They will say, for example: "That too was an
instance of falsification." (Popper) If some upstarts come along
and produce another text, a change in rhetoric, or style, or
paradigm, the protectors of the "true text" will call them nasty
names like "relativist", "nihilist" (Steiner's relentless cry. And
Danto agrees.), "pragmatist," "deconstructionist infidel," "enemy of
society" (Popper again); while the other group might shout back
names like "metaphysician," "foundationalist," "mannerist,"
"modernist tyrant".
The conclusion to such outbursts will be the lack of one. The work
or text "itself" and the authority of the tradition into which it gets
placed (Plato as epistemologist, or Plato as playwright) will not
35 On the issue of change and how it is conceptualized within the notion of
"community", cf. Fish, "Change," Tamkane Review. 14, 1984:277-296.
36 In other words, reading is not a "machinery of extraction" performed by
socratic mediators. Again an analogy: as philosophers have "ways of
worldmaking," they have what Fish calls "ways of reading," through which
they make and order their texts, form canons, make traditions.
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effect a reconciliation or perform arbitration. The debate will not
prove who has the truth: rather, the debate will be the "proof" of
one's membership in one or another interpretational sect,
productive of a nod of recognition and familiarity from someone
else in the group. And this will show what neither group could
show the other: that this is a good way to interpret, to read and
write, for the time being. As the competition is between
communities (usually with names like analysts, relativists, or
whatever), legislating necessary and fundamental units and/or
styles of analysis as binding for any reading of any text or work
(the epistemologist and/or formalist again) will be both unhelpful
and unnecessary The law need not be invoked when persuasion
is what does or does not do the trick. The call back to the work
itself (. . . "but what Wittgenstein actually said was . . .", or " . . .
but what Manet really painted was . . .") can only have rhetorical
power over those who are already persuaded by a version, and
that whosever interpretational work it was should not be
betrayed.
The pragmatist manoeuvre, when threatened with the "text itself"
and the objectivist's reproaches (nihilist, relativist, etc.), is not to
counter with another total account of the nature of interpretation
(any more than James and Dewey tried to offer another total
account of Truth); it is to parry, by simply producing more
compelling, richer and persuasive renderings of our cultures' most
esteemed styles and works, or by not producing renderings of the
ones thought to have died. As one can stop repainting
Rembrandts, one can stop re-writing Descartes into the "structure"
of our "precarious" relationship to textual objects, and compensate,
on the other hand, by making the objects "given," the same in
every reading situation. With Abrams and Hirsch we need an
object;37 with reader-response, a subject; with pragmatism, a
community with doesn't let them become totally separate in the
first place: what we have (if anything), writes Rorty, is solidarity,
not objectivity.38
37 When M. H. Abrams, "The Deconstructive Angel," 1977:434, poses the
rhetorical-moral question, "if ... all texts can engage only with a critic's
own misconstruction, why bother to carry on the activities of
interpretation and criticism?," he presumes that some true construction is
possible as a way to match up the text itself and the critics model, and that
this text itself (the object) will perform the comparison; and he presumes,
on the other hand, that an (ultimately) indeterminate conclusion to
interpretation rules out any reason to interpret (provisionally) at all.
38 Cf. Rorty, 1985, "Solidarity or Objectivity?."
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5.4 PARADIGMS LOST,39 AND CONTINUED ARTISTIC USAGE:
It is Derrida who most thoroughly turns the philosophical
community, its tradition, its canon, into an art historical series,
into an etymological collage of paradigms lost, to be regained as
metaphors, as textual echoes, as a new and different sort of work
— "intertextual," as has been said. (And finding a critical idiom to
deal with this movement is no less difficult.) It is Derrida who
extends the two-way reciprocity of the aesthetic and the
philosophical more relentlessly than most; who, therefore, presses
the reader to engage in an act of re-framing the way[s] in which a
philosophical text can be understood as such, and how it interacts
with the artworld. What makes this engagement and the
questions it raises interesting is due precisely to Derrida's writing',
because it is difficult, not immediately assimilable by the evening
news or the dictionary of philosophy; because he writes not just
about, but out of the artworld as a philosophical participant in the
stylistic-thematic shifts of modernist and post-modernist
aesthetics.
In other words, one cannot simply summarize Derrida's
9
"argument," anymore than one can easily summarize the "point" of
Joyce's Ulysses. The point, therefore, will be nevertheless to
subject him to the injustice of paraphrase, and to place him in the
path being charted from classical rhetoric, — (to which Derrida
39 The joke is borrowed from M. Harris, Cultural Materialism: The Struggle
for a Science of Culture. 1980:21, who borrows it from Keesing, "Paradigm
Lost: The New Ethnography and the New Linguistics," Southw, J. of
Anthropology. 1972.
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often refers, especially regarding the philosophical tradition's
[failed] attempts to master metaphor, to contain its own
metaphors and rhetoric within a discourse which depends upon
them), — to the pragmatic and post-modern. And in the context
of this placing it will be asked what pragmatic consequences one
might draw out as to how one criticizes the tradition, how one
writes philosophy in so doing, and what the stylistic links between
art, philosophy and rhetoric look like as an outcome.
Derrida is as connected to the contemporary artworld as he is to
the philosophical community. And he criticizes the latter tradition
as an artist would criticize his: likewise, his style and technique
as a critic are also his theory and his work, or text. As repainting
or imitating Picasso's Guernica could only be read as ironic or
parodic, so too writing in the style of Kant or Hegel about art
would also be read as stylistic training in terms of a dead master,
or as philosophical self-parody. In other words, as difficult as it is
for the philosopher to continue searching out real and worrying
metaphysical prigs (as Rorty suggests), achieving literary naivete
is even more so.40 Hence Derrida practices his aesthetics to
reaffirm performance over the descriptive unity and closure of a
System. He re-writies the tradition with the same sort of
attention to and alteration of technique as the modern and post¬
modern writer exercise regarding literature: that is, he reads
texts not as representations but as rhetorics.
40 Rorty, 1984b:2.
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Reading and writing from a (French) post-structuralist position
means that Derrida understands the notion of metaphor through
Aristotle's attempts to control it, and through Anatole France's
dialogical criticisms of the metaphysician's "usure" of metaphor in
so doing.41 He understands the functions and conventions of
Graeco-Western discourse through Nietzsche and Heidegger, and
through Antonin Artaud's violent attempts to overcome these
conventions through drama, through the theatre.42 Derrida writes
Glas like a philosophical Finnegans Wake, like a Borgesian
interlingual labyrinth, a book and counterbook at the same time —
"without imitation, without verisimilitude, without truth or
falsity," in which one finds only "traces, foretellings, recallings,
fore-blows and after-blows which no present will have preceded
or followed."43 Derrida has been as close culturally to Parisian
Surrealism as he has been (critically) close to Anglo-American
41 "Usure" is a good example of one of Derrida's philosophical puns: it
means both usury, (an acquisition of too much interest), and using up, (the
deterioration through usage). It is an economic metaphor used to
highlight the irreducible exchange of profit and loss involved in the
philosopohical metaphor, in "the ruining of the figure," which must first
have and then lose its metaphoricity to become foundational — what
Nietzsche called the Abniitzung of the figure. And Derrida's "usure" runs
parallel to Nietzsche's "Abniitzung." (Cf. p. 11 n.5.) In other words, the
metaphysician attempts to profit from the loss. On the "general economy"
of philosophical metaphorics, cf. "From Restricted to General Economy: A
Hegelianism without Reserve" in Writing and Difference. 1981:251-277. On
Derrida's "usure" of France's "The Garden of Epicurus," cf. "White
Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy" in Margins of Philosophy.
1982:210 ff. and the traiflators remark, p. 209f, n2. (By way of contrast,
Dewey's use of the concept "use" is broader, more practical and less
metaphysically punning than Derrida's "usure." More on this difference
following.)
42 Cf. Derrida's "The Theater of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation"
in Writing and Difference. 1981:232-250.
43 For a brief discussion of the affinity between Joyce and Derrida, between
Shaun the postman and Derrida's facteur (factor, purveyor, postman) of
truth, cf. Megill, A., Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche. Heidegger, Foucault.
Derrida. 1985:290.
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speech acts;44 as close to Saussure's linguistic abstractions as to
Valery's and Mallarme's poetry. His metaphors wander
exegetically through close readings of the root metaphors of
philosophical texts, helping them undermine the containment and
order they initially impose, by reading them also as literature, as
rhetoric. In other words, and more to the purpose of this work,
Derrida writes out of an aesthetic which Philosophy fails to frame,
conversing with non-philosophical centers of culture, and
reapplying them to an understanding of the philosophical text.
This is not to say that reading canonical texts (and their
metaphorical sleights of pen) through the filter of aesthetic
(literary) moments is of great metaphysical import (as Derrida
sometimes implies); it is just that it is not usually done, and done
so provocatively. And so doing proposes an interesting way to
thematize how one can use the tradition as an etymological
reservoir for a new work. To (art)historicize the philosophical
genre, like historicizing culture and art themselves, raises the
question of what now can and ought to be produced, what sort of
critical purpose it thereby serves, and the question of how well it
serves it. It is this set of questions the pragmatist critic attempts
to put to the Derridean figure of the post-structuralist, (post-
44 Derrida, "Signature Event Context" in Margins of Philosophy. 1982:307-
330. I am not endorsing Derrida's "misreading" (for metaphilosophical
purposes) of Austin, or Searle's criticisms of Derrida (for exegetical
purposes) in "Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida," Glyph 1,
1978:198-208. But I would endorse Fish's use of Derrida's metaphilosophical
points to criticize Austin and Searle, in "With the Compliments of the
Author: Reflections on Austin and Derrida," Critical Inquiry 8, 1982:693-
721.
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modernist?) philosopher as he reuses the artifacts of old
paradigms. But first . . .
5.5 FOUR THEMATIC EXTRAPOLATIONS:
1. One of the themes of this dissertation is the inseparable
proximity of philosophy and literature -- like the inside and
outside of the same reversible glove — inescapably related in the
act of writing. And writing is a preeminently Derridean theme
which has already been written into the previous readings of the
tensions between Dialectic and rhetoric, the tensions within
classical pragmatism and its ambivalent attempt to establish a
non-foundational genre of philosophy; and it has been written into
the breakdown of structuralism as a would-be descriptive
metadiscourse. Derrida's point is that writing has been debased or
"abased" before speech (or vision) as the contact point to truth.
Writing has been thought to be simply that which codifies what
speech (or sight) makes present. And it is this initially socratic
rejection of writing, of artifice, which has dominated the West.
Derrida makes writing itself the (marginalized) theme of the
philosophical tradition.
2. His metaphysical critique circulates around the "metaphysics of
presence" involved in privileging speech: the longing for a
moment of original plenitude when form and meaning, speech and
world were simultaneously present to consciousness, a pre-
lapsarian state which could be recovered by following "rigorously"
1
the "traces" of signification back to its "sources." But all we have
left are indeed the "skid marks," the "traces" only of our strategies
of signification. And tracking down traces simply leads to more
traces ad infinitum. The recovery of presence is the metaphysical
dream of Philosophical discourse. The tragi-comedy of this
Philosophical effort is what generates Derrida's own metaphysics
of writing, a writing about the unachievable onto-theological goals
of the Philosophical genre.
3. His literary critique circulates around Philosophy "disfiguring
its figures," around the rhetorical attempts of the tradition to
master its metaphors and its failure to do so. In the attempt to
produce "closure," meaning and the continuous rewriting of
meaning have continued to spill out into a diffuse irresolution, a
literary openness which indefinitely defers us from being able to
establish closure or presence. The continuous peeling off of the
shells of rhetoric and imagery, the peeling back of language, leads
simply to more language with no inner core to be discovered: no
Being at the end, only more deferring, difference, or "differance,"
as Derrida (graphically) puts the (mispelled) point. (More on, and
less of, his jargon following these points.)
4. The more specific application of Derrida to aesthetics, to the
philosophy-art relation, has to do with his deconstruction of "the
frame" (parergon).45 As the Dialectician attempted to construct a
boundary or frame between truth and rhetoric, so too does
4^ Recall Peirce's failure (chapter 3.3) to keep the aesthetic on the margin,
to frame the aesthetic in terms of a prior foundation.
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Aesthetics depend on a distinction between the inside and the
outside (of the aesthetic frame), and, therefore, on a Philosophical
discourse which will firm up the distinction, be the framer, be in
the frame, observe the frame — (Such agility!). Aesthetic theory
has been determined (writes Derrida) by the persistent demand
that:
we must know what we are talking about, what concerns the
value of beauty intrinsically and what remains external to
an immanent sense of beauty. This permanent demand ~ to
distinguish between the internal or proper meaning and the
circumstances of the object in question — organizes every
philosophical discourse on art, the meaning of art, and
meaning itself, Plato to Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger. It
presupposes a discourse on the boundary between the
inside and the outside of the art object, in this case, a
discourse on the frame. Where do we find it?46
One finds it of course in Kant's The Critique of Judgement. In
other words, every analytic of aesthetic judgement rests on the
possibility (and the relevance) of rigorously defining and
distinguishing between what is intrinsic and what is extrinsic,
what is inside (the frame) and what is outside, on what can be
included and what should be excluded from judgement. And, of
course, for Kant, it is a rationalist discourse (the cognitive) which
frames the aesthetic (the non-cognitive). Elsewhere Derrida calls
this difference "the law of genre,"47 which is based on "the
principle of contamination," according to which one seeks to
prohibit what always occurs: the mixing of the two (say, the
cognitive and the non-cognitive, the philosophical and the
literary) which are being separated.
46 Derrida, Truth in Painting. 1978:53.
47 Derrida, "La Loi du genre/The Law of Genre," Glvph. 7, 1980:176-232.
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Framing always produces reframing, leaving us with what Derrida
calls a "certain repeated dislocation" in which the marginal can
become central, form can become content, the outside can get
inside. The reciprocally deconstructive link between Derrida's
philosophy and his aesthetic is the point that foundational terms
in Philosophy become destabilized by their own "margins," by
their own attempts to suppress (frame), and make merely
"external," their metaphors, their rhetoric: And so too are styles,
works and interpretations of art made, thereby, unstable, or, as
Dewey put it, made "provocations for new works." It is "the logic
of the frame" for Derrida -- that is, the instability of the
distinction between the inside and the outside — which cannot be
contained by the conceptual legislations of aesthetic discourse.
So, Philosophy frames art within a boundary with itself both
constituting that boundary and being on the other side. What
Derrida asserts is that: "There is framing, but the frame does not
exist."48
Take away from a painting all representation, signification,
theme, text as intended meaning, take away also all the
material (canvas, colored paint) which for Kant cannot be
beautiful in itself, rub out any drawing oriented toward a
determinable end, take away its background and its social,
historical, political, and economic support, and what is left?
The frame, the framing, a play of forms and lines which are
structurally homogeneous with the structure of the frame.49
48 Derrida, Truth in Painting. 1978:93.
49 Ibid., p. 111.
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What is left? Not art, but Philosophy. Philosophy is the discourse
of framing itself as the non-work, the non-literary. The frame
between philosophy and literature depends upon the paradox of
making and using language to produce a metalinguistic "position,"
but whose authority can only be substantiated by being also
within, by the "usury" of what is being described, by being both
"places" at once, which are not places. Derrida's point is that the
distinction inside/outside, (like philosophy/literature,
aesthetics/art, finding/making), always evades final formulation,
yet it is always at work, needing to be formulated and disrupting
the possibility of being stabilized. What Derrida puts in such
metaphysically interminable terms is what the pragmatist means
when he says that the failure of Philosophy to justify itself as the
privileged framer is the inability of any critical discourse to
account for itself except as a practice. What epistemological
oppositions like inside/outside cannot "leisten" (accomplish) is
what no discourse needs to accomplish in the first place: it is good
or bad practice, not inside and outside the practice it seeks to
ground. Framing is (metaphysically) paradoxical only when it
seeks to be foundational.
Derrida's deconstructive turn has brought into contact four
important and interrelated points regarding the relationship
between the literary (aesthetic) and the philosophical, which can
be summarized with unjustifiable plainness: 1. By according a
greater role to the study of figures, he has pushed with a new
idiom for a change in the concept of philosophy. By treating the
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philosophy of Kant's third Critique as a work of art (of framing),
and Artaud's theatre as a contribution to the philosophy of
language, Derrida keeps but does not hierarchicalize the
literature/philosophy distinction. The hierarchical and privileging
oppositions of framing (intrinsic/extrinsic) are thawed, and a
genre of writing is introduced to mark the philosophical: writing,
rather than foundational framing. 2. By bringing the rhetoric of
philosophy out of the margins of its text, he has provided
contemporary literary and philosophical criticism with a shared
body of themes. These themes have to do not with being or truth,
but with the tropological procedures by which they become
produced. 3. He has also introduced strategies of reading and
writing, a practice of writing about the aesthetic construction of
philosophy in a way which is itself a different aesthetic, linked
primarily with modernist and late-modernist movements in
literature, thereby using the category of the literary reciprocally
to remake and decentralize philosophy's self-image[s]. 4. This
disruptive function of the literary has suggested different goals of
philosophical criticism: non-Platonic and non-Kantian goals.
Rather than the achievement of closure, of a completed system, or
of a final interpretation, or even of immediately assimilable
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"clarity" and easy appropriation,50 what is sought is literary
openness, diffusion, the celebration of the loss of both a procedure
to "retrieve" the origins of discourse and the loss of a final goal or
telos for discourse. The goal is, paradoxically, the continuous
disestablishment of the referential and verifiable as possible or
interesting (pleasurable) rhetorical achievements. We should read
philosophy, writes Derrida, as "defined by its opus," as "a literary
genre," to be read in terms of "its rhetorical organization, . . .
which is not just the articulation of its signifieds and its reference
to being or to truth," but, rather, as "organizing, forcing, or
diverting a set of tropological possibilities." With the loss of truth,
Derrida makes an aesthetic, Nietzschean recommendation:
philosophy is "dancing with ideas, with words, and need I add that
one must also be able to dance with the pen — that one must
learn how to write?" (Twilight of the Idols).
50 Derrida's decentered and decentering style is also, of course, (like
modernist work) ideologically motivated, not to be difficult for the sake of
it, but because of the monolithic models he is attempting to criticize and
escape, and because of the powerful cultural apparatuses which groom,
appropriate and defuse these styles. Derrida's literary /philosophical
(rhetorical) analysis of Sartre revolves precisely around how decisive the
norms of his educational background (the lycee, the "classe preparatoire,"
the Ecole Normale and the "agregation") and university were for his work,
as well as the acquisition of technique and status through his link with a
major publishing house. Derrida's philosophical aesthetic is also an
investigation into the subtle relations between ideology, culture and the
state, as regards the authority a model of discourse can acquire and how
one might decentralize that authority. This is not intended as an
endorsement of Derrida's style, but only to express some of what motivates
it. Cf. "An Interview with Derrida," Derrida & Differance. Wood &
Bernasconi (eds.) 1985:107-127, esp. pp. 114-120.
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5.6 PARADIGMS LOST, AND CONTINUED ARTISTIC USAGE --
REMINDER:
Artistic practice, like post-structuralist and pragmatic rhetoric,
has already found these traditional hierarchies (Truth or trope,
intrinsic or extrinsic) highly fluid, reversible and responsible for
each other's continued re-production. The difference here
between the artful and the philosophical might be useful
(professionally), but not ontologically settled or metaphysically
given. In this sense the construct is no longer subordinate to the
"Truth" (Dewey), the interpreted to the "directly perceived,"
different worlds to "the world" (Goodman), the metaphorical to the
literal (Mary Hesse), nor literature to philosophy (Derrida &
Rorty). There is no epistemological given to keep these
ontologically straight, no given constraint to inhibit these old
oppositions from some mutual and novel, functionally reversable
interplay.
It is not only that philosophical metaphors became erased and
suppressed by their products (Objectivism, Representation, Truth),
but that those operations requiring the use of a medium, socio-
linguistic or otherwise, have so often led to the (unnecessary)
attempt to suppress the degree to which it participates in
production. Dewey writes that the medium was "seen-as" a
mirror rather than as an organic means of making,51 and
Gombrich, that the materials and schema together produced the
illusion of their absence. Both are referring to a tradition of
51 Dewey, "The Common Substance of the Arts," in Art as Experience.
1934:187-213.
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painting which, (to offer some hackneyed examples), stopped
hiding itself behind the pretence of "imitation." Abandoning the
"stereoscopic reality" (Van Gogh) of representationalism, it could
become a new Expressionism (Munch). It stopped "mirroring" the
absent Sublime and Beautiful (Kant), and made present the anti-
values of suffering and violence (Kokoschka, Beckmann).52 It
dropped the "constraint" of "correct perspective" (Cezanne), and
became the possibility of Cubism (Picasso). With the help of
Freud, an undermined sense of control and mastery of the "real"
by consciousness became Surrealism (in Dali).
This meant, in other (philosophical) words, the inventive use of,
rather than the rehabilitation of the priorities of the old
ontological, hierarchical paradigm of Truth and Art. Without the
now aged Greek hope of achieving, or wanting to achieve,
ontological closure (Derrida), and without the hope that all
experimental inquiry (Dewey) would converge into one final
perceptual vocabulary, color and shape, for example, were no
52 This is not an accusation that the sublime, for Kant, is simply the super-
beautiful as opposed to the sense of the grotesque evinced by some
modernist work. It is, rather, to say that the awe and "terror" which Kant
mentions in terms of the sublime still smacks of the theologically
reden^tive, and is tied to his relationship not to art but to nature. Like our
awe before yGod, we experience awe before "mountain peaks," not in terms
of the woryngly human world but in terms of the more distant and non-
human, to be "fear[ed] by aid of the imagination." What makes Beckmann's
sentiments so different are their relation to the human, to the terror he
feels in the face of "collectivism" (he wrote this in 1938 -- no longer in
Berlin), in the face of those "longing for oblivion" in a "boundless world of
turmoil." In other words, the "terror" of Kant's sublime "mountain peaks"
is quite different from the terror occasioned by the sight of soldiers goose
stepping down the street. It is this difference I am referring to. (Cf.
Beckmann, "On My Painting" (1938), in Modern Artists On Art (ed.) R. L.
Herbert, 1964. I am grateful for Peter Lewis for pointing me back to Kant's
Critique to clarify my gripe with Kant on this point.)
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longer subordinate to object or representational "givens" (e.g.,
Expressionism, Cubism). Musical phrase and form were no longer
subordinate to "given" structures of melody, harmony and
ensemble (structuralist metaphors Levi-Strauss is fond of), nor to
romantic climax and conclusion (e.g., Schonberg's "Row," Coltran's
Jazz). Stone in the hands of Moore was a medium which was not
subordinated to the model or to mimetic representation. Literary
language became no longer subordinate to realist theme, content,
or form (Joyce, Derrida, John Barth); and in Philosophy, rhetoric
became (again reminiscent of the Sophists) no longer subordinate
to a mono-language of "objectivity" and "Truth" (James, Dewey). A
plurality of interpretations, then, could no longer be subordinate
to linguistically transparent and/or analytically inter-translatable
descriptions (Quine, Rorty, Fish).
So, (the aesthetic/philosophical story might continue), should
Expressionist and Cubist, or Modernist and Post-modernist, or
analytic and pragmatic communities start comparing their "self-
descriptions," and should a philosopher be invited to help "find" or
"translate" it all into a commensurable and general ground about
which everyone is talking (writing), then his will be another
medium, a rhetoric, a regional short story, not a neutral mirror or
meta-language, in terms of which the different sides of such a
comparison are likely to come out equal or to agree to the third
vocabulary (say, "Rationality") produced in the process. More
specifically: Beckett has said he did not translate En attendant
Godot from the French into English ("Waiting for Godot) and
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German (Warten auf Godot). He wrote three different plays. No
one of them is necessarily parasitic upon or subordinate to the
other. They do not form one inter-translatable identity, nor are
they best compared by waiting for a single ideal Godot to
arbitrate. They are different texts. They have similar but also
different contexts, and connect with similar but also different
socio-linguistic communities, practices, histories and interests.
The aforementioned aesthetic/philosophical oppositions and
distinctions (inside/outside, literature/philosophy, fiction/fact,
identity/difference) use each other in practice and seem to
confuse each other unnecessarily when dualistically ontologised in
theory. Rather than two separate realms to be compared, or
realms which need to be linked with a theory of Truth or Being,
the pragmatist suggests that we have a way to talk which can
function usefully and/or not. Dewey's organicist and naturalist
language about art is a way to say that these oppositions interact
with, rather than ontologically and hierarchically exclude, one
another. Color forms neither identity nor dualism with objects;
they are neither the inside nor the outside; they, (as Dewey
remarked about the Impressionist painting of his day) make each
other up and down, deconstructing and reconstructing each other.
Likewise with the linguistic medium, is Derrida's suggestion; no
philosophical writing suddenly becomes, by mystical transport,
kenotically abandoned by itself into non-writing, standing naked
before the (privileged) face of Truth (no matter how much idealist
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Berlin in the 19th century (Hegel) and empiricist Vienna in the
20th encouraged us to sustain this dream).53
It is in being written, (as Derrida put it), that philosophy and
aesthetic theory conjoin, that (as Dewey put it) inquiry and its
purposeful constructs emerge and interrelate,54 that old
paradigms become artfully undermined. This is what I think
Dewey got right and used a pragmatic aesthetic theory to help
explicate. Dewey disliked static Absolute idealisms (in his day
Bradley, Royce, etc.) and used aesthetic theory as a corrective.
Rorty has rebuked parallel analytic/realist (anti-realist) lapses (in
his day Kripke, Dummett, etc.) and made dapper use of Dewey and
his understanding of the (non-foundational) art of philosophy
(Recall p. 140.). Dewey spoke of consequential contextual/political
conditions, and Rorty of "conversational" ones. But the pragmatic
point is that we should make and talk critically about our
philosophical styles and artifacts, not pretend to "find" them "in"
the world and then enforce them as necessary, unwritten and
therefore a priori legislative constraints.
Philosophical talk then, like talk about art and its "objects"
(passim Wollheim),55 is criticism not epistemology. It is critical
53 One of Derrida's consistent themes has been to trace the prevalence of
philosophy's appeal to the metaphors of light and vision, to the unmediated
face to face relation, to an essentially theological discourse which will stop
the infinite regress of signification through the image of the face.
54 J. Margolis has also taken up, in a Deweyian fashion, the theme of art
and the culturally emergent in the context of contemporary aesthetics and
its importance for philosophy more generally in Art and Philosophy, pt.
1/3 "The Cultural Nature of Art," 1980:esp. pp.44,45,48.
55 Wollheim, R., Art and Its Objects. 1968.
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talk about different sorts of cultural production (artistic, linguistic,
political) and interpretation of them, rather than conceptual
legislation into "different realms of Being" and representation of
them. It does not seem as if we still have an intact socio-
theoretical world of ontologically simple "mere objects" {passim
Danto)56 with artistic objects and stories following later-, as if we
have an uncontroversially grounded epistemology and "fiction"
following, first Philosophy and then literature (and the rest of
culture) as a spicy after-taste to the discovery of the True and
Rational. James' (like Emerson's) lyricism occasionally waxed
metaphysical. They thought such rhetoric could be put to good
use (The religious background of Boston is important here.); and
we needn't hold this against them. But what seems agreeable in
James (and Dewey and Rorty) is the belief that "Truth" and
"Rationality" can be "good in the way of belief," useful constructs
for getting what we want. They are compliments "paid to
sentences that seem to be paying their way" (Rorty),57 which "fit"
with other sentences we thought good of before-hand, and which
promise some new ones designed to help out.58 But the
philosopher is not one who has a special faculty or set of a priori
principles for arbitrating. The post-structuralist and pragmatist
55 Danto, A., The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art.
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57 Rorty, "Introduction," Consequences of Pragmatism. 1982:xxv.
58 Dewey's more systematic questioning of "rationality" places it neither in
an empiricist object nor in a Kantian (Cartesian) Subject, but in "strategic
interaction." The language of "strategy" rather than "source" is echoed in
post-Kantian psychology (Piaget), philosophy of science (Kuhn), and in
post-structuralist philosophy and criticism (Foucault & Harari). The
"source" of "rationality" being in the "structural/functional" activities of
its very construction, development and use.
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aesthete believe in a little insubordinationism (oppositions are not
abandoned but deconstructed and reinscribed). They do not
expect to find any paradigms regained; but they do expect some of
their instruments to continue doing some worthwhile critical
work.
5.7 Quibbles about our family resemblance: an uneasy
alliance:
How far does the pragmatic critic go along with Derrida's
philosophical aesthetic, with his post-structuralist style and
rhetoric, with his criticism of "the Tradition," with his
philosophical art? (These are not distinguishable in any strong
sense in Derrida.) From those who know what it is to find the
"right" interpretation comes the criticism of deconstruction that it
allows disorder and anarchy to reign; that, on the contrary,
meaning is indeed capturable by sound method; that one can still
hunt down some honest-to-God truths, and by solemn professional
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effort establish a "clear" prose to prove the point.59 Whereas,
from those who feel somewhat "left" of Derrida's paradoxical
loyalty to the very subject of philosophy, of his remaining the
persistent critic of its most foundational and classical metaphorics,
comes the fear that Derrida has left the institutional producers of
this failed discourse where they were, in power, still benefiting
from Derrida's linguistic diffusion; because no social restructuring
has occurred or can occur in the context of "an undifferentiated
textuality," in the context of a relentless "post-structure" which
59 Regarding the loss of an analytic foundation by which a language would
prove how good a job it is doing, there have been some attempts to propose
a family resemblance between the "deconstructions" of Quine and Goodman
and those of Derrida. (e.g., C. Norris, 1983 and S. C. Wheeler's very helpful
article, "The Extension of Deconstruction," 1986:3-21.) This is worthwhile
but also misleading for the following reasons: 1. Both Quine and Goodman
make their initial moves toward language-centered conventionalism in the
context of empiricism and its failure to find objects and properties behind
or as the supports of language. Derrida's context is less circumscribed. His
use and understanding of language engages in a larger cultural domain
which links questions of language more to literature than to the fallout of
empiricist physics. This is significant because: 2. Quine might indeed
soften the authority of empiricism, but he nevertheless maintains a
controlled discourse committed to the role of evidence, committed to
keeping science the primary co-partner regarding questions of language.
Whereas Derrida, in the context of high modernism (in the context of
aesthetics), writ es in terms of a "crisis of culture" at large, effecting
"language as a whole." Hence, his style and his "arguments" resist being
regroomed and paraphrased into the would-be neutral and socially
congenial discourse of late-analytic philosophy of language. Neither Quine
and Goodman nor Derrida conceive of language as a transparent window;
but in Derrida, 'language takes on a more autotelic and uncontrollable
agency and power. It is this stylistic difference which itself articulates a
different relationship to (philosophy of) language, which cuts accross any
distinction between the form Derrida's writing takes as opposed to the
content he "shares" with Quine and Goodman. It is this stylistic difference
which should not be trivialized in the production of their "shared
resemblance." 3. Derrida's impact on //rerary-philosophical questions, on
questions of the aesthetics of philosophical writing itself, has produced a
more celebratory (and less shop worn) expansion of the philosophical
genre, in mutually beneficial contact with literary criticism. This is to say
that the richer and more illuminating venue for making comparisons
between, say, Derrida and Quine might be less in terms of a
"commensurable" philosophy of language than in terms of the (aesthetic)
values with which they stylize philosophical writing.
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abjures latching on to anything solid.6° The pragmatist is roaming
somewhere in the excluded middle, uneasy about Derrida's
relation to "the Tradition" and about the (Heideggerian) art which
Derrida contrives to rework it, but an admirer of the plurality of
languages his art employs. In the following a pragmatic set of
realignments will be presented:61
1. Derrida has been so diligently clever at undermining the
metaphors of old foundations that he has lost contact with the
social context, contexts which mediate the relations between
metaphors and people or social experience, contexts in which
already dead and/or still successful rhetorics acquire their force,
where they receive or lose their concrete endorsements: Reenter
the pragmatic rhetorician.
2. In concentrating on the diffusion of meaning to prevent the re-
consolidation of the grand metaphors of "the Tradition," and in
order to keep opening the "the Tradition's" "blind spot" to "its own
611 Although, deconstruction has indeed had some impact on the Marxist
literary theories of, for example, Fredric Jameson and Terry Eagleton.
What were considered by many Marxists to be revelatory tools which pried
apart a text for its hidden social core, these tools have been openned up,
become "hermeneutic." As even Eagleton writes, Marxism is not a tool for
decoding novels by reference to an explicit social content or theme, it is an
attempt "to understand the complex, indirect relations between [literary]
works and the ideological worlds they inhabit -- relations which emerge
not just in 'themes' and 'preoccupations' but in style, rhythm, image,
quality, and form." Marxism and Literary Criticism. 1976:6. Although
Eagleton often tends to treat works as allegories of Marxist ideology, he does
not usually treat this shift from the idiom of the text in question to the
idiom of Marxism as an instance of the latter having represented the
former.
61 Much of the discussion which follows follows Rorty's "Philosophy as a
Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida," 1982:90-109; and his "Deconstruction
and Circumvention," 1984:1-23. The latter article is, I think, a closer and
more careful reading of Derrida than the former.
214
metaphorics," Derrida has paradoxically rehabilitated the
(necessary) status of the grand texts of the classical canon and
mythunderstood "the Tradition" as a still unitary discourse which
requires a "brutal interruption." This (thinks the pragmatist) is
already redundant.
3. In sustaining this (Heideggerian) myth that an "ontotheological"
discourse permeates the entire history and future possibility of
the West in every domain of expression (science, politics,
literature and philosophy), he has self-deceptively overblown the
cultural relevance of an academic specialty and the idea that the
philosophical deconstruction of this "language-condition"
(Heidegger) could make a significant differance to our culture's
practice. He has put the "urgency" of a deconstructionist theory
ahead of the variety of practices which have already made the
theory superfluous. (It will be argued in chapter 6 that this is
late- rather than post-modernism.)
4. In attempting such an indeed formidable re-reading of "the
Tradition" through literary figures, Derrida establishes thereby an
artificial (unjustifiably omnipresent) dilemma which neglects
seeing the degree to which it has already been replaced by a
smaller plurality of pragmatic questions and discourses which
latch onto those bits of our traditions, which can be useful for
current purposes. This is what the pragmatist (like Dewey) does
when he borrows (non-foundational bits) from sophism,
empiricism, impressionism, Marxism, or wherever; and it is what
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much post-modern art does (without metaphysical inhibition) as
well. In effect, one borrows for reasons of use and effect, not
because the same old metaphors have succeeded in hiding their
metaphoricity, made us ontotheological dupes once again, but
because they are indeed flexible metaphors which can still do
some good work. (More on the analogy between pragmatic
philosophy and the post-modern artworld in the following
chapter.)
Derrida is one of a group of writers who have said that the
philosopher is a kind of writer who doesn't like to acknowledge
that this is what he does, who privileges a certain metaphor
(banking on "the light of reason," "the vision of truth"), who
transfers it to the world, and says that he found it in the "nature
of things" rather than wrote it in a book. The upshot of Derrida's
point is that philosophy becomes writing about what others have
written, with no way to test the text's accuracy of representation
except over and against another text. Thereby, when Dewey
writes about some classical text book problems (mind/body,
freedom/determinism) that "we don't solve them, we get over
them," and when Kuhn writes that when enough "anomalies are
not explained" a new idiom can be constructed to have a go, they
are both talking about the possibility of two or more different
texts which can be compared on pragmatic grounds (not
necessariliy commensurable and certainly not foundational
grounds) to see (or fight to see) which text will do the desired
work most successfully. But when Derrida writes that "the dream
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at the heart of philosophy is . . or "it is only on the basis of
differance that . . or "all texts deconstruct themselves," he
seems to be saying that there is only one textual strategy, one
ubiquitous metaphysic of discourse, always structured and
unstructuring itself in the same way. The point is that when these
sorts of pronouncements appear, Derrida loses the critical power
of his own deconstructions, the power of his own idiom to remain
different, to remain an outlaw to this "law of genre," to remain
outside of the dream he criticises.
In other words, in philosophy (as in architecture, painting and
Kuhnian science), the new idiom need not explain, "in the most
faithful, interior way, the structured genealogy of philosophy's
concepts;"62 nor need it explain the nature of coming up with any
idiom which acquires power. It need only do things, have a
successful jargon or style which compares well, is more agreeable
than the way last year's (last decade's, last period's, last
millenium's) idiom performed. That is, Derrida, in producing the
myth of a unitary dream or genre of philosophy, and in presuming
that it is central to Western culture, is working against his own
success as a critic. Derrida is indeed ambivalent about remaining
within his own trap. Where Hegel and Heidegger offered a
program for building a new cultural pyramid with philosophy on
the top, Derrida has most certainly dropped the nostalgic hope of
completing it, but he has held onto the necessity of the lineage of
texts which promoted it. He sees their truths as our metaphors,
62 Derrida, Positions. 1981:6.
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but the tricks those metaphors played (to ground themselves) as
tricks we cannot avoid. He has, in Dewey's terms, confused an
institution of texts for a momentous metaphysical dilemma, one
we can "get over."63
The paradox here is that to say we cannot but "rigorously repeat
[this] circle" implies a point of observation, a "certain exterior that
63 In D. F. Krell's Intimations of Mortality: Time. Truth, and Finitude in
Heidegger's Thinking of Being. 1986, we can't possibly get over anything,
and certainly not Heidegger: For (he writes) "[e]ven the young Heidegger
knows, as Richard Rorty and John Dewey do not seem to know (perhaps it
would be Un-American to know it), that all courageous and forthright
decisions to abandon metaphysics result in naive reduplications of its
patterns of thought. The passion to be original, to start from scratch, to roll
up our sleeves and attack our "present troubles," dissipates itself in second¬
hand and third-rate replays." (p. 144: My italics.) (Obviously Heidegger
and Krell "know" something the pragmatists have never felt privy to,
something "deeply" metaphysical and inescapable that pragmatists fail to
worry about. For they certainly don't know, or understand how one could
know, that abandoning a certain sort of text (metaphysics) means we are
bound to "reduplicate its patterns." They seem, rather, to ask: What are its
(irrevocable?) patterns but the production of another ahistorical
essentialism, the elevation of someone's meta-discourse? Of course we don't
"start from scratch," nor am I aware of Dewey and Rorty having suggested
we could. On the contrary, we are "funded" with an enormous amount
which we "replay." But why one must "replay" Heidegger is still not clear.
One might, rather, suppose that there is some possibility of change: in
history, in philosophical interest and idiom, perhaps even a difference
between what sorts of things philosophers were allowing to be "replayed"
in Germany in the 1930's in comparison with North America in the 1930's —
however u n -metaphysical this (social) form of "knowing" might be.
Apparently one can't start pragmatically with an interest in "present
troubles" because these "do not touch the mystery." (p. 148) And, anyway,
(Krell writes) "[i]t is surely pathetic to believe or hope that at the end of
metaphysics some sort of "other thinking" will effect any real change in
the world." (p. 150) Well! It appears that the only mystery here is how
pompously Krell reduplicates the mystifications of Heidegger. Dewey's
retort (p. 75, n. 2): "Better it is for philosophy to err in active participation
in the living struggles and issues of its own age and times than to maintain
an immune monastic impeccability, without relevancy and bearing in the
generating ideas of its contemporary present."
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is unqualifiable or unnameable."64 It implies a position common
also to the unworkable paradoxes of Royce and Peirce. (Cf.
chapter 3.) As Royce's Absolute monism attempted to explain
error and plurality, he put the Absolute into the position of having
to explain their unreality, putting himself, thereby, into the
position of having to explain the ultimate impossibility of what he
did see by comparison to the Absolute, by that which, by its
nature couldn't be seen or grasped. He had to get the unreal, the
"appearance" of the plural (descriptively) right by comparison to
what was out of reach. But how does one compare (accurately
represent) the plural to the One or Absolute when the whole point
is that there is only one thing? So too with Peirce. How could he
explain the contrast between the eventual truth of science ("in the
long run") to the apparent error of what we know now, when the
only possible (mortal) position is in terms of what we know now?
(This is again their inheritance from Kant — attempting to contrast
the conceivable [the phenomenal] to the inconceivable [the
nouminal]: This is indeed quite a trick.) But Derrida is caught in
the same metaphysical and eventually unproductive paradox, but
doubly so because he articulates it self-consciously, embellishes it
and makes it unavoidable.
Derrida writes that "metaphor can never be dominated;" that "no
philosophy, as such, has ever renounced this Aristotelian ideal:"
64 Ibid. This momentous and paradoxically framed fight is "to think — in
the most faithful, interior way — the structured genealogy of philosophy's
concepts, but at the same time to determine — from a certain exterior that is
unqualifiable or unnameable by philosophy -- what this history has been
able to dissimulate or forbid."
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because "[t]his ideal is philosophy."65 In so writing, he is in the
same aforementioned paradoxical position (of Royce and Peirce),
that of implying a position from which he could contrast the only
text there is to something which is different, to a text which might
be unworried about such mastery, not searching for a univocal
language or repressing its own rhetoricity, not proposing the
victory of "distinct meaning" as the only telos of philosophical
inquiry. So, when Derrida uses his own new idiom to "disrupt" the
possibility of his prose being reappropriated into this ideal dream,
he turns his own pragmatic accomplishment against itself, and
uses his own ambidexterity, his own ability to play more than one
game, as a way of saying something like, "really there is only one
game and I embody the paradox of resistance."
By thus reestablishing the metaphysics he wants out of, Derrida
must become aware of the paradox of his own performance; and
he exploits it by writing the "dilemma" as a tragi-comedy, (writing
without Heidegger's gloom or Foucault's bitterness), by writing
indeed in a spirit of radical toleration (as his own textual range
and stylistic games imply): But it is nevertheless written in the
Hegelian spirit of a necessary, irrevocable complicity with this
Tradition.66 By problematizing this as a universal and general
"dilemma of all discourse" to such a degree, it is impossible to
assess whether everyone suffers the illness in the same way, to
the same degree. For the context of discourses never changes (for
65 Derrida, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy,"
1982:247.
66 This is what "Aufhebung," or in Derrida's terms "releve," entails: the
necessary retention of what one wishes, by negation, to overcome.
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the context is discourse itself). Hence, the relation of a vocabulary
to context is never asked (except obliquely).67 Metaphysics in its
most inapplicable "sense" is restored in the degree to which
Derrida's reading of (the myth) of "the Tradition" is persuasive.
Derrida is uneasy with his own novelty. And in this regard too
the pragmatist finds Derrida's critique of "the dream" helpful, but
its continuous and paradoxical restoration (releve) unhistorical.
The paradox is being stressed here because Derrida's great theme
is the lack of closure, while the dream of philosophy is precisely to
find one true metaphor, to find closure, in the form of statements
like "No statement can be true unless . . ," or "No statement can
make sense unless . . ." (Recall A. J. Ayer.) And these statements
themselves must be part of a vocabulary which is closed; and, at
the same time, they must be able to know which vocabularies
don't belong in order to be able to exclude them. That is, one
must know, in order for the proposition to be operative, all other
vocabularies, and know that they are translatable into one's own
universalized vocabulary; and it must, on top of this feat, be able
to refer to itself without paradox — know that its statement "not
true unless" belongs to the closed category of true sentences.
Derrida knows the paradoxicality of this self-reference full well,
and makes it all the more extravagant with statements like "all
Western discourse is dominated by . . ," when he could have
avoided the circuitous brilliance required of his own pushing
67 For example, Derrida does make a much needed contextual reference in
his essay "The Ends of Man," 1982:130; but he relinquishes its effect and use
by returning to the question of "metaphoricity in general," p. 130.
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endlessly against and yet reiterating such paradox by simply not
formulating a totalizing claim in the first place. And it is this
escape from unnecessary paradox, of trying to do too much, which
I think James and Dewey, like Wittgenstein and Rorty later,
stopped indulging in.
As Rorty writes: "just when we pragmatic Wittgensteinian
therapists were congratulating ourselves on having disabused the
learned world of the idea that [this paradox is] 'deep,' just when
we thought we had got this terminology nicely leveled off and
trivialized," along came Derrida to say, not indeed that it is a
worrying paradox, but precisely because it cannot be avoided, we
must retain it, even if playfully. He wants to deconstruct all the
classical discourses which thought they had found closure; but he
won't "de-thematize" these efforts as just a set of systems and
tropes we don't use, and don't need to use any longer; that, like
the Gothic cathedral, this form of philosophy "is a genre which had
a distinguished career and an important historical function but
which now survives largely in the form of self-parody."68 Or
positively stated: Like the efforts of Schonberg and/or
Stravinsky, a medium can again be made meaningful and useful
when it drops old "structures," when a dissonance is created to
revivify a medium which has lost its critical/effective power and
cannot be reinvigorated by endless repetition. A medium must
assess itself (encourages the pragmatist) in the context of cultural
68 Rorty, "Deconstruction and Circumvention," 1984:19.
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change (as modernist and post-modernist aesthetics have
attempted to do).
It is the enormous figure of Heidegger who has kept Derrida
under the shadow of the philosophical family tree from Plato to
Husserl and Heidegger himself.69 It is Derrida's assessment of
Heidegger which encourages him to talk in terms of "the
dominance of an entire metaphorics of proximity of Being with the
values of neighboring, shelter, house, service, guard, voice, and
listening. . .; on the basis of both this metaphorics and the thinking
of the ontico-ontological difference, one could even make explicit
an entire theory of metaphoricity in general."1® (My emphasis.)
So, Derrida wishes "to change terrain, in a discontinuous and
irruptive fashion, by brutally placing oneself outside, and by
affirming an absolute break and difference." To do this "one must
speak several languages and produce several texts at once." What
we need in order to do this is what Nietzsche called a change of
"style;" "and if there is style, Nietzsche reminded us, it must be
plural." {Ibid. p. 135.)71 But just when Derrida gives the
69 Rorty indeed treats the philosopher's relationship to the tradition as a
familial rather than a metaphysical one, treating the tradition as a sort of
Bildungsroman. -- "a family romance involving, e.g., Father Parmenides,
honest old Uncle Kant, and bad brother Derrida" — the latest offspring still
being obsessed by an ancient family tree, reluctant to tell a different story,
through a different and culturally contextualized narrative, relevant to our
specific period and location within the history of the West. Cf. Rorty,
"Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida," 1982:92. In other
words, for non-Hegelian, non-Heideggerian pragmatists there is no
persistently ubiquitous but hidden tree (metaphor) holding us all back, no
single persistent problem or tradition save perhaps the persistence of such
neo-Hegelians and neo-Heideggerians.
1® Derrida, "The Ends of Man", 1982:130.
71 Cf. also Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles. 1978, for further remarks on
the aesthetics of philosophizing, of using different styles vis-a-vis
Nietzsche.
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impression of writing his way out, indeed with a vocabulary of
writing, with puns, spinning out associations as well as inferences,
he then returns to the chiasmus;72 in which one still hears the
reminder that we are dealing with the "whole of the West."
Hence, the attempt to "change terrain," to get "outside" is
impossible.
My point is: 1. Derrida has set up an artifical and
uncontextualized myth (the Tradition), an undeterminable
etymological "force" (Heidegger again), against which he then does
"battle" (with metaphors like "violence" and "brutally placing
oneself outside"). Derrida is a responder to Texts which are raised
up like windmills for mythological fights. This Heideggerian
background suits etymological specialists; and Derrida is a good
one. It suits a professionalized Sitz im Lesen still consolodating a
Tradition which, if not since the pre-socratic Skeptics, Cynics and
Sophists then certainly since the Baconian enlightenment, has
generated a more questioning, rhetorically pliant, historically
adaptive and differentiated set of discourses than Derrida's notion
of "a dominating metaphorics" can do justice to. He has set up an
ideal type as if no new language games within the literature of
philosophy or science or politics had ever taken place. Derrida
certainly does not have Heidegger's nostalgia (regarding Greece)
72 The primary rhetorical gesture of deconstruction is the chiasmus ("One
opens what is closed and closes what is left open." Or another example: "One
gets inside the Tradition by getting to its ouside; by striving to get outside
one remains inside.") It is a technique of reversal which nevertheless
repeats. It is a displacement of the old order or hierarchy by way of this
reversal which functions, I think, to stabilize the "necessity" of being
caught in between. Like Derrida's other forms of paradox, it can function
as a conservative gesture.
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or political myopia (regarding Germany), but he is nevertheless a
curiously contented Sisyphus still rolling the fictional rock of the
Tradition up several different hills, albeit chuckling.
2. Closer again to aesthetics: Heidegger sought a new idiom, a
different frame for philosophizing, and a more primal vocabulary
(a poetics) of "Sein" and "Ereignis" to support his story. And
Derrida too begins on occasion to look suspiciously like a
transcendental story teller when making his narrative appeal to
"differance" and "trace." The point is that "textuality" sometimes
begins to look like reiterating the old hope for one matrix of
metaphors; as if "writing" will succeed (and write itself) where
"Being" could not (speak itself); as if one grand form of literature
is the only way worlds get made; and as if literature is therefore
the paradigmatic and only art. This again uses an aesthetic (or
writing) to reestablish the role of philosophy: Language is the art,
and the philosopher is the benefactor (and in Derrida's case,
admittedly the beneficiary) of its dominance. The point here is
not simply to say that paintings and films educate vision, that
buildings help define our sense of space, and that our worlds are,
as Goodman puts it, plural and not all products of one notational
system — language; it is also to make the metaphilosophical point
that as Hegel and Heidegger privileged poetry as the first art,
after, of course, philosophy, (the Denker over, or as "Aufheber" of
Dichtung), the metaphorics of "textuality" often performs the same
function. Everything is a product of the written, of metaphor, and
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the philosopher is the releve, the relifter, the Aufheber of writing
in general. 73
3. Closer again to the rhetorical: Talk primarily about the literary
arts is for Derrida essentially strategic; because they can be
played off against philosophy to produce an "interminable text," a
writing without archai, without telos, etc.. And the Derrida-da of
Glas performs this juxaposition of different sorts of writing at
length. But a social context, which the rhetoricians attempted to
keep the Dialecticians mindful of, is kept on the margins. As much
as Derrida blurs the frames which keep distinctions from finding
foundational/hierarchical supports (e.g., philosophy/literature,
truth/art), he nevertheless operates within a metaphysical frame,
idealizing and totalizing a problem of language which fails to
admit into the conversation the historical processes which have
already displaced the grand philosopher and his meta-exercise
from center stage in the west. This is indeed Foucault's reproach
against Derrida -- perhaps the last great epi-phenomenal
practitioner of this form of metaphysics.
Today Derrida is the most decisive representative of the
[Classical] system in its final brilliance; the reduction of
discursive practice to textual traces; the elision of the events
that are produced there in order to retain nothing but marks
for a reading; the invention of voices behind texts in order
73 Reldve is ambiguous and persistently untranslatable, a pun, a word play,
a paradox, an endless revision of Hegel. It is "based" on Hegel's aufheben/
Aufhebung (verb/noun) in that it is a metaphysical-conceptual dynamic
which involves the dialectical movement of negation and conservation,
change and repetition. It raises (releve) our understanding of the "basis"
upon which understanding is possible to a higher level of understanding.
For a discussion of the ways in which Derrida uses these notions, cf.
"Differance," 1982:19,29 n.23 and "Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from
Being and Time," 1982:43 n.15.
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not to have to analyze the modes of implication of the
subject in discourse; assigning the spoken and the unspoken
in the text to an originary place in order not to have to
reinstate the discursive practices in the field of
transformations where they are effected.
I do not say that it is a metaphysics, ... I shall go
much further: I shall say that it is a trifling, historically
well-determined pedagogy which very visibly reveals
itself.74
Foucault's remarks are very pointed even if ungenerous.
Derrida constructs a totalizing "dream of philosophy," into which
he himself continues to wander, a dream which the pragmatist
had thought already sufficiently satirized at the turn of the
century if not sufficiently by the rhetoricians at the time of its
Socratic inception. What Dewey wanted to resist was the coercion
of a totalizing vocabulary. He did not have, and did not have the
desire for,75 one meta-language. He simply did not want our
pragmatically different languages to avoid each other as
metaphysicalist/absolutist talk in the epistemology of his day
avoided his pragmatic, aesthetic and experimental talk of art and
science).76 It is not that deconstructionist conceptual foes like "the
Origin," "the Source," "the noun" themselves need be more
upsetting than other symbols and metaphors, paintings and
74 Foucault, Histoire de la folie. 1972:602.
75 "Desire" is another key term in the post-structuralist (e.g., Freud via
Derrida, Kristeva) diagnosis of what "the West" has wished language could
do; i.e., the desire that it give us the Truth, but only by suppressing itself as
a system of signs, metaphors. Cf. J. Kristeva, Desire in Language. 1980; a
largely psychoanalytic (Lacan) account of the desire/power dimension in
socio-linguistic operations to achieve mastery, sub-plotted with a feminist
critique of this "desire;" and Derrida, "White Mythology; Metaphor in the
Text of Philosophy," 1982.
76 Cf. Dewey, "Social Inquiry," Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. 1938, in which
Dewey highlights the cultural matrix as forming a continuum between
both aesthetic and natural scientific inquiry.
227
symphonies, believed on occasion to have special powers in
specific circumstances. It is that such predominantly
Heideggerian textual word-worries about our "language-condition"
themselves need something other than textual opposition. This
con-text needs something else with which to (functionally)
interact. In other words, rather than placing
philosophical/rhetorical criticism in .^//-deconstructing texts,
Dewey linked the text with its social location: That is, Aristotle is
not a culprit simply because he sponsored the "dream of
philosophy" and suppressed rhetoric under the fist of the
Dialectician (Zeno's image); Aristotelian ontology is suspect also in
the context of its complicity with Athenian slavery;77 as is Kant's
principled contrast between the noumenal and the phenomenal
suspect in the context of the politically convenient
Lutheran/Prussian separation of the "internal," moral (noumenal)
and the "external," political (phenomenal) subjects. With the
arrival of Hegel's absolute Geist Dewey linked the attempt to
produce its German embodiment; and perhaps with Heidegger's
pre-occupation with Greek etymology he might have linked the
77 In "Philosophy's Search for the Immutable," The Quest for Certainty
Dewey uses a contextual/sociological discourse to place Aristotles's
ontology, and to argue that it needn't find a place in our context.
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politicized removal of Husserl's being-there in Freiburg (Grass).78
Dewey too had a familial tie to Hegel,79 but his re-reading
involved a cultural context, his own and Hegel's; and this wasn't
"aufgehoben" into another philosophical dialect or by another
meta-language of big "binary oppositions," or as part of an
omnipresent "history of metaphysics" (which then required urgent
deconstruction in order to get culture out of its "crisis").
Linguistically speaking, Derrida has certainly left the structuralist
penitentiary and chosen what the post-modern writer William
Gass calls a "kindly imprisonment" within a certain form of
philosophy. And the pragmatist is certainly a supporter of
Derrida's (somewhat narcissistic, e.g., in La carte postale. 1980)
78 For a terribly dark literary/political parody of the Heideggerian idiolect
cf. G. Grass's Hundeiahre (Dog Years), 1963, trans. Manheim 1981; Cf. Harry
Liebenau: "A visionary, who lied a good deal, . . . believed this and that, and
regarded the never-ending war as an extension of his schooling. . . , a
uniformed high school student, who venerated the Fuhrer,...and of late the
philosopher Martin Heidegger. With the help of these models he succeeded
in burying a real mound made of human bones under medieval allegories.
The pile of bones, which in reality cried out to high heaven between Tyrol
and Kaiserhafen, was mentioned in his diary as a place of sacrifice, erected
in order that purity might come-to-be in the luminous, which
transluminates purity and so fosters light." Both Harry and Stortebeker
took part in the Kaiserhafen battery's "increasing success in purging the
battery area of rats . . . You couldn't help admiring Stortebeker, . .
Between rat death and rat death he whispered in his own tongue, which
however had been infected with obscurity by the tech-sergeant's
language, rat propositions and ontological rat truths, which, so we all
believed, lured the prey within reach of his glove and made possible his
overarching withdrawal. Imperturbably, while he harvested below and
piled up above, his discourse ran its course: 'The rat withdraws itself by
unconcealing itself into the ratty. So the rat errates the ratty, illuminating
it with errancy. For the ratty has come-to-be in the errancy where the rat
errs and so fosters error. That is the essential area of all history...(He)
spoke almost tenderly and with a mild didacticism: . . . This tail-knotted . . .
demonstration ... he termed his being-there-relatedness." (pp.324, 25, 38,
39, 30, 31).
79 Cf. Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism", Contemporary
American Philosophers. Eds. Adams & Montague, 1930; where he stresses his
relationship to Hegel.
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way of reinvigorating what James called the "plasticity" of
language. Philosophy can indeed "loop" and stretch between pre-
socratic rhetoric and post-modern fiction. But the pragmatist adds
to this that, like post-modern art, he can do his picking and
choosing for specific social/aesthetic purposes, without nostalgia,
without bearing the weight of the "Whole of the Tradition," by
referring to traditions for reasons of use, out of perhaps ironic
loyalties to systems and styles which as wholes are not
inhabitable or historically reestablishable. One can tell the style
of a philosopher, like the style of a painter, (as Goodman puts it),
by their signatures, that is, by the names they drop and the styles
they quote, not by the universal truths discovered.80 Philosophy
in this regard is also in the same cultural position as art, where
re-creating and using canons has taken over the role which
philosophical systems (like those of Aquinas or Kant) were at one
time able to play.81 It is to this pluralism of the post-modern and
to its pragmatic criticisms and contributions to aesthetic (non-
foundational) culture which I now turn.
80 Goodman, in "The Status of Style," 1975:799-811, argues for the
importance of the notion of 'style' precisely because it is a signature which
cuts across any epistemological frame between form and content, between
"internal" and "external" properties. Style, in helping to locate a work
(give it its signature), is also part of its very ability to function
symbolically. The same would hold for a philosophical work. It only
functions as a work in so far as it has a style rather than presuming to
function on the "basis" of having an unstylized "truth."
8 1 Cf. Rorty's "The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres" in
Philosophy in History, (eds.) Rorty, Schneewind, Skinner, 1984 for the (I
think persuasive) argument that Geistesgeschichte, because of its function
in creating canons, has usurped, in contemporary culture, the role that
grand systems played in previous periods.
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6.1 A POST-MODERN RHETORIC:
Modernism appears as a polemical, sloppy and mean-too-much
rubric which makes the appeal to the post-modern appear to do
little more than compound the conceptual problems of its parent.
And yet, it is perhaps useful in helping to elicit positive points of
conversational contact between pragmatism and the arts, in
drawing out further the relation between philosophy and the
aesthetic. For, like the analytic and structuralism, "modernism"
seems to acquire its coherence and order as much from the "post"
group (post-analytic, post-structuralist, post-modern) which
wishes to define it and go elsewhere as from any "basis" the
modernists may have provided for themselves. Indeed, it is
precisely the incredulity regarding the establishment of a "basis"
or foundation for art and "theory" which is one of the persistent
themes of post-modern discourse, and precisely where the
pragmatist locates an important reciprocal interest between
contemporary art and philosophy. Being post-modern does not
always mean the same thing in literature, in architecture and in
philosophy; so. to pretend that it can stand for a determinable
"movement" in culture, art or thought is highly suspect. Yet, it is
this elusiveness which makes it different and interesting: it is not
unified; it has not stopped long enough to make a
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"Begriffgeschichte" very helpful (passim Huyssen);1 it has no
orthodox and centralized progenitor, no apocalyptic
"masternarrative" of history to support itself and no board of
trustees in the academy to enforce its (highly plural) standards.2
It is this aesthetic/intellectual decentralization which I will
attempt to make the "basis" of its pragmatic and positive value, its
using and mixing of historical forms as genres, as a way to
advertize in advance that there is no underlying truth to get at.
Both John Barth (p. 34) and Umberto Eco (p. 57) have been
alluded to as rhetorical writers who see post-modern literature as
the use of traditional forms (genres) of writing in ironic and
displaced ways, who appeal neither to polemical repudiation nor
to imitation of realist or modernist precedents. Nor are they
attempting merely to parody over-privileged and over-used
forms. They may not be interested in reforming the major
achievements of modernism, but their post-modern pluralism is
still committed to the values of craftsmanship and audience, to
(pragmatic) literary practice without absolutes to be transcended
1 Cf. Andreas Huyssen's, "Mapping the Postmodern," New German Critique.
Fall, 1984:5-52 for an attempt to locate the stirrings of the post-modern in
several separate, creative and ununified attacks on Modernist elitism,
academicism and quite puritanical repression in such a way as to not quite
constitute the sort of systematic conceptual tradition which philosophical
aestheticians tend to search out.
2 One of the theoretical dispositions around which modernists tend to rally
is an apocalytic and crisis-centered view of history and aesthetic culture,
the concomitant view that they have identified the "bourgeois causes" of
this "crisis," and that they can overcome it (with the help of the rhetoric of
Nietzsche) by instituting an heroic break with the culture's
historical/aesthetic past. For a good historical summary of how this crisis-
view links modernist aesthetics cf. M. Bradbury's and J. McFarlane's "The
Name and Nature of Modernism" in Modernism, (eds.) Bradbury and
McFarlane, 1976:19-56.
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(in the name of change) or achieved (in the name of a new and
radical truth). In the context of (and by analogy to) this generic
pluralism I will (in section 6.5) compare the analytic (modernist)
and reformist rhetoric of Danto (still after the truth despite
(notwithstanding) his aesthetics of "transfiguration") to the post¬
modern pragmatism of Rorty (in section 6.7), in order to
extrapolate a concluding view as to the way[s] in which one might
generalize (with the help of post-modern aesthetics) about the
genre of philosophy.
Both Lyotard and Habermas are philosophers explicitly engaged in
articulating the stakes of the debate between post-modernists and
modernists, but still doing so in terms of a "crisis" of epistemology.
Lyotard argues that our (intellectual) culture is now "incredulous
towards meta-narratives," and that what has constituted the
modern has been "an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such
as the dialectics of the Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the
emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of
wealth:" i.e., the sustained attempt to "legitimate itself with
reference to a metadiscourse." The alternative (he implies) is to
produce a continuous series of revolutions which cannot be
reabsorbed into another "grand narrative." Habermas, on the
other hand, wants "to preserve at least one standard" by which
some continued critique and emancipatory reform of our social
discourses can proceed and develop, so that the distinction
between "theory" and ideology doesn't lose force. The pragmatist
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attempts to split the difference.3 The pragmatist can also be
incredulous, but he is still interested in critique and reform
precisely because he thinks that it never was on the basis of an
epistemological meta-narrative (or "standard," passim Habermas)
provided by philosophers that critique has ever succeeded; nor is
permanent revolution (a modernist, avant-garde hangover of
Lyotard's) required, and, therefore, an emancipatory (or any
other) narrative obsolete or not "normalizable" (in a provisional
and Kuhnian sense), simply because French post-structuralists
have suddenly discovered the loss of the meta-narrative which
was thought to be required for good critical or normal discourse
felicitously to proceed. To quote Fish quoting Isocrates, "good
discourse is discourse that works."4
In other words, the felicitous alliance between pragmatism (Fish
and Rorty), rhetoric (Isocrates) and post-modern aesthetics (Eco,
for the moment) will suggest that it is on the relativistic "basis" of
pragmatic, generic and stylistic relationships (not epistemology)
that we decide which and how philosophical texts work. To better
establish the analogy between the pluralism of post-modern
aesthetics and the genres of philosophy, I will offer a reading of
the work of Rorty (over and against Danto) and of the music of
Aaron Copland (over and against Adorno and Schonberg, in section
6.4) as pragmatic representatives of an aesthetic/ethic of
production which is neither repetitively bound to nor polemically
3 as Rorty does in "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity," in Habermas
and Modernity, (ed.) Richard Bernstein, 1984:161-175.
4 Fish, "Withholding the Missing Portion: Power, Meaning and Persuasion
in Freud's 'The Wolf-man'," (abbreviated version) TLS. Aug. 29, 1986.
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trying to out-transcend its generic precedents. They represent a
socially engaged aesthetic which is interested in the pluralistic
versatility of writing (composing) for a hybrid (not entirely
consolidated and professionalized) culture which does not
understand itself as unified and all-powerful (the legitimizing
myth of avant-garde adversarial aesthetics), nor as needing to
overthrow and replace all preceding generic frames and styles
with an aesthetic/philosophical oligarchy of mandarin modernists
(the legitimizing strategy of Adorno and Schonberg).
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6.2 POST-MODERN THEMES:
The post-modern is initially and perhaps appropriately a negative
banner in a period, unlike that shared by 19th-century
transcendentalists and empiricists (Recall p. 8.), in which various
philosophical/aesthetic practitioners have not been entirely sure
where they stood, perhaps sure that they were standing, and
comfortably able to stand, in more than one place, and able either
to resent or joyfully ignore the Utopian and mechanized heroics of
Bauhaus "straightforwardness," analytic "simplicity" and/or
serialist rebellion. In effect, they have been acquiring a pluralistic
and relativized relationship to past tradition which Le Corbusier
and Gropius, for example, had ruthlessly attempted to deny. What
occurred was a Jamesian change in aesthetic sentiment. And this
is what Gerald Graffs "The Myth of the Postmodern Breakthrough"
fails to notice.5 Graff collapses 1960's post-modernism either into
a strain of apocalytic desperation or visionary celebration — both
of which are already a part of Modernism. But it is the pragmatic
middle, the casual and ironic which he misses out, a middle not
bitching against an evil orthodoxy but toying with an optional
reservoir of useful technique and exhausted ideology which can
be combined in any number of new and locally relevant ways.
In other words, the post-modern is "highly eclectic," which, for
neo-marxists like Huyssen seems to be a code word for "uncritical
hodgepodge," and which, for critics like Clement Greenberg {the
5 G. Graff, "The Myth of the Postmodern Breakthrough," in Literature
Against Itself. 1979:31-62.
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theoretical high priest of American Modernism), entails a
"lowering of aesthetic standards" due to the very democratization
of art-historical periods. That is, what unsympathetic modernists
are lamenting is the loss of authority (their's), the loss of a clear
hierarchy of aesthetic (ideological) judgement. Whereas, the
positive achievement of this eclecticism is what Charles Jencks has
called post-modernism's "double coding."6 This entails the
construction of hybrids which continue being able to use some of
the old idiom while doing without its foudationalist assumptions.
Like Rorty, it is a post-analytic style which generally appreciates
and welcomes the loss of final authority assumed by one's own
institutional background, treating it more with irony than
defiance. Jencks defines "double coding" as "the combination of
Modern techniques with something else (usually traditional
building) in order for architecture to communicate with the public
and a concerned minority, usually other architects."7 And this,
with little substitution, defines Rorty's work: the combination of
late analytic techniques with something else (usually traditional
pragmatism) in order for philosophy to communicate with a wider
literary public and a concerned minority, usually the philosophical
profession. The effort is to institute more successful and effective
links with the larger cultural environment and with history than
the analytic discourse of Modernism managed.
6 Cf. C. Jencks, The Language of Post-Modern Architecture. 1984 and What is




What links the rhetorician, the pragmatist and the post-modern
aesthete is their pluralism. On the one hand, philosophical
aesthetics has continuously searched for universals (of judgement)
and onto-foundations (of form) to identify art vis-a-vis a more
elevated Philosophy -- the Kantian legacy. On the other hand,
Modernist art theory (since the rise of Dada and early surrealism
up to abstract expressionism) has itself competed with ever more
i
ideologized manifestoes to proclaim their own oppositional
ultimacy. Post-modern aesthetics undermines them both
simultaneously in terms of its explicit commitment to pluralism,
and in a way which has become a provocation also for the rest of
intellectual culture (judging from the increasingly large amount of
literature which feels obliged to make reference to it). Post¬
modern products, by using the results of previous polemics as
rhetorical devices, rhetoricizes itself in the process -- suggesting
that our antecedents are, in end effect, ours; that the
writer/maker might have a number of entirely different
perspectives within his lifetime; indeed, a number of careers
within a single sentence or work itself. (Both Eco and Copland will
be examples of this.)
Take, as Jencks does, James Stirling's addition to the Staatsgalerie
in Stuttgart: his ironic use of classical details, his "Acropolis"
above the indifferent BMW driving by, his parking garage with a
classical base ironically mixing with the necessities of parking
laws. To create holes for legally required ventilation, it appears as
if stones have been punched out and left as "ruins" on the ground,
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revealing not the "insides" of the classical world (marble) but the
steel frames which counter the skin-deep beauty hanging on
them. He juxtaposes genres and styles which the "analytic" beliefs
of the Modernist would have disallowed for the following reasons
of faith: '"truth to materials,' 'logical consistency,'
'straightforwardness,' 'simplicity' -- all the (analytic) values and
rhetorical tropes celebrated by such Modernists as Le Corbusier
and Mies van der Rohe."8 Stirling double codes local function and
architectural-historical commentary, the new and the old, the
practical and the elite, the inside and the outside, (or, as Dewey
put it, the "pragmatic and the experimental, the artistic and the
everyday") without ontological hierarchies being established to
make these otherwise "crucial distinctions." This is an ironic
mixing of use of and criticism of the recent past which resists
ideologizing it as a monolithic advance in art or culture. The post¬
modern product communicates with both popular and professional
signs to an eclectic and pluralistic culture.
It is this pragmatic and pluralistic sentiment of the post-modern
which has encouraged the replacement of single truth with many
genres, using combinatorial metaphors not as ornaments but as its
aesthetic/cultural premise, no longer worrying (like Derrida)
about a unified Tradition of father figures to be fought but, rather,
(like Rorty) nonchalantly avoiding the "problem" when it
constitutes itself in that way. It produces no homogenous
bourgeois "crisis" against which the political crusaders of the
8 Jencks, 1986:18.
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avant-garde develop their counter insurgencies. Nor does it
produce a nihilist "crisis" in art against which the cultural
conservatives of truth construct those worrying deconstructors
who are ransacking the edifice of Modernist accomplishment —
(the genre of "truth"). Post-modernism bids farewell to these
embittered opposites as two unnecessary personages "who have
washed each other's hands for more than a century, a stormy but
enduring mutual accomodation"9 based on the shared vocabulary
of the "crisis of truth." Post-modern vocabularies have
appropriated local vernaculars and regional traditions to offer a
pastiched reading of "the Tradition" as an heroic "side-show"
(Rorty), but containing in this pastiche its own moralistic
narrative. By appealing to genres rather than truth, styles and
narratives rather than grounds or foundations, it is saying that it
"would be better to be frankly ethnocentric" (Rorty),10 to admit
the limits of changing vernaculars without attempting to build a
"cathedral of the future" (Gropius) to house and protect them.
9 Cf. Charles Newman, The Post-Modern Aura. 1985:198.
10 Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity," 1984:166 and 175,
argues that the benefit of a "post-modernist form of social life" is its ability




Post-modern texts, as John Barth has said, are not written in order
to refute Modernism but to democratize and replenish its own
generic possibilities, no longer pretending that the texts of the
art/philosophical world are the trains pulling the rest of culture
but, rather, slippery skateboards trying to pull the train of its own
traditions, more self-mocking of the position of the middle-class
writer no longer able to sustain his romantic and hyperbolic self-
image as the "outsider" in opposition to all the "insides" of
bourgeois rationality11 -- a framing trope which Foucault has
often fallen into. The post-modern writer is, as Rorty suggests,
reestablishing ties to his community by leaving behind the
objectivist pretensions that there was a privileged form of
textuality (say, realism or high-modernist anti-realism) which
separated the writer from his context. And Umberto Eco is an
excellent example of these virtues.
Eco's The Name of the Rose successfully combines the careers of
a
the historical novel and discourses on post-structurlist philosophy
of language, ironically choosing the otherwise dark and sterile
Middle Ages made so unredeemable by Renaissance aesthetes as
the venue for the contemporary, post-modern chase of "the sign."
He borrows the genre of the detective story and transposes
Sherlock Holmes into a witty monk investigating signs (of murder)
which leave no referential trace. The self-parodies of their God-
1 1 Cf. Barth, "The Literature of Replenishment," 1980.
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talk and their juxaposition to original as well as imported
dialogues about signification make it impossible to distinguish the
ar
genuine from the contempory, Occam from Saussure, the
straightforward from the artifice, philosophical disputation from
good 'ol story-telling12 -- mixing the structures of opera-buffa,
Agatha Christie and Aquinas. The book is an allegory about the
Book, about writing, about method, about chasing signs (of
murder) back to the vested interests of the librarian (Jorge, who
himself alludes the writer Jorge Luis Borges); and it is
accomplished by mixing the ironies and paradoxes of medieval
metaphysics and deconstructionist rhetoric. William, the detective
monk-semiotician, finds himself investigating connections
between signs, between genres, between texts and deaths,
between lost pages and censorship, making associations which
produce no order, no system; thereby finding himself in the (post¬
modern) situation of having to imagine possible disorders as
crucial for imagining possible orders, until the final ironic twist.
What Jorge, the culprit, has feared and protected is the second
book of Aristotle and Aristotle's tendency to see laughter as a
force for good, as having instructional value which, like
metaphors, can re-orient and alter perspective. But why fear
Aristotle's reference to the rhetorical power of laughter, especially
Aristotle'si Because, says Jorge, "the divine mystery of the Word
was
12 Eco, Reflections on The Name, of the Rose . 1985, has remarked how often
readers have wrongly identified the quotations from the constructions,
finding that what appear to be Derridean remarks are statements taken out
of original manuscripts and vice versa.
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transformed into a human parody of categories and
syllogism. . . Every word of the Philosopher, by whom now
even saints and prophets swear, has overturned the image
of the world. But he has not succeeded in overturning the
image of God. If this book were to become . . . had become
an object for open interpretation, we would have crossed the
last boundary." But what was frightening in his discussion
of laughter, pursues William. . . "But here, here" [says Jorge,
striking the table] "here the function of laughter is reversed,
it is elevated to art, the doors of the world of the learned are
opened to it, it becomes the object of philosophy, and the
perfidious theology . . . [T]his book could teach learned men
the clever and, from that moment, illustrious artifices that
could legitimatize the reversal, ... an operation of the belly
would be transformed into an operation of the brain. That
laughter is proper to man is a sign of our limitation, sinners
that we are. But from this book many corrupt minds like
yours would draw the extreme syllogism, ... it could strike
the Luciferine spark that would set a new fire to the whole
world, and laughter would be defined as the new art,
unknown even to Prometheus, for canceling fear.
And Jorge continues with echoes back to Gorgias and forward to
Nietzsche and Derrida: "And this book . . . would induce false
scholars to try to redeem
the lofty with a diabolical reversal: through the acceptance
of the base. . . But on the day when the Philosopher's word
would justify the marginal jests of the debauched
imagination, or when what has been marginal would leap to
the center, every trace of the center would be lost." (And
then another twist. By finding reference to Gorgias in
Aristotle's' text, Gorgias is brought off the margin to decenter
Aristotle's own critique, to make Aristotle himself the
threat.) "A Greek philosopher (whom your Aristotle quotes
here, an accomplice and foul auctoritas) said that the
seriousness of opponents must be dispelled with laughter,
and laughter opposed with seriousness; . . . [and] this must
be restrained and humiliated, and intimidated by sternness."
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Then, one more outburst by Jorge (still preparing for Danto) and
William's casual response: "But if one day somebody, brandishing
the words of the . . .
Philosopher and therefore speaking as a philosopher, were
to raise the weapon of laughter to the condition of subtle
weapon, if the rhetoric of conviction were replaced by the
rhetoric of mockery, if the topics of the patient construction
of the images of redemption were to be replaced by the
topics of the impatient dismantling and upsetting of every
holy and ve^nerable image -- oh, that day even you,
William, and all your knowledge, would be swept away!"
"Why? I would match my wit with the wit of others. It
would be a better world than the one where the fire and
red-hot iron of Bernard Gui humiliate the fire and red-hot
iron of Dolcino."
Eco ends the post-modern tale, not surprisingly, without final
resolution, replenishing the different genres used by ironically
mixing them (but not closing them), as humanized and
democratized by laughter -- that which always "distorts the face
of truth." The vehicles of the book vary widely in time and
vernacular style, becoming coherent in the context of their
rhetoricity, double coded for the historical/academic elite, and (by
being narrated by Adso who confesses to not being able to
understand everything, and with whom the reader can, therefore,
identify and feel exonerated for not always following) it is
accessible to the popular reader of intrigue and suspense. (Eco
reports one reader who was "affected" by the sustained allusions
to theological debates as if they were the background "suspense"
music of a Hitchcock movie.) Eco has so many texts off his back
but under his belt (Recall Barth, p. 34.) that the book becomes a
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conversation between books — an ironic plurality of levels
without an omniscient narrator telling us the truth.
6.4 INTERPRETING THE MODERNIST SCORE:
But the modernist worry about (post-modern) plurality is not
simply an (epistemological) argument from "truth"; it is also an
argument which makes appeal to the (political) "necessities" of
cultural history. The rhetoric of the modern is, in Schonberg's
case, the search for a single code, entirely elite, which can throw
off his back the weight of the entire tonal tradition of Western
music. It is primarily the belief in necessary and irreconcilable
oppositions: again, an aesthetic and a Philosophy coincide to
produce an inexorable authority. In 1936 Schonberg wrote:
"Supposing times were normal — normal as they were before
1914 — then the music of our time would be in a different
situation." One can easily see and accept that cultural upheaval
and controversy are central to the significance of Schonberg's
music, and that the ritual riot with which the Viennese received
modern(ist) works is part of the aesthetic polemic of Schonberg's
locality; but he goes on to write (about the George songs) that he
was already by 1910 . . . "conscious of having broken through
every restriction of a bygone aesthetic; . . . (And, with echoes of
Zarathustra.) I feel now how hotly even the least of
temperaments will rise in revolt, and suspect that even those who
have so far believed in me will not want to acknowledge the
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necessary nature of this development. . . I am being forced in this
direction. . . I am obeying an inner compulsion which is stronger
than any upbringing."13 Notice the classical oppositions: inner
versus outer, internal "compulsion" versus external "upbringing;"
in other (older) words we can hear again the (neoplatonic) refrain
which Isocrates had rejected: phvsis versus nomos — nature
versus civilization. Schonberg appeals to nature in order to crush
tradition; while, to his opponents, he broke the "natural laws of
music" in the name of an artificial system. Both sides trade on the
rhetorical reversability of the dichotomy; for both have the need
to naturalize and universalize their view as the technique of
legitimization. It is the cultural career of this philosophical/
aesthetic coincidence which (I will argue) Copland's work (for one)
helped make an expendable and unnecessarily inhibiting rhetoric
with which to develop a post-romantic genre of music (and of
writing about music).
There was, of course, a great deal of interdependence of modernist
rebellion. Per Blaue Reiter. the document of German
Expressionism (coordinating the work of Kirchner, Nolde, Klee and
Kandinsky, for example) included nearly as many articles on
music, as well as facsimile manuscripts by Webern and Berg, and
discussions of Skryabin by Schonberg. And Schonberg thought of
himself for some time as a painter. It was the political imagery of
13 Cited by Charles Rosen, Arnold Schoenberg. 1981:5,6, who is citing Willi
Reich, Arnold Schoenberg: A Critical Biography. 1971:49 — a certainly
more adulatory than critical account. My account also refers to
Schonberg's Style and Idea. 1950, and Adorno's philosophical/aesthetic
apologetics in Philosophy of Modern Music. 1973.
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rebellion and revolution which unified these movements, a
rebellion as much against "nature" as "convention" precisely
because "nature" was seen through conventions. The two were
appealed to as different and as interchangeable enemies precisely
because no firm distinction could be found and sustained. What
eventually did order the attack on "convention" was its association
with what presently pleased a public toward which the
modernists had a latent hostility. The Baroque, classical and
romantic genres couldn't be borrowed from because they became
lumped together as one paradigm which the conspiratorially
complacent bourgeoise found accessible. (As we will see, Copland
exchanged the post-1914 anxiety and aestheticized hysteria of the
modernists for an easier and less monistic relationship to the
tradition.)
Reviewing the cultural polemic is crucial for understanding why
and how the ontological vocabulary used to justify or attack these
new musical conventions acquired the pragmatic function it did.
The development of Wagner's chromaticism and Brahms'
asymmetrical phrasing became, after 1908, a total chromaticism
which was linked to the need to express extreme emotional states.
(Cf. [or, listen to] the interrelationship between atonality and the
nightmare of Erwartung.) In other words, there is a relationship
(intensified by modernists) between culture (in "crisis"), emotion
and musical technique which is not ontologically different from,
but a conventional extension of, the themes of romanticism. What
makes the philosophical/aesthetic context pragmatic is the failure
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of a naturalistic or onto-foundational vocabulary to deal with the
changing, but for that reason, persistent links between music,
emotion, technique and culture. The post-Wagnerian "breakdown"
of Western harmony was the breakdown of a convention in
conflict with another convention, a breakdown (or tension)
implied in Wagner himself and exacerbated by the public as well
as "private" (artistically and communally angst-ridden) mood of
an anxious culture, a culture which looked to and responded to the
products and socially implicated images its artworld produced in
very detailed political and economic ways. Recognizing the very
mixed generative conditions which produced this music, and,
indeed, due to the reaction it provoked, entails recognizing the
reciprocal looping (as Dewey wrote) "of the complex relations
between art, culture and experience."
Parenthetically, my polemic here is aimed against essentially
three different styles of doing Anglo-American (primarily
analytic) aesthetics. 1. The Danto/Dickie "artworld"-concept: This
is far too vague, formal and thin a notion to be able to
accommodate the complex and twisting context of social relations
that arise in modernist and post-modernist communities. The
"artworld" is a concept which (certainly counters attempts to
ground the aesthetic in purely sensory terms, but which)
"analytically" circles in on itself (conceptually) without making
contact with the "synthetically" political, economic and ideological
relations within which the "institution of the artworld" functions
when attributing or denying "status" (Dickie) to works — works
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themselves made within and "referring" to a plurality of different
and competing communities of practitioners, who criticize and/or
solicit non-artworld institutions and markets in a variety of
(aesthetically) relevant ways.14 In other words, the "artworld" is
still being written within the genre of formalistic concept-
aesthetics.
2. The Langer, Goodman symbol orientation: This more
fundamentally formalist approach attempts to determine either
"what an art work represents, expresses and exemplifies by
determining what symbol system it is to be fitted into"
(Goodman); or by determining the symbolic nature of art by
empty semiotic comparison with (opposition to) "propositionally
representational language" (Langer). Again, as different as Langer
and Goodman are in some respects, their abstractions are based on
over-straining the ability of a formalistic analogy with language to
do any work whatever in assessing the varied and relevant ways
in which the different arts interrelate ideologically to each other
(in ways not captured by their notational "identities" and
differences); nor has the abstract "symbol system" approach an
apparatus which can chart the social relations which modernist
and post-modernists have themselves (intentionally) made
relevant to their enterprise.
3. More specifically regarding music and syntax-driven theories:
The neo-Kantian tradition of writing about music, from Eduard
14 For an elaboration of this point, cf. Waartofsky, M. W., "Art, Artworlds,
and Ideology," J. of Aesth. and Art Criticism. Spring, 1980:239-248.
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Hanslick, Deryck Cooke and Leonard Meyer to the analytic
philosopher Malcolm Budd,15 sets up and endorses a dualistic
vocabulary or frame to distinguish (ontologically) the inside from
the outside, the syntax from the semantics, the structure from the
social meaning and interpretation and experience of music. Neo-
Kantian contemplation is set against emotional response
(Hanslick), the intramusical is set against the extramusical
experience (Meyer), i.e., the "intrinsic" is distinguished from the
"extrinsic" (Budd). All of the above are attempts at separating
music (as "form") from an historical and social context. Budd,
most recently (Music and the Emotions. 1985), although carefully
rebutting the weaknesses of these grand onto-narratives, simply
ends up eulogising the "intrinsically musical" in a way which
functions primarily to reaffirm a philosophical idiom which
utterly neglects the history of music, music theory and music
criticism. In effect, he "clearly" rebuts their "arguments," and is
convincingly suspicious of their ontological and linguistic
analogues, but his own analysis functions equally well to
disembody music and separate it from criticism and history. That
is, his "interest is philosophical, not historical." Thus he too goes
on to use an ontological idiom to gloss historical myopia: By
identifying what is "inherently rewarding" in music, he simply
presupposes a traditional tonal canon, treats the complex
paradigmatic changes in music as uncontroversial and
"philosophically" irrelevant, and he adopts the unacknowledged
Cf., Hanslick, The Beautiful in Music. 1891, (1957 edition), Cooke, The
Language of Music. 1959, Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music. 1956, and
Music. The Arts. And Ideas. 1969, and Budd's refereeing of these (amongst
other) positions, Music and the Emotions. 1985.
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romantic formulation of the "inherent" and emotionally
"innermost" resonance of music as that which is philosophically
"analytic" in the "nature" of music. In other words, these three
styles of analytic aesthetics are formalistic, ahistorical and unable
to connect with the socially burdened theories which have so
preoccupied art and our experience of art since the rise of
modernism. They appeal to a socially "autonomous" genre of
philosophy as a way to write about art which is itself a
thoroughgoing critique of this "autonomy."
In extending the language analogy to music, in attempting to
uncover a stable notational syntax, this form of methodological
formalism has bypassed what it is that has changed, and how
precipitous the whole question of such stability was in the cultural
circumstances of Schonberg. The point is that the "language" of
music is not in the notation simply or even primarily; it is in the
experience (interpretation, reading or whatever) of the traditional
schema ("language") of harmony. And it was indeed this musical
system which was experienced in radically different ways, which
was used and transformed fundamentally within single works. It
might even require a long period of time (years, in most people's
case) of listening before this new "language" can be accepted as a
different and competing paradigm over and against that which
has previously been considered as the organizational "basis" of its
predecessor. But, the values of atonal music -- in its rhythm,
dissonance, tone color, accent — and the non-notational cultural
anxiety which suffused them are not traceable in the formalistic
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preoccupations of aesthetics when it continues transposing
historical changes in music into linguistic/syntactic structures.
With atonality comes music "based" precisely on the instability of
a system of values (Recall Nietzsche.), of given units of meaning.
The instability of the traditional categories of musical
understanding is one of the goals of such music. And without this
minimal requirement that the musical/cultural intention of
modernist music be grasped, the general ontological identity of
music sought by aestheticians will remain an irrelevant
"achievement," out of touch with the traditions they intend to talk
about.I6
The traditional "semiotics" of scales, arpeggios, of harmonically
related materials, the "semiotics" of all the traditionally "given"
units of musical construction were given up for short, highly
expressive miniatures, put together note by note to make wholes
which, when heard as such, had no syntax, no single organizational
principle. The logic or anti-logic of such work is incomprehensible
without being aware of the "non-musical" ethos of "crisis" which
attended the (especially European, even more especially German)
modernist music of the early part of this century. That these
16 The desire to locate underlying notational identities and syntactic
structures out of the context of the varying intentions of contingent and
emergent his^rical/aesthetic communities is a gripe which Margolis has
continuously put to Goodman and to the semiotics of music generally; and I
think rightly so. Margolis has also made some sort of pragmatic
rapprochement with Wittgenstein's and Adorno's commitment to the
context of (artistic) "praxis" as important in assessing intentional
dimensions to the "semiotics" of modern art. In other words, {passim
syntax-driven theories of art vis-a-vis Wittgenstein and Adorno) "[Tjhere
can be no hierarchical relationship between practices and the would-be
rules of practices." Cf. Margolis' "On the Semiotics of Music," 1984:13, an
unpublished essay, so far a I know.
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ideological and political polarizations, along with a party-political
avant-garde, have been largely absent from much American
modernism, is one reason why a more pragmatic (occasionally
complacent) post-modern aesthetic was more quickly developed
by Copland. As dissonance (and fragmentation) might be the
primary modernist metaphor (Adorno), as was consonwance (and
unity) the metaphor of 18th-century aesthetics, their mixture
(pluralistically) is the order (-disorder) of the day with respect to
the post-modern, and with its relationship to tradition, culture
and technique. This plurality is achievable by playing on the
pragmatic (that is, non-foundational) semiotic and syntactical
looseness of these relations, a looseness which the post-modern
artworlds. have found much more productively beneficial and
obvious to themselves than have the philosophical aestheticians
busy chasing syntactic "laws."17
The argument here is that the relevance of one-concept aesthetics
(everything is "beautiful," "expressive," "significant form," "part of
a syntactic structure," etc.) is generated by a genre of philosophy,
17 Typical of such analytic excess is Beardsley, who writes that "we have no
warrant for taking a musical composition to refer to anything at all outside
itself . . . , there is no such thing as interpreting music." (in Beardsley, The
Aesthetic Point of View. 1982:182.) Francis Sparshott is also attracted by the
global power of semiotic generalization, telling us that sound is either a
sign (which "we need to attend to") or a symbol ("designed for attention").
He takes one step closer to history than Saussure in that (unlike Saussure)
he is interested less in "ideal languages" than in actual historical and social
"praxis;" but he still presumes that there is, in some relevant sense, some
embracing and underlying "system" of which these practices are a part.
Sparshott, The Theory of the Arts. 1982:18. But contrast Beardsley's "there
is no such thing as interpreting music" with the musicologist Charles
Rosen's view that interpretation and criticism are "at the center of the
work of art:" in Rosen's "The Ruins of Walter Benjamin," 1977:32. Rosen is
of course starting here where most analytic musicologists stop: with
modernism.
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promoting a philosophical interest already deconstructed by the
artworlds it attempts to assimilate. Calling art expressive is a
trivial truth presented as a philosophical achievement which does
not and cannot ask what the expressive differences are between
the many aesthetic rhetorics brought into opposition (by
modernists) or mixed together (by post-modernists). Nor is
consonance and the "liberation of dissonance" (Schonberg) a new
structural discovery. For they will both, like the other distinctions
which have been mentioned (inside/outside, intrinsic/extrinsic)
be debated about in specific historical moments, and constituted
in those different cultural moments. And needless to say,
prevailing conventions of what is consonant and/or dissonant,
what is intrinsic and/or extrinsic, what is syntactically or
semantically relevant to music have varied radically in different
cultures, and have been decided upon not by the physics of the
human ear, or the "laws of nature," or a prioristic philosophy, but
in traditions of practice. Nor are the notions of "practice," "style"
and "rhetoric" ontological notions. On the contrary, they are used
to discourage the constitution of a philosophical genre which goes
hunting for (or uses aesthetics as a genre to go hunting for)
foundations which ontologically structure the arts, and/or sustain
them as one single entity capturable by a philosophy so inclined.
Rather, it seems that a study of the intentional changes (especially
since the advent of modernism) of the various arts ought to have
the reciprocally persuasive power to convince philosophy to give
up this endeavor.
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As disruption (of "structures" or conventions) and dissonance
became large scale (and totalizing) devices for modernists, post¬
modernists were led to pluralize, mix and ironize these
conventions. And as generic stability is no longer the goal of such
products, it becomes all the more dubious to treat any one
stability or genre or convention as analytic to all of them. The
rhetoric of music (including its social/contextual dimensions)
would seem a more appropriate critical "category" to apply than
the "semiotics" or "structure" of music in the same way as it has
been in the previous chapters regarding texts and their lack of a
groundable structure.18 That is, talking of the arts in terms of
their rhetorics implies a post-structuralist plurality which makes
the "achievement" of a "deeper" philosophical generality already
redundant. It implies, as Dewey wrote, that to art, like
philosophy, criticism is more relevant than ontological pigeon¬
holing. What links our previous discussion, of dialectic and its
18 There is at present a significant shift in musicology away from analytic
musicology ("Just study the score.") to musicology interested in the history
of ideas, rhetoric and criticism. (J. Kerman's Musicologv. 1985, charts such
a course generally; and R. Subotnik, "Musicology and Criticism," 1982, does
so more specifically.) In this regard, the notion of rhetoric is being taken
up in primarily two senses: 1. Rather than aligning music with some
ontological theory about its autqmous and hermetic structure, it is being
considered as a. social discourse, as a persuasive idiom, as cognitive,
symbolic and communicative as any other art. 2. Musicologists are
unearthing historical interconnections between composers musical
sketches and their readings of specific rhetorical texts and constructs,
inquiring into the possible "correlation between rhetorical analogies and
compositional principles." (Cf. Maniates, "Applications of the History of
Ideas," 1982:47.) On specific rhetorical readings of music, cf. Maniates,
"Music and Rhetoric: Faces of Cultural History in the Renaissance and the
Baroque," 1982; on the proximity of rhetorical concepts and the historical
vitality of the fugue, cf. Butler, G. G., "Fugue and Rhetoric," 1977:49-109, and
also Butler's "Music and Rhetoric in Early 17th-century English Sources,"
1980:53-64; and on the "intra-musical" and "extra-musical" clues left by
Bach as to his relationship to Quintilian's views on symbolic devices, cf.
Kirkendale, U., "The Source for Bach's Musical Offering," 1980:99-141.
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battle with rhetoric, of foundationalism and its battle with
pragmatism, structuralism with post-structuralism, and
modernism with post-modernism (Stirling and Eco), is the lack of
a fixed key to unlock the one structure or the true and right
interpretation. What all the latter proponents in the
aforementioned battles have in common (and what the post¬
modern raises to a goal) is the positive use one can make of
putting different keys together (in the same work) for a variety of
(rhetorical) purposes.
Again, with respect to music, even the "atomic" unit of the note is
no longer ultimately stable. (Strauss is known to have worried
that the growing virtuosity of the modern professionalized
orchestra would give an undesired clarity to passages composed to
sound not discreet but sweeping and technically blurred. And
contemporary jazz, especially improvisational jazz, continues
(unbeknownst to much analytic musicology) to function without
scores, without sustaining a demonstrable "identity" of a "work"
between performances, always treating the "note" as a metaphor
for musical use and experiment.) Tonality too, becomes not a
"given" but a quotation of an expendable idiom. And post-modern
music does quote and reconstruct the tonal genre without the all-
or-nothing polemic which obsessed Schonberg and his group. Due
primarily to the political metaphorics within which it was
discussed, tonality was a "tyranny" which either would pull one all
the way into its "system" or should be destroyed altogether.
Schonberg considered any reference to tonality as an hypocritical
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compromise. Whereas, those less tied to modernist "theory"
(Britten, Copland) found their expression enhanced by the
retention of old and new musical rhetorics without the modernist
moralizing. (Adorno became even more uncompromising than
Schonberg in this regard, adopting a completely mandarin
dogmaticism regarding the allowable values of music. Primarily
for neo-marxist ideological reasons, there was to be no
compromise with a musical rhetoric which would give it
accessibility to the "Kulturindustrie.")
The point to all this decentering and disruption of musical
convention was that the new work would lose its critical power
and experimental value if it offered a centering point of reference
which could be appealed to and appropriated by "bourgeois
culture." It was an attempt to prevent any motif from becoming
the point of reference by which the others could be understood.
The worry was, like Lyotard's critique of metanarratives still, that
any provisional narrative center or order would be a damning
compromise with repression and illegitimate masters. And it is
precisely this which pushed Schonberg into three forms of
pragmatic inconsistency. The first was the practical problem of
producing large scale and more heroic forms to compete with the
tradition when the ideology of composition was to produce totally
expressive, intense miniatures which were completely saturated
for the sake of a fierce aesthetic explosion. The second pragmatic
inconsistency was the paradoxical tyranny the critique of tyranny
took on. The miniature allowed one total control over the form,
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leaving nothing to spontaneity or improvisation. The
improvisational democracy of jazz was unthinkable. Order
returned as the obsession of the atonal and serialist composer.
And thirdly, the formation of the "Society for the Private
Performance of Music" (as part of the critique of the pressures of
commercialism, of the public and its "culture industry") was an
attempt to cut off precisely those pressures which produced the
P
rapid development of a less supressed and more experimental
secular music from Bach to Schonberg. In other words, it is in the
context of these pressures that the notion of musical obsolescence
and development (which Schonberg depended upon) became built
into the arts. The attempt to go private sustained the pretense
that art transcended social utility, and it sustained the
contradiction that it could later feed a market which wants of
course only that which wasn't produced merely for the purpose of
consumption in the first place. And in this regard too, the post¬
modern has adopted a different aesthetic/commercial strategy.
The commercial substratum to the production of the arts is a
relationship to the public which post-moderns handle with more
irony, democracy and positive, constructive acceptance. Without
producing an answer to the dilemmas this relation entails, there is
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an acceptance of the working connection between the aesthetic
and other public discourses.19
It was the transition from the atonal to the serialistic technique
which helped solve the problem of generating larger forms. On
the basis of the formalistic rigor demanded by the twelve tone
row, Schonberg could compose with the bauhaus purity of a
sterilized structure, in terms of an unbreakable "rule of
derivation." But Schonberg, for example in the Suite for Piano,
opus 25, could also demonstrate great suppleness with the
technique, allowing him also to recapture classical forms. The
series bridged the atonal gap to the tradition as a sort of
"transformational grammar" which allowed for change and
development within a piece. But he and his technique were still
chauvinistically opposed to the rising success of Russian and
French music; and the enmity between the Neoclassicism of Paris
(Stravinsky) and the serialism of Vienna (Schonberg) is well
known.20 But it was Copland who broke down the "theoretical"
19 I don't wish to let the post-modernists off the commercialist hook: The
relationship especially of architects to their (usually corporate) sponsors is
certainly ambivalent; and it is not entirely irrelevant that they design and
produce more corporate headquaters than low income housing, more banks
than public toilet?. But the other side is the less hostile and authoritarian
relationship they tend to engender between the aesthetic "codes" of the
profession and accomodating the desires of the local client. The architect I.
M. Pei's Peking Hotel in Fragrant Hills is an example of an attempt to
accomodate Modernist technique, early Renaissance and Chinese
vernacular traditions. (Cf. Jencks, 1984:156.) And about his relationship to
his clients, he has said (in a pubic radio interview) "they deserve 40% of
the credit" — an unthinkable relationship (or ratio) to the Modernist. For a
view which puts post-modern architecture under much critical pressure to
perform an ameliorative function of political resistance, cf. Kenneth
Frampton's "Towards a Critical Regionalism: Six Points for an Architecture
of Resistance," in The Anti-Aesthetic, (ed.) H. Foster, 1983.
20 Cf. Perspectives on Schoenberg and Stravinsky, (eds.) Boretz and Cone,
1972.
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opposition by combining both styles as rhetorics not incompatible
"truths." What Copland more freely exploited was the many
functions of tonality which could be used within the confines of
serialism, and, thereby, providing an eclectic way to refer to the
tradition, to reestablish links by using modernist dogma as a
useful genre in the production of mixed-genre works.
Serialism wrote itself into paradox (not unlike Derrida has done).
Schonberg also felt the need to see himself as preserving what he
was transmuting in such a radical way. By totalizing "the
Tradition" and totalizing the need to escape it, but wanting to
remain internal to its development as its necessary and logical
outcome, he suffered the difficult consequences which the
"violence" of this I-want-to-be-outside-inside paradox produces.
Schonberg was obsessed with the idea of a "single source" for
music, believing that "the Tradition" had in essence only one.
Schonberg produced the myth of "the Tradition" and then the
need to offer his own replacement, the series, "pure form," the
new and single generative source. The aesthetic spinoffs of this
foundational quest were of course many and important works.
Schonberg did manage to provide new conventions and the
possibility of a radically altered form or idiom, indeed to satisfy
non-musical feelings which were not dualistically separated from
the musical forms which they entered. Schonberg, too, offered a
totalizing reading of the tradition. But it is Copland who, in
comparison, pragmatizes the interpretation of the score, who
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reads the variety of musical genres in the most pluralistic and
non-hierarchical way.
6.5 INTERPRETING POST-MODERN SCORES:
The post-modernist rereads his traditions; and performing a re¬
reading is not unlike the work of performing a piece of music. An
"historical" (exegetical) performance of Bach is not a copy, it is not
truer than a contemporary one. The score and the music are not
merely dependent on the old instruments (and his keyboard work
is probably less so (dependent) than, say, Monteverdi's or
Scarlatti's). And the music, and its dynamic (rather than static)
array of aesthetic/musical values, will be enriched by both styles
of interpretation. Likewise, one cannot wholly represent Plato's
text (i.e., read him in a bygone Athens) any more than one could
(or must) carry around the historical marble hall and harpsichord
to represent Bach. On a physical/instrumental level,
representation is impossible, the post-modernist adds that it is not
desirable.
The dense contrapuntal structure of a Bach fugue may receive
different color (or rhetorical tone) on a different instrument (i.e.,
on a piano as opposed to an organ), as may a text when read and
cpnterpointed with a contemporary interest (as opposed to an
"historical" disinterest). Indeed, it may make the "text" or piece
more "successful" when played on different (critical) instruments.
Bach's A minor Fantasy ("Prelude") may be more "successful," (or
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appreciably different) when played on a piano rather than a
harpischord; as might a Platonic text when re-played less as a
piece of Philosophical Epistemology than as an innovative
dialectical art, or perhaps a treatise on education, or (as Dewey
suggested) as a piece on political utopianism. Such critical
transcriptions of works can help and/or impede interpretation,
but judging this is not done by comparing the interpretation to
the "real voice itself." It depends on the particular performance.
Did Bach's transcription get Vivaldi "right," or Busoni Bach? Did
Dewey get Plato "right," or Rorty Dewey? The text "itself" does not
adjudicate between these possibilities. And there are no a priori
rules to follow which will guarantee the legitimacy of one
performance over the other. Reading and writing, quotation and
criticism cannot be literal re-readings or re-writings any more
than note for note renditions of a score can be. Successful
performances depend on the range of conventionally accepted
variations which these things always entail; there are changes in
the material instruments (the objects used), in location (the place
played — be it church, lecture hall or pub), and changes with
respect to the contextual interest in, and function of (why play it
now) a performance. In effect, in the arts we have performance
traditions, in the sciences research traditions, and in philosophy
and literature critical/exegetical traditions. These "things," these
discourses change (and have good reason to), and with them the
"things themselves."
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For Dewey, the text, the building, the painting, the dance and the
music are not "things:" they are media embodying communicative
relations. And Aaron Copland is a pragmatic/composer case in
point. His art was not a "modernist" polarization of old and new
with structural pre-scriptions of what form the new was to take.
Nor was it a late-modernist dualism which took the same "crisis"
of the old "structure" for granted and opted for an anti-structure
(Cage) and "the play of surfaces." His ability to use the technical
formalism (analytic serialism) of the profession and the melodic
vernacular of the "common man" was not, as Leonard Bernstein
has called it, a musical "Manichean dualism." On the contrary,
Copland attempted to undermine these dualisms: between, for
example, neo-European abstraction (Schonberg) and the American
folk song (Foster), between over-determined structure and
improvisational Jazz, between the "progressive" compositional
ideologies of a professional elite and popular social functions. (He
wrote austerely with European harmonies and the freedoms of
Jazz in, for example, the "Piano concerto" of 1927.) His art has had
no single location nor formed a single unitary text. His art, too, is
not dualistic but "double coded for different taste cultures"
(Jencks).
Unlike the more rhetorical exorbitations of modernist/
postmodernist debate, Copland wrote: "I felt that it was worth the
effort to see if I couldn't say what I had to say in the simplest
possible terms."21 In other words, neither his art nor his aesthetic
21 Copland, A., "Composer from Brooklyn," in Our New Music. 1941.
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theory was an attempt (stylistically) to overburden every bar or
every sentence. This was not a relaxing of the "high standards" of
the aesthete (contra Greenberg, p. 239) but an awareness of
specific social functions, and the role of practical media: He
composed for the radio ("Music for Radio"), for schools ("Outdoor
Overture"), movies ("North Star", etc.), and for ballet ("Rodeo",
etc.). These were not primarily "modernist" conceptual and meta-
theoretical commentaries on the "nature" of the genre "itself."
They were generically mixed for specific use (and even for non¬
professional performance; e.g., "Second Hurricane"). This contrasts
also with Schonberg's Society for the Private Performance of
Music: Copland had different musical rhetorics, all of them public,
with no single ontology or masternarrative of music to constrain
its functions. Rather than a private society, he helped found the
American Composers Alliance as a support structure for new
work; and he helped organize a music press for publishing
"unprofitable" music.
To compose during the Depression (no more or less than any other
period) meant that politics and economics were not anti-aesthetic
(rhetorics or) experiential concerns easily effaced by a
philosophical/aesthetic tradition of "disinterest" (Kant). For
Copland, the "common man" still could be the subject and
beneficiary of art; an art not categorically removed (or
removeable) from the New Deal humanism and liberal idealism of
his day; (an art, therefore, which could be suspiciously close to a
sentimental patriotism and to the Rotarian rhetorical aspirations
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associable with his "Lincoln Portrait").22 But his local contribution
did not become a metaphor for a global mythology of music
(Wagner) or a melancholia of lost causes (Adorno). Copland's
idiom changed and remained flexible. It had no single (totalizing)
platform (like the True and Rational) and supported no static
demarcation between the ("internal") score and the ("external")
world, between the artistic and the useful, the ideal and the real,
the given and the interpreted. His art disabused us of the need to
call upon any dualism to lend the support required of such
architectonics.
22 Cf. Berger, A., Aaron Copland. 1953:esp. pp.27-29.
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6.6 A DEFENCE OF "TRUTH" OR A DEFENCE OF GENRE?:
But Arthur Danto, a philosophical aesthetician, is still wanting to
write within an analytic performance tradition: where local
contributions to art are redeemed by their participation in a
global mythology of "truth;" where philosophy, depjsite its generic
and historical variety, is still searching for this one legitimizing
platform, requiring a firm demarcation between the given and the
interpreted; where one ought to be worried that the canon which
has so valiantly sought to support this endeavor is in serious
danger of being desacrilized by the "frivolous sadism of the
deconstructionist;" and where one is still convinced that "the
artworld" (in general) is in need of this genre of philosophy to
explain its relationship to "the world" (in general). It is this sort
of straight man whom the post-modernist parodies. But let us
play along.
1. The protection of a genre: Danto writes: "Considering what has
been happening to texts when treated in recent times, our canon
seems suddenly fragile, and it pains the heart to think of them
enduring the frivolous sadism of the deconstructionist. . . — these
unedifying violations."23 Then consider the very revealing
analogy Danto offers of submitting philosophy to a literary
23 Danto, "Philosophy as/and/or Literature," 1985:64. The irony of Danto's
appeal to save philosophy from becoming "mere" rhetoric with such an
appeal to pathos (which "pains the heart") is enhanced when one recalls
that Danto's plea is presented not first and foremost within a distancing and
proof-oriented text, but as an oral and highly dramatic performance for
the Eightieth Annual Eastern meeting of the American philosophical
Association, December 28, 1983. I will develop this point further in the
following pages.
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(relativizing) style of reading: "the comparable perspective of the
Bible-as-literature." What Danto regrets, like Eco's Jorge, is the
transition from reading for truth to reading the text as text, as a
powerful "kind of drama." He is concerned that in reading it as
narrative rather than truth, "some fundamental relationship to the
book will have changed when it sustains transfer to the
curriculum as 'living literature'." Whereas the pragmatic, post¬
modern point is not only that this "transfer" has already taken
place (vis-a-vis the Bible) but also that it is a positive
achievement that style and "laughter can distort the face of truth."
But for Danto, being left with Eco's William to "match his wit"
without recourse to "the truth in all possible worlds" is clearly not
good enough. For "no one could conceivably be interested in
participating in the form of life defined by the literary form in
issue [philosophy], were it not believed that this is the avenue to
philosophical truth."24 (Oh! Is that so?)
2. Truth over style: No one could accuse Danto of not being
sensitive to style or of not being keenly aware of the varieties of
genres which constitute "the canon:" aphorisms and summae,
pensees and Ho Izw eg e, Grammatologies, Genealogies and
Unscientific Postscripts, to mention only some of those he has
mentioned and commented upon. What makes Danto so sly is his
ability to appeal so competently to this varriety as a way to
criticize philosophers who have a "reduced concept of reading,"
24 Ibid., p. 66. (Recall Abrams' parallel "If I can't do it all, I don't want to
play" response, on p. 194 n.37, to the same deconstructionist enemy and the
interpretational relativism he flaunts.)
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while doing so in a way which doesn't allow the category of style
to get near enough the philosophical center "to stultify the
aspiration to truth."
3. Ontology versus the literary: Nor could one accuse Danto of
consigning all literary fiction to falsehood or of believing that
assessing literature against a philosophical concept of reference
("fictive reference") is the only route by which "literature derives
what intellectual dignity philosophy can bestow."25 But it is again
the very criticism — of "the extravagant ontological imagination of
semantical theorists in proposing things for fictive terms to
designate"26 — which Danto uses as an ironic stimulus to do better
ontology. For, after all, it is to "the credit of this enterprise that it
at least believes some connection between literature and the
world is required."27 And, presumably, philosophy is still that
elevated arbiter who holds the literary in its left hand and "the
world" in its right in order to explain to the rest of us the fit. In
other words, Danto is still operating with a very subtle dualism
between scheme and content, text and world, between the
analytic and the synthetic; i.e., he is still separating rhetoric and
truth with an evaluative rhetoric which passes out complements
of "credit" for what a group "believes" without explaining either
who's worried about the "connection between literature and the
world" or what makes philosophy that special (epistemological)
genre which will reestablish the "link" by showing us "the truth."
25 Ibid., p. 68.
26 Ibid., p. 69.
27 Ibid., p. 70.
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In effect, Danto is a foundationalist at heart who appeals to the
aesthetic as a clever justification for remaining so: and his view of
the concept of intertextuality points this out.
4. The world versus the text: Danto sets up the polemic between
himself and the "deconstructionist" as a contrast between two
views: a. that "reference to the world works together with
references to other art," versus b. the "intertextualist" view that
all literature (or art), "just so far as it is literature, [is] about
nothing" (Flaubert), that is, nothing "external to itself."28 But
Danto's ire has led him to miss the rhetorical (meta-philosophical)
point being made by his opponent; and he has simultaneously
demanded of himself an epistemological demonstration to justify
his position. In other words, the deconstructionist "argument" is,
firstly, not that literature is about nothing, but that it is not about
something given (not written) which onto-philosophy will reveal
to us without itself having produced its own text within a
tradition of texts or genres at the same time. And secondly, for
Danto to give his own contrast between text and world force, he is
beholden to show us how it is that he knows how to detect the
difference: and the epistemology required is not forthcoming. But
thirdly and more elusively, Danto's appeal that we "need" a
vocabulary that will order our productions into their "distinct
ontological locations" (without himself providing the goods)
Although Danto does not say explicitly to whom he is referring, it
appears from the references that Geoffrey Hartman is the "representative"
fall-guy for deconstruction.
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highlights the rhetorical nature of his own appeal for a distinctly
"philosophical" (non-literary) project.
And art gets pulled in to support the same project. That is, for
Danto, art is bound to produce philosophical problems. Danto
rightly, I think, credits Duchamp with success at having persuaded
us (Danto says "discovered") "that nothing the eye can reveal will
arbitrate the difference between a work of art and a mere real
thing which resembles it in every outward particular." But just
when the post-modernist successor to Duchamp might be
expecting the follow up to this point to be something like: "That
(Duchamp's) was a good way to criticise some stayed conventions,
by mixing those two genres together -- the (anti-) aesthetic and
the practical, by mixing the conventions of the gallery and loo.
One might suppose that philosophy too is a conventional genre
which could do with some sacrilegious mixing." Danto says, rather,
that there is something "deeper" going on: Duchamp rattled the
artworld "by proving that the problem was philosophical." The
post-modern is saying quite the contrary: Duchamp played off
one set of conventions against another. The contrast between
aesthetic objects and "mere things" doesn't require a meta-genre
called philosophy to show us what a problem we have: the
differences involved are questioned and/or resolved
pragmatically. In other words, Danto is struggling to find in art a
real live philosophical dilemma which would distinguish in some
principled way the difference between what critics do from what
philosophers do, between what artists do and what philosophers
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tell them they've done: and it is the "truth" which "constitutes"
the difference.
How does Danto support the "difference?" Firstly, by confessing;29
"[m]y own view is that philosophy wants to be more than
universal; it wants necessity as well: truth for all the worlds that
are possible."30 What could be more imaginative? But what Danto
wants philosophy to want isn't itself a strong enough "truth" to
perform the needed service of distinguishing between "all worlds"
and the ones contingent communities write into being (with texts);
it is not strong enough to distinguish his own rhetoric of
"necessity" from just more rhetoric. But why is Danto so loyal to
this single view of the philosophical genre? Why does he submit
himself to the epistemological failure his own distinctions force
upon him. Why is it good enough for literature and art to be
valued as "transfigurative,"31 while philosophy should be exempt
from such self-confessed rhetorical power? "Literature is, . . .
(Danto writes), transfigurative, and in a way which cuts across the
distinction between fiction and truth." But this complement to the
versatility of art is a backhanded way of implying that philosophy
can separate out for us fiction and truth, with a rhetoric which
doesn't "cut across" the distinction between transfiguring and
29 One might here recall the long tradition of referring to oneself as a
rhetorical trope to write about a knowledge which transcends the self,
from Isocrates through Descartes to the present.
30 Ibid., p. 77.
3^ Danto, in The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art.
1981, has argued as clearly and persuasively as anyone for the
"philosophical" importance of the view that art is transfigurative rather
than "imitational." It is precisely because he has done away with the
imitational view that it is so difficult to understand what philosophy does if
not transfigure. Imitate?
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mirroring. That is, for philosophy to avoid tranfiguring, it must be
able to mirror, to "copy as in the old days" — (as Flaubert
concludes his "book about nothing," Bouvard and Pecuchetl.
But if it is already conventionally operative that we distinguish
the genre of the poem from the philosophical dispute on the basis
of genre (and not because one genre copies), why take the next
step and propose a need for "truth" as the distinguishing "basis?"
Will the genre be defiled because we have no epistemological
foundation for elevating it to the top of the heap? Danto seems to
think so; and it leads him to some very paradoxical positions
regarding metaphor and philosophy's "escape" from it. "One mark
of metaphors is their ineliminability, ... But in philosophical as in
scientific writing, what looks like a metaphor in the beginning
ends as a fact, and it may be eliminated in favor of a technical
term, as Locke begins with the natural light — with "the candle
within us" — and ends with the technical term intuition. So what
appear to be metaphors, what have been taken by
deconstructionists to be metaphors, belong to philosophy as
science, rather than to philosophy as literature." But precisely
what is it that produced this sudden transition from metaphorical
device to ontological fact? What is it that makes an intuition less
metaphorical than a candle? What Derrida, Hesse and Kuhn have
pointed out is that science is indeed highly literary, highly
metaphorical. If, then, science is a better "basis" for philosophy or
a better alliance than literature, it is not because it's being
"technical" is a better ontological credential but because it
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proposes certain interests and textual conventions that suit
Danto's generic preferences. And Danto stands by these generic
refrains and the rhetoric of "fact" because viewing philosophy as
persuasive literature would simply be "a consolation prize for
failing to be true."32 But it can only be a consolation prize if the
truth is "on hand" for comparison; and this "truth" Danto doesn't
produce. Nor does he ever say what sort of procedure will reveal
it. He offers an ontological-sounding distinction which collapses
into generic rhetoric due to the lack of methodological and
epistemological content that would be required to back it up. In
effect, Danto won't be satisfied until he gets it both ways:
metaphors are "ineliminable" and they "may be eliminated in
favor of a technical term" or a "fact;" philosophy is scientific and
literary; and its texts are "representations of a kind of reality
[and] things to be read."33 He wants his cake and to eat it too.
6.7 A POST-MODERN GENRE WITHOUT TRUTH:
It has been said that one of the points of the modernists was to
treat what a community had considered as "natural" and
inviolable (aesthetic) "givens" (e.g., realism, tonality) as alterable
genres and practices. The attempt to break down what had been
considered to be the inherent constitution of these genres can be
seen, (Jameson writes), as a "strategic feature of what must be
called the ideology of modernism."34 In other words, a genre
32 Ibid., p. 82.
33 Ibid., p. 83.
34 Fredric Jameson, "Magical Narratives: Romance as Genre," New Lit. Hist..
7, 1975:135.
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doesn't fix anything. It is a strategic and pragmatic device for
interpreting, placing and criticizing cultural products. But in
Danto's case, having the "truth" seems to be the final complement
paid to the successful illusion {passim Gombrich) that a
philosophical genre has suddenly become a pure representation,
that the type of text being written has suddenly been transfigured
into a token of truth. Danto is attempting, on the basis of
artworlds which don't have fixed genres, to fix philosophy's. As
"genre" has become, even more tellingly for the post-modernist, a
pragmatic metaphor and device for ordering and re-ordering art,
it has remained, for Danto the philosopher, an eliminable
metaphor for epistemological and ontological truth-telling.
To talk about genre in a post-modern sense (Recall Jencks, Stirling
and Eco.) is no longer to aim at the elimination of ambiguity or
metaphor but precisely at its ineliminability. And this is what
(and the way) the rhetorician and the pragmatist have been
arguing (writing) all along. To refer to Vaihinger again, "what we
call truth, namely a conceptual world coinciding with the external
world, is merely the most expedient error-,"3 5 or (passim
Gombrich) the most expedient illusion So, discussing philosophy
as a genre or as genres is a way of saying that our comparisons
between this "truth" and that "truth" are ways of moving between
accounts, between texts. And reference to genre and style further
33 Vaihinger, op. cit., p. 108; and cited by A. Rosmarin, The Power of Genre.
1985:20. Rosmarin refers to Vaihinger in the context of arguing for a
pragmatic (rather than analytic) notion of genre for literary studies. But
what she says applies equally well to philosophy. Cf. especially her
introduction and chapter 1. "Defining a Theory of Genre."
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encourages the discussion of that text in ways which link it
explicitly with the strategies of other texts', and it discourages
making that "class" of texts being discussed so grand and
foundational as to facilitate making the desired "error" too
expedient. The shift to genre is not, firstly, an attempt to read a
philosophical text as a novel. But if this self-conscious generic
"mistake" is made, it is made for a critical purpose, as an edifying
instruction in how else one can read such a text when doing so in
terms of its coincidence with an external truth is no longer an
option. What the literary critic argues is that reading a text in
terms of a genre (in terms of its "belonging," as Fish has written, p.
139) is one of the enabling conditions of reading in the first
place;36 and mixing genres (as Rorty has written) is a way to read
when the single-genre reading (for truth) is tired and broken
down.37 Post-modern works (both products and theory together),
like Derrida and Rorty in philosophy, have unraveled the one-
edifice hope. Their very eclectic mixing makes the rhetoricity and
generic pluralism of their work highly visible rather than hidden.
And this mixing highlights the constitutive power of the activity
3 6 Derrida, in "The Law of Genre," writes that there is always genre and
that there is no genreless text, but that "such participation never amounts
to belonging" in- any complete and deductive sense. That is, there will
always be new details and, hence, belonging will not be reductively total.
Derrida puts the point, of course, in its most parodoxically metaphysical
formulation: different texts always repeat, and to repeat is always to differ.
This is another rhetorical chiasmus made to look deeply metaphysical. I
think it is enough to say that the notion of genre has an hermeneutical and
pragmatic status and not an epistemologically foundational status.
37 Although, Rorty, 1984b, locates, for his purposes, the generic mixing
between "modern" philosophy and literature not with modernist ideology
but primarily as a constructive bi-product of romanticism. And one could
certainly argue, as Nietzschean deconstructionists omit to, that this mixing
of genre and aestheticizing of philosophy is already raised to an issue in
the Schillerian and Coleridgean receptions of Kant, and not an
unprecedented explosion with Nietzsche.
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of choosing a schema; by choosing schemas and (as the rhetorician
does) putting them together, the act of choosing relative to specific
purposes is forgrounded. This is at one and the same time an
aesthetic model and a pragmatic model: We construct in the
context of (non-foundational) genres for specific purposes; and
these genres (as Dewey insisted) have histories, and historical
genres are transformable. Hence, the evaluative (even
knowledge-aiding) compliments we pay to them are attributions
of how well (or badly) these genres are fulfilling those purposes,
doing their thing. What the post-modernist has added, by
borrowing and mixing historically displaced genres and styles, is
that it is a worthwhile goal to show their metaphoricity, their
symbolic usefulness; and by this very use (or usure) the point is
being made that genres have no intrinsic nature or structure; that
they are definable only in the pragmatic and provisional terms of
when, where, why and how they are being used.
To put Derrida's point (note 36) pragmatically, genre can be a
general and/or a particular, a type and/or a token. In other
words, it has no ontologically predetermined location or function.
It is the provisional construction of "classes" and relationships for
pragmatic/critical purposes; that is, it is yoked to a purpose not an
epistemology. The energy involved in the post-modernist view of
itself as genre goes not -- as Derrida implies it must -- into
further and unavoidable concealment of itself but, rather, into
wearing itself unashamedly on its sleeve. A genre can, of course,
be forgotton, die or just become impotent to rouse any interest or
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persuade of any point. But this is due not to its having been
concealed but to its having lost its usefulness. As Jameson notes
with a certain amount of Marxist momentousness, the "final
moment of the generic operation, in which the working categories
of genre are themselves historically deconstructed and
abandoned, suggests a final axiom, according to which all generic
categories, even the most time-hallowed and traditional, are
ultimately to be understood (or "estranged") as mere ad hoc,
experimental constructs, devised for a specific textual occasion
and abandoned like so much scaffolding when the analysis has
done its work."38 Jameson's "final axiom" was the starting point of
the rhetorician, and is the starting point of the pragmatic post¬
modern. Both Dewey and Rorty have treated the genre of
philosophy as a critical invention, not anchored in "truth," in a
theory of knowledge, or in transcendentally "perennial problems"
(passim Nagel's time honored Mortal Questions), but in terms of its
power to offer vocabularies which are persuasive. And if a
vocabulary is operative it has no reason to be defensively
obsessed with its generic identity (passim Danto). On the
contrary, one of the post-modern criteria of a successful work has
to do with its power to distress ready made classifications. And
this, I wish to propose, is one of Rorty's contributions to
"philosophy."
38 Jameson, "Magical narratives: On the Dialectical Use of Genre Criticism,"
in The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. 1981:145.
For a literary-historical view and theory of how genres grow, die and
revive themselves for re-use, cf. A. Fowler, Kinds of Literature: An
Introduction to the Theory of Genres and Modes. 1982.
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Rorty's ability casually to expand the tension and relationship
between clarity and artifice, between argument, historical
pastiche and irony, is basic to his work's ability to persuade, to
persuade us that what has been undermined is "self-foundation"
not "self-assertion."39 In other words, he borrows and brings
together rhetorical ploys from the enlightenment, Romanticism,
pragmatism, from wherever, as genres which could only be
considered inherently incompatible on the basis of a
foundationalist theory. This post-modern sense of accommodation
and plurality is part of what empowers Rorty's rhetoric to irritate
the defender of the philosophical genre: His (epistemological)
nonchalance stimulates the desire to find worrying -- (e.g., the
loss of objectivism) — what he persists in not worrying about; his
self-avowed provincialism stimulates the reproach that this must
somehow not be enough. By substituting relative practices for
legitimizing foundations, he stimulates rebuke all the more
rhetorical for its inability to supply what we "can't do without" —
grounds. In effect, his making due with the "edificational" (which
Danto alludes to as "unedifying violations") draws out the
primarily rhetorical vigor of the otherwise rigorous truth-seeker.
By straining the one-genre view, by pushing the model to its own
self-cancellation, Rorty makes the point that, like all pragmatic
inventions, a genre invites its own use and exhaustion or
alteration when a new purpose, context or interest comes along
(and the post-modern is one such context). The aggravation is
3 9 This distinction is itself a pastiched summary of Baconian
(enlightenment)s and Romantic rhetoric which relativizes "self-
foundation" (Descartes) but encourages "self-assertion." The terms are
borrowed from Hans Blumenberg's, The Legitimation of Modernity. 1982.
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stimulated by how easily he incriminates himself as simply a
social "kibitzer" with limited use. In effect, this teasing is
precisely Rorty's most powerful rhetorical ploy, an artifice to
persuade us of the point that philosophy is a persuasive artifice
and/or often a failed, redundant and self-absorbed genre or
artifice. At the same time, his aesthetic is constructive, in the
sense that he succeeds as a revisionist to the extent that the
expendability of certain ways of writing is admitted, his own
included. Rorty, like William, is "matching his wit," not matching
the world to his epistemology.
Danto writes a different sort of drama, and its didacticism is of a
different tenor: He recounts the "tragedy" {op. cit., p. 80) of
someone who is not able to distinguish between literature and the
world; he testifies to the "nihilism" of deconstructionists against
which the search for truth must be sustained by default. In
effect, his own rhetoric (self-assertion) undermines his intent (the
"appeal" to truth). His desire for truth is not expressed in terms of
"its" propositions; and the reader does not himself, thereby, arrive
at the long-awaited reward: "truth in all possible worlds." He
produces a rhetorical envelope with nothing inside. And he must
choose a rhetorical strategy, for what he would demonstrate he
hasn't got on display. Hence, Danto dramatizes his own dilemma
like the valient Cleon (of Browning's dramatic monologue), who
wants us to arrive at a belief which his own rhetoric doesn't
justify or embody: He doesn't practice what he preaches. Hence,
it is read ironically, that is, it is read in a literary and rhetorical
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way because of this very tension or gap. And this seems a very
appropriate way to read Danto, in a way which admits these two
strains Danto is under. This rather dialectical tension between
Danto's rhetoric and his pleas that philosophy be something
beyond rhetoric encourages one's awareness of the generic
proximity of the literary and the philosophical. Danto wants
philosophy to have a dualistic allegiance, to the production of a
readable text for an audience, and to the production of a boundary
between philosophy and textuality. Whereas the post-moderns
exploit the breakdown of such a boundary as one of the enabling
conditions of its revision.
But this clash of rhetorics does share a certain sort of turf: the
form of the essay. Danto, in good post-modernist fashion,
ironically highlights the benefits of the essay as a stylistic choice:
For it is short enough to justify its rhetorical punchiness, and not
long enough to demand results from the implied method of truth-
finding. In effect, the essay widens the discrepency between how
he would like to be seen and how he is read. The irony is in the
grandiose claim for the strivings of philosophy, inside a form (the
essay) which could never be held responsible for building the
desired edifice. The usefulness of the essay is its ability to
frustrate, by the very artifice required to write a good one, the
idea that there are building blocks for philosophical writing which
are not themselves already part of the artifice and craftiness of
writing.
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Rorty is, of course, a self-confessed essayist in the pragmatic and
pre-modernist tradition of Emerson and James. But the self-
understanding of the pragmatic essayist has, again, important
theoretical and practical links with the Nietzschean and modernist
appeals to the essay as a form of philosophical/literary
deconstruction and critique. And this alliance has been appealed
to by contemporary literary theory as an important mode which
links Wilde and Lukacs, Emerson, Nietzsche and Adorno, the
modern and the post-modern: i.e., the essay foregrounds its own
art, and its own generic limitations.40 That is, the essay is a sort
of shorthand which emphasizes its critical power by its smallness,
its unwillingness to produce a. replica of the things (or systems) it
criticizes. Emerson is appealed to in this regard by Nietzsche as
well as the contemporary literary theorist Harold Bloom. And the
rhetorical link between them is Emerson's "mastery of prose"
(Nietzsche), his choice of eloquence and self-relativizing
40 Edward Said, in "The Text, The World, The Critic," appeals to both Wilde
and Lukacs as writers, from different ideological circumstances, who argue
that the critical essay is not secondary to or parasitic upon the product it
treats. On the contrary, the critical essay, writes Wilde, "treats the work of
art as a starting point for a new creation." ("The Artist as Critic, p. 367).
Lukacs has put it more cautiously, that "the essayist is a pure instance of the
precursor" [(Der Essayist) ist der reine Typus des Vorlaufers] ("Die Seele und
die Formen. p. 29). Cf. Said, op. cit., p. 187.
281
rhetoricity over absolutes and grounds.41 The essay is, in this
context, less a device for professional advancement and the
acquisition of tenure than a theoretical and practical criticism of
the production of the "grand account." In other words, its critical
power is it brevity, its ability to escape the issue of matching itself
with fidelity to the details of the "fully extended system." It is a
pragmatic option to omit rather than represent aspects of a
tradition or a work which aren't going to be made use of. The
essay has functioned in both the continental and pragmatic
traditions to criticize the canon-encrusted rights of passage
associated with representationalist exegesis.
The following six points (very) briefly summarize some of the
connections between the modernist (Adorno), pragmatist and
post-modern uses of the essay: 1. The essay emphasizes its
fragmentary nature, its inability to produce (which is, therefore, a
critique of) "the total viewpoint." ( But Adorno, unlike Emerson
and Rorty, often exacerbates the production of fragments into an
41 Emerson appears in Nietzsche's aphorism 92 in The Gav Science and 13
in Twilight of the Idols. And on the writing of Emerson, Bloom asserts with
his usual inhibition: "The theoreticians of deconstruction in effect say, "In
the beginning was the trope," rather than "In the beginning was the
troper." This follows Niezsche, but . . . Emerson ... as usual said both.
Deconstructing Emerson is a course impossible, since no discourse ever has
been so overtly aware of its own status as rhetoricity." (Cf. Bloom, Wallace
Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate. 1977:12.) And on the deconstruction of
the absoluteness of the Kantian problematic (of how to theorize the
distinction between the "objective" and the "subjective"), Cavell too appeals
to Emerson's rhetorical strategy: "My claim is that Emerson is out to destroy
the ground on which such a problem takes itself seriously, I mean
interprets itself as a metaphysical fixture . . . This no doubt implies that we
do not have a universe as it is in itself. But this implication is nothing: we
do not have selves in themselves either. The universe is what constantly
and obediently answers to our conceptions. It is what can be all the ways
we know it to be, which is to say, all the ways we can be." (Cavell, 1982:264.)
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elitist and ideological device for the defensive subject expressing
his [Adorno's] own cognitive/aesthetic Utopia.)42 2. It seems
especially suitable for periods when paradigms are unsettled,
understanding is partial and the reconstitution of the traditional
argumentative "Aufbau" appears unmanageable. 3. The essay
cannot promise too much; and it, therefore, tolerates a high degree
of incompleteness. It hasn't time to propose a new "conceptual
key" or metadiscourse which would require a more laborious
initiation cite. 4. It presents, then, rather than first principles or
foundational atoms, "partisan" (Rorty) "complexes" (Adorno) which
are somewhere between logically sequential arguments and
allegorical fairytales for a critical purpose. 5. By avoiding
reproducing what it examines, it can foster conditions under
which "the object" can be viewed differently. 6. By abjuring
epistemological beginnings and/or argumentative exhaustiveness,
it starts in the middle (Recall Fish, p. 151.) where intrusions are
most pointed and less superfluously long winded and/or given to
the sort of epistemological dispute which seeks to avoid the social
conflicts arising in this "middle."43
Although irony is a concept shared by the modernist and post¬
modernist essay, the post-modern's irony is less crisis-ridden and
melajcholich. (It is this good humor which Nietzsche appreciated
about Emerson and which Adorno did not appreciate about
42 Cf. Adorno's "Der Essay als Form," 1958.
43 For a thorough treatment of Adorno's theory of the essay and its relation
to Nietzsche and Lukacs, cf. Gillian Rose, The Melancholy Science: An
Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W, Adorno. 1978.
283
Nietzsche's critique of enlightenment reason.)44 For Rorty, what
presents the conditions of knowledge so well as the irony of
communities out looking to transcend themselves? It (irony)
exploits the curious relations between "finding" truths and making
texts, between the different contexts and genres of literature,
science, history, politics and philosophy appealed to when carving
out their disciplinary space, when writing within relations which
are unstable, involving conflicts, infighting and competitions
which impinge on (and help produce) the variety of our
communications. Irony self-consciously conveys epistemological
limitation; it recognizes the interplay between truths and the
social motivations which negotiate their institutional courses.
Irony foregrounds rhetorical devices which thereby restrict the
author himself from assuming definitive linguistic and conceptual
authority over the domain in question. It problematizes the
language dominant in a discourse by the juxtapositions and
conflicts it enjoins.
Of course the modalities of irony are many and diffuse:
juxtaposition of words, of narrative voices, of genres themselves.
For Rorty, one method is rubbing up caricatures of time-honored
systems against pithy essays, of treating the system's failure as a
"comfort" and the traditional comforts sought in a foundationalist's
theory of knowledge as unsupplied and contingent on other more
44 in other words, Adorno's and Horkheimer's critique in Dialectic of
Enlightenment recalls Nietzsche's in the context of a very humorless book.
Whereas, Adorno's sense of irony comes dcross very strongly in his more
aphoristic and essayistic work, Minima Moralia. But, again, it is an anxiety-
ridden and modernist irony which Adorno makes most effective.
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precarious social circumstances. His irony is couched not in terms
of the stylistic contrasts between narrative speakers, as in Plato's,
Kierkegaard's and Hume's dialogues; it is produced by casually
rubbing genres together: talking philosophy as literature, talking
straight and talking satire, using the modality of argument and
couching it in a deflationary "form of conversation." Those critics
who constantly and blandly chant "We surely need more than
conversation" mean much less by the word than Rorty, who allows
all the strategies of philosophy to wander into a democratized
form of conversation, making their appearance not as truth but as
rhetoric. Rorty's oxymoronic "post-Philosophical philosopher" is a
social "kibitzer" (an oral rather than a textual metaphorical
intruder) who knows that "representation" is no more important
or effective than his oral ability to "gossip convincingly and
appropriately," to handle committee meetings, to be brief, public
and useful (like the essay).
So, to view the genre of the philosophical essay as something
which doesn't outrun its aesthetic in order to represent the truth
is to say that, whatever language and/or style is used to do the
"representing," it will function in such a way only insofar as the
language games which got the genre off the ground have become
thoroughly conventional and assimilated. As Northrop Frye writes
in Anatomy of Criticism: "An original painter knows . . . that when
the public demands likeness to an object, it generally wants . . .
likeness to the pictorial conventions it is familiar with."45 And
45 Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essavs. 1957:132.
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this is Rorty's point too: It is the familiar which establishes the
"given;" verisimilitude is achieved (contra Danto) in terms of a
text's correspondence to generic conventions. Choosing to couch
philosophical disputes and changes in idiom in relativistically
aesthetic and literary terms rather than "scientific" terms of
approaching "truth," is to say that once some dissenter is driven
up against a wall of argument (or apologetics) for the truth, "the
wall against which he is driven will come to be seen as just one
more vocabulary, one more way of describing things. The wall
then turns out to be a painted backdrop, one more work of man,
one more bit of cultural stage-setting."46 And it is this which the
post-modernists celebrate. They are no longer longing for the
literal elimination of metaphor: They accept and exploit the
topological or symbolic nature of their constructs; and they take
pleasure in the versatility this engenders, in the possibility of
continuously reconstituting our traditions for present purposes.
While the failure of philosophy to "see" the truth rather than its
own metaphorics of vision is, to Rorty an instructive irony, it is, to
46 Rorty, "The Contingency of Community," 1986. As has already been said,
that Danto the aesthetician has argued so persuasively against imitational
theories of art, it is all the more curious that his essayistic apology for the
genre of philosophy would smack of the imitational hope that there is
something "outside" (e.g., the necessary and true) for philosophical
constructions to "approach." This is not to say that there is no "intellectual
progress" to be got from the "literalization of selected metaphors" (Rorty,
Ibid.) which become "technical facts" (Danto, cf. p. 261); it is to say (if I
follow Rorty here) that progress for a community or a genre is a question
of criticizing old words and perhaps using new words, but that the appeal to
notions like "truth," "argument," "foundation" and "reference" are badly
suited and counterproductive notions for describing the transition, or
change, or relation between the old, the critical and/or the new, between
the metaphor, the fact, and its eventual deconstruction back into a
polyvocal metaphor.
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Danto, the stimulus to keep the quest, the impossible dream, alive
and kicking. And in this sense, Rorty's democratic apologetics for
a pragmatic rhetoricity "is more like returning to a house
(Isocrates' and James') than like propping it up or placing
barricades around it."47 The post-modernist aesthetic critique of
Danto-like philosophizing is, like James' of copying (p. 114, n. 44)
and Gombrich's of literal representation, that increasing the power
of a genre is accomplished not by creating and copying univocal
facts with increased fastidiousness, for all possible worlds; it is
accomplished by transfiguring, suggesting and altering with
increasing persuasiveness, subtlety, plurality and concreteness.
When the sensational conflict between phenomena and noumena,
between those who embrace the contingent and those who chase
eternity, between those who write hymns, or parodies, or in some
other genre, is not handled as a dispute between "nihilists" and
"truth-seekers," then it might be argued that it is precisely this
generic flexibility which has been the "basis" of philosophy's (or
philosophies') persuasive staying power; and that its ability to try
new partners, like literary theory, is one more aid in this effort.
So, one can summarize the consequences of a post-modern reading
(or "deconstruction") of Danto's rhetoric with the following four
points: 1. Danto is persuasive precisely when his prose does not
conform perfectly to his prescriptions, when he reiterates genric
rhetoric without supplying the univocal "facts" which would
vindicate his hopes. 2. Thereby, his own activity helps
47 Rorty, Ibid.
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undermine the illusion of being able to distinguish in a stabilized
and principled way between artifice and truth. 3. One might,
then, add that the tropological and affective power Danto wishes
the philosophical text to have (for reasons of communicating well
with readers) is always already part of its ability to communicate
at all, and not a stylistic afterthought, or a dubious and
threatening form of equivocation to be controlled with a theory of
truth. 4. It is this conclusion to Danto's apologetics (that the
genre of philosophy, or any genre for that matter, has no
"intrinsic" dynamic or constitution) which is the premise of the
post-modern use of genre (Recall Copland.): Genres are
conventional and pragmatic habits which become increasingly
useful and communicative when treated non-hierarchically and
pluralistically, when offering a larger repertoire of speakers in the
context of a single work. Genres are then treated (as I think Rorty
treats them) as provisional, ad hoc laminations of styles and
interests, rising and falling in specific circumstances.
A post-modern aesthetic operates as an acceptance of Einstein's
relativization of time and the deconstruction of linear,
progressivist and polemically structured modernism. Its products
make several times and styles contemporaneous, specific
constellations brought together for specific moments and places.
Its reunions with tradition are utilitarian, not determinatively
monolithic or linear (or "ruptured"). Post-modern products, and
their appeal to ironic relationships, are able (again, like Rorty in
philosophy) to generate more sympathy with our failures (and the
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provisionally of our rhetorical alliances) because they are not
"deep." Rorty casts our philosophical failures as a comedy of
manners, as sets of family quarrels, as the continuous revision
(not of the grounds of knowledge, but) of practice and discourses
for evaluative and pragmatic reasons. The irony is enhanced by
his willingness to define himself fully in terms of textual and
rhetorical traditions and practices which are still useful (perhaps
even more useful) when deprived of their foundations.48 What
aligns the pragmatist not just with traditional liberalism but also
with the post-modern is the view that when they are criticized, it
is not because someone has compared them to the truth, but
because they have failed to match up to pre-established ideologies
and conventions of genre. But in attempting to succeed, the post¬
modern, too, is a reworking of classical rhetoric, the bringing
together of styles and their conflicts without an underlying
epistemological polemic to keep them separated and prevent their
cohabitation for some purpose. They acknowledge, like Gorgias,
that their symbols are brought together as self-acknowledged and
pragmatic tropes.
48 Because Rorty aligns himself with pre-socratic rhetoric, Baconian
pragmatics of "reason" and lS'^-century liberal politics, he takes issue
with the modernist all-or-nothing critique of tradition, and especially with
the Horkheimer/Adorno critique of enlightenment reason: "Horkheimer
and Adorno assumed that the terms in which those who begin a historical
development describe their enterprise are the terms which describe it
correctly, and then inferred that a repudiation of that terminology
deprives the results of the development of a right to exist." Rorty, "The
Contingency of Community," Ibid...
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6.8 IN-CONCLUSIVE: CAUGHT IN THE ART OF PHILOSOPHIZING:
In the language of Philosophy Gorgias had seen persuasive
powers, the not entirely pragmatic Peirce had seen icons, Eco a
labyrinth of signs, Dewey social artifacts, Derrida erased
metaphors, Foucault power discourses, and Rorty rhetorical
narratives; thereby making Philosophy a semiotic system of
figures through which it has constructed a means of access to its
world (e.g., "objects") and reflexively to itself (the "subject"), with
a "network of interpretants" holding it all together. The
pragmatist's rather nonchalant after-thought is that some of our
most basic figures (the onto-epistemologically representative
itself) are used up, that we still have an old effigy which
occasionally lingers on, dislocated from its cultural sources
(Graeco-Christian), having had long enough to "demonstrate" its
picture of itself and the picture's use.
The pragmatist (like Nietzsche) sees the analogy between
language (sign) and something other than itself (the signified) as
being, when given content, an elliptical summary of social
interests, mediating the relation of sign and signified, of metaphor
and its literal uses. Recall Nietzsche from p. 10, n. 5:
"What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors,
metonymies, anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human
relations which became poetically and rhetorically
intensified, metamorphosed, adorned, and after long usage,
seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding; truths are
illusions of which one had forgotten that they are illusions;
worn out metaphors which have become powerless to affect
the senses (die abgeniitzt und sinnlich kraftlos geworden
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sind), coins which have their obverse (Bild) effaced and now
are no longer of account as coins but merely as metal."
The difference between the contemporary Nietzschean and
pragmatic arts of philosophizing is that continental criticism (e.g.,
of Foucault) is itself dominated by the negative social metaphorics
of domination, power, misuse, and suppression. The post-modern
pragmatist is less high-pitched, less covertly Romantic, and more
positively ambivalent. If what we do is construct figures and
images to get things done, make things true, and form big pictures
anyway, then there is no given that says it cannot on occasion be
done well and for good social reasons, done artfully as well as
powerfully. The sociable pragmatist sees philosophical imagery
functioning not only to exclude and efface but also to include and
enhance, not only to recapulate a "dominant metaphorics" but to
change them or drop them depending on the occasion. Truth is
not only a social act of excluding the "false" and "irrational," an
effort of the "civilized" to use the language of "Truth" and "Reason"
to protect themselves from (and marginalize) the "mad," to make
discourse synonomous with repression (Foucault's analysis).49
There is also a potentially positive interplay between the
constructed figure, the rhetorics of truths and goodness, and our
socio-personal experience. (This is the constructive side of
Dewey's theory of aesthetic experience.) If, while producing
philosophical figures (e.g., of "rationality"), fact and value talk are
49 Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of
Reason. trans. R. Howard, (based on the pocket edition), 1965. Foucault, of
course, amended this one sidedness (that all is ill), not with the ambivalent
glee of Nietzsche, but with a sense that there is positive power and healthly
resistance. Cf., Power/Knowledge, (ed.) C. Gordon, 1980.
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integrated, part of a fluid social exchange, inverting each other
without either having final autonomous, hierarchical priority, then
the critical exercise is not merely deconstructive but
reconstructive too. (After all we need a straight man for our
(phallo-critical) ridicule [passim Derrida]). If philosophy is not to
be centered universally around an erased metaphorics of
knowledge (epistemology), governed by the brute and simple
(imagery of "fact"), then it must be pursued artfully within
different particular networks of cultural work where figures and
narratives are constructed to do certain (particular) jobs, and
hopefully to do them well.
Philosophy is a medium through which things get produced. And
the pragmatist would mean by the socio-artistic metaphor of
"production" that philosophy is positively caught in the art of
abetting and/or criticizing these narrative systems in terms of the
social experience out of which they accrue and also to the
edification of which they can contribute. (This is the evaluative/
educative thrust of Dewey's aesthetic (reminiscent of Schiller),50
and the matrix within which he assessed such things as the more
"ideally" intended imagery of humanist ethics and political
metaphysics.
But whatever the literary art or genre, the pragmatist critic wants
to be able to drop different sorts of names, and do different sorts
of criticism, hoping it is possible to "read" different artifacts and
50 Cf., F. Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man. Wilkinson &
Willoughby (eds., transl., Intro., Commentary, & Glossary of terms), 1982.
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texts being produced in different places in contemporary culture,
(which neither start from nor work toward the "Universal" but
from and toward the rhetorical and pluralistic). He sees his
thematic taken up after Dewey by a motley of allies; in e.g., the
philosophy of science (when they drop any ahistorical, objectivist
pretence and recall that they are talking with the rest of culture
and its conflicts ~ as do Feyerabend and Kuhn). He has allies too
in anthropology, when the totalizing hope of "finding" the
structural discourse of either the "inner" universal mind (Levi-
Strauss) or culture's hidden universal "objects," e.g., "class" and
"contradiction" (Godelier), is dropped, and when decentralized and
critical "research strategies" and "narrative strategies" are taken
up instead (M. Harris, C. Geertz, J. Clifford and G. E. Marcus).51 He
wants to converse also with Hermeneuticists when their favorite
texts (e.g., Gadamer's Aristotle) do not make it a virtue to
transcend all over again (cf., Margolis).52 And he has friends
doing philosophical aesthetics and literary criticism when their
sometimes self-deprecating bow before honored texts and
"eternal" problems becomes an attempt to use interpretative
constructs to enhance and expand text reading and making (e.g.,
Fish, Culler). What James called "pluralism" and Dewey called "art
and aesthetic experience," and what both summarized as
"pragmatism," is a dis-position to draw together similar and
51 Cf., especially M. Harris, op. cit., and Clifford and Marcus (eds.) Writing
Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. 1984, for the ways in
which some anthropologists have used deconstruction, contemporary
literary theory and questions of a rhetorical cast to criticize and reorient
their discipline's epistemological narratives.
52 Cf., J. Margolis' "Pragmatism Without Foundations", Amer, Phil,
Quarterly, Jan. 1984, on the lingering transcendental in "Hermeneutic
culture critics" like Gadamer, Habermas and Apel.
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